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Summary 
Con il presente elaborato si vuole sostenere tesi per cui l’inserimento di una serie di principi 
di diritto pubblico regionale può condurre ad una riforma interna (sistemica) del regime degli 
investimenti internazionali, al fine di legittimare l’autorità esercitata nello spazio giuridico globale 
dai tribunali degli investimenti in Sud America. Al fine di sviluppare tali principi, è necessario 
collocarli all’interno di un discorso giuridico regionale.  Questa tesi è presentata in primo luogo 
attraverso una comprensione ad ampio spettro del concetto di legittimità nel diritto internazionale 
in generale, e nell’ambito del diritto degli investimenti internazionali in particolare; si sostiene che 
la legittimità operi come un concetto che descrive la spinta a conformarsi alla norma giuridica, ma 
che essa possa anche agire come un velo sotto il quale si cela la lotta tra le diverse autorità che 
popolano lo spazio giuridico globale. In secondo luogo, si scompone il regime degli investimenti 
internazionali in due dimensioni. La prima, quella normativa, facendo riferimento alla rete di 
accordi di investimento internazionali; la seconda, quella transnazionale, analizzando la 
giurisprudenza arbitrale che ha de facto plasmato la disciplina a livello globale. In terzo luogo, il 
lavoro propone un quadro generale per lo sviluppo dei principi in materia di investimenti 
internazionali nel contesto sud americano. Si sostiene in particolare che la regione debba 
ridisegnare il proprio approccio al tema, a partire da un discorso giuridico basato su tre gruppi di 
principi, al fine di consolidare la legittimazione dell’autorità esercitata dagli attori transnazionali. 
Parole chiave: legittimità, pluralismo globale, diritto degli investimenti internazionali, 
America del Sud, America Latina. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Abstract  
The central argument expressed here is that it is possible to internally (systemically) reform 
the international investment regime and legitimize the authority exercised in the global legal space 
by investment adjudicators in South America, through the insertion of a set of regional public law 
principles and encouraging the development of these principles through regional legal discourse. 
This argument is presented first with a general understanding of legitimacy in international law. 
Then it takes on the task of developing a concept of legitimacy for international investment law, 
arguing that legitimacy operates as a concept which describes the pull of self-compliance of a legal 
order, but can also act as a veil that covers up the struggles of various authorities in the global legal 
space. The argument further decomposes the international investment regime into two dimensions. 
The first, the normative dimension, refers to the network of International Investment Agreements, 
while the second, the transnational dimension, involves the study of that fragment of global society 
that has shaped the discipline by building arbitral jurisprudence. Finally, the current work develops 
a basic framework for the construction of South American principles for investment. It will be 
argued that the region must reshape its approach to some extent, by using a legal discourse based 
on three clusters of principles for the legitimation of authority. 
Keywords: Legitimacy, global pluralism, international investment law, South America, 
Latin America.  
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1. Introduction: Why Legitimacy Matters In International Investment Law 
 
1.1 Motivation, Problem and Research Questions 
October 6, 2012 was a day that shocked Ecuadorian society. An international 
arbitral tribunal ordered the South American country to pay nearly 1.77 billion US 
Dollars to the multinational oil company ‘Occidental’1 at the end of a very 
controversial investment dispute that lasted six years. The order was rejected by the 
Ecuadorian government and various social groups, not only because the idea of 
paying an indemnification to a foreign oil company in South America was not 
popular per se, but also because the amount was equivalent to the Ecuadorian health 
care or education budgets of that year. It was believed that payment would alter the 
national budget plan in subsequent years. The situation forced Ecuador to initiate 
an annulment proceeding to set aside the award under the ICSID rules, a process 
that came to an end on 2nd November, 2015, when an Ad-Hoc Annulment 
Committee partially annulled the award and reduced the amount due to $ 1,06 
billion USD, but only due to an error in the calculation of damages rather than for 
substantive2 reasons. 
This case drew attention from outside Ecuador as well because it involved 
one of the largest amounts of money ever granted to any investor in the recorded 
history of investment arbitration3, and one of the largest payments ever ordered by 
an international adjudicator. It sparked a public debate in which critical voices arose 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The 
Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No ARB/06/11), 2012). 
2 The partial annulment decision was taken on the grounds that the Tribunal assumed jurisdiction 
with regard to the investment now beneficially owned by other investors. 
3 This amount would later be greatly surpassed by a set of awards comprised in the Yukos v Russia 
awards in 2014 which totalled more than 50 billion USD. However, this series of awards was set 
aside [or ‘overturned’?] by a district court in The Hague, Netherlands, and continued to be litigated 
within the domestic system of this country. For a reference regarding the amounts of money granted 
to investors in investment arbitration by the time the award was issued see UNCTAD United Nations 
Conference On Trade And Development, "IIA 2013, Issue Note No 3: Reform of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap", 2013, 1. 
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and questioned the legitimacy of the system as a whole4 and whether it made sense 
for Latin American countries to continue to participate in it. In this respect, the 
Occidental case was not only relevant to South America5, but also to other 
controversial cases around the world including the Philip Morris vs. Australia and 
Uruguay6 and the two Vattenfall cases against Germany.7 These disputes have 
drawn multidisciplinary attention, not only from lawyers, but also from political 
scientists and economic scholars interested in the field of international investment 
law8 and debates about its effectiveness and legitimacy9. 
 
 
 
 
4 For a critical view of the system see also: René Urueña, "You'd Better Listen: Notes on the 
Mainstreaming of Public Participation in Foreign Investment Arbitration", (2010) 16 Int. Law: 
Rev. Universidad de los Andes, Nicolás Perrone, "Los Tratados Bilaterales de Inversion y el 
Arbitraje Internacional: ¿En Dirección al Mejor Funcionamiento De Las Instituciones 
Domesticas?", (2012) 17 FORO - Universidad Andina Simón Bolivar. 
5 More recently, the 22 of August 22, 2016 The ICSID Arbitration Tribunal of Rusoro Mining 
Limited v The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/52016. Rusoro 
against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela awarded the Canadian Company damages plus pre- 
and post- award interest in excess of US$1.2 billion. See info available on the website of the 
company <http://www.rusoro.com/s/News_Releases.asp?ReportID=761079, accessed 24 August 
2016. 
6 The states of Uruguay and Australia decided to issue black packaging legislation with the aim of 
preventing their citizens from smoking. This originated separate investment arbitration processes by 
the Tobacco company Philip Morris, which argued that such legislation affected their principal asset, 
their trademarks. 
7 The Swedish company Vattenfall has initiated two separate arbitration proceedings against the 
state of Germany to ease environmental standards that were issued in 2009 and that were perceived 
to be contrary to the investment. The second Vattenfall in 2012 contests the decision of Germany to 
phase out its nuclear energy program, which was also seen as detrimental to investor rights. Both 
cases are confidential. (a) Vattenfall Ab and Others v Federal Republic of Germany, (ICSID Case 
No ABR/12/12 2009). (b) Formerly, Vattenfall Ab, Vattenfall Europe Ag, Vattenfall Europe 
Generation Ag & Co. Kg v The Federal Republic of Germany (ICSID Case No ARB/09/6). 
8 See UNCTAD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, "IIA 
2013, Issue Note  No 3: Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap" 
(2013). 
9 S. D. Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law through Inconsistent Decisions’, (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review. 
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In recent years, there have been two ways societies could respond to cases 
coming from the international investment law regime: either by leaving the regime 
or by transforming it. The first response, leaving the regime, consists in the 
restoration of an old conception of sovereignty in which the state is the sovereign 
entity that exercises an absolute and supreme authority over its territory. There are 
two legal strategies possible within this response . The first strategy is “unplugging” 
a country from the regime: denouncing all of the investment treaties that bind a state 
to that investment regime10. The second strategy is the use of internal public law, 
particularly in the constitutional sphere, to "protect" the country from interference 
by the investment regime or to prevent future governments in the same country 
from granting consent to arbitration of investment11. 
The attempt to revive the concept of absolute sovereignty, through either 
one of these two strategies, has a fundamental conceptual problem that can be 
described as a methodological boomerang for Latin American society. This is 
because restoring the supreme and exclusive authority of the State directly affects 
important features of other regional systems that depend on a conception of 
permeable authority that can co-exist with others at the global level, such as the 
Inter-American Human Rights System. As a result, the same states that initially 
tried to leave the investment regime12 have subsequently questioned the authority 
of the inter-American system. 
Additionally, International Investment Agreements have a complex system 
of provisions governing any unilateral termination which serves to defend the 
stability13 of the regime. Consequently, leaving the investment regime can not be 
 
 
 
10  In the case of the Latin American region, this was the path taken by Ecuador, Venezuela and 
Bolivia. 
11 See: art 422 (Constitución de la República del Ecuador) and art 366 (Constitución Política del 
Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia) 
12 Gonzalo Rodríguez Carpio, La Denuncia del Convenio CIADI  Efectos y Soluciones Jurídicas 
(Editorial Jurídica Venezolana 2014) 12-17. 
13 Two types of clauses in treaties: the periods of validity and survival of obligations. The clause 
validity period usually includes a time before which the treaty cannot be terminated unilaterally, i.e. 
if a state decides to denounce a treaty, a minimum number of years stipulated in the treaty itself must 
have already elapsed. The second important provision is the survival of obligations, which sets the 
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achieved as a single act but requires a slow and gradual process that can take up to 
20 years. 
Using domestic law as a means to leave the regime has not worked for states 
when the neighbors of that state do not follow the same path of disassociation . On 
the contrary, in such a scenario, the state that tries to leave the investment regime 
puts itself at a competitive disadvantage, since all states in the region are competing 
to attract flows of capital. 
The second response, one which can be utilized when there is greater 
consensus, is to reform the current investment regime without abolishing it. In this 
scenario, the international investment law is considered to enter an era of ‘re- 
orientation’14  in which there is no doubt about the need to reform the global 
investment regime but only about the method, content and extent of this reform 15. 
At the multilateral level, much of this kind of reform has taken place within 
the framework of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), where a new generation of investment treaties have been studied along 
with new core principles16 to offer states the ability to individually adopt a wide 
variety of options in their investment treaties17, as well as at the domestic level. 
 
 
 
 
time that a treaty continues to have effects on investments already established within a state. The 
terms of survival periods vary per treaty, ranging from 5 to 25 years 
14 UNCTAD, ‘Taking Stock of IIA Reform. March 2016’ (UNCTAD IIA Issues Note 2016), 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2016d1_en.pdf> accessed 3 March 2016. 
15  UNCTAD, ‘Taking Stock of IIA Reform. March 2016’ (UNCTAD IIA Issues Note 2016), 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2016d1_en.pdf> accessed 3 March 2016. 
16 "Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development", UNCTAD, 2015. 
17 UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, 2015 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf> accessed 25 March 2016, 
UNCTAD, ‘WIR 15 Reforming the International Investment Regime. An Action Menu. Chapter 
IV’ (UNCTAD Word Investment Report 2015) 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/wir2015ch4_en.pdf> accessed 25 March 2016. 
UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2015’ (UNCTAD Word Investment Report series 2010 – 
2015) <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf> accessed 24 March 2016. See 
further UNCTAD Investment, Enterprise and Development Commission hosted in Geneva, 
Switzerland which includes two Expert Meetings, one entitled ‘on the Transformation of the 
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This reform includes five broad paths: promoting alternative dispute resolution, 
tailoring the existing system through individual IIAs, limiting investor access to 
ISDS, introducing an appeals facility and creating a standing international 
investment court18. 
Furthermore, at the regional level there are an increasing number of dispute 
resolution bodies, with the dominant trend being the creation of permanent 
adjudication bodies. An example is the Investment Court System used for new 
treaties in the European Union since the Treaty of Lisbon had included exclusive 
competence in foreign direct investment as part of its common commercial policy19. 
Nowadays, only Canada (CETA agreement) and Vietnam have accepted the 
European proposal. The United States and Europe are currently negotiating the 
Transatlantic Partnership on Trade and Investment (TTIP by its acronym in 
English), which if ratified, will certainly have a global influence on methods of 
dispute resolution. 
Within the second response, that is, reforming the regime, either by 
following any of the paths drawn by UNCTAD or by creating multiple bilateral 
investment courts, still requires that the element of time be taken into consideration. 
Any reform of the regime will require a long period of time, since states have to 
wait either for a treaty to be renewed or for a massive renegotiation of treaties, in 
itself a major challenge for any developing country. 
The external scenarios of reaction to the international investment law regime 
indicate that, at least for the next few years, Latin American states will remain 
involved in arbitration processes arising from treaties signed during the 1990s, until 
new disputes, based on more normative ‘developing friendly’ treaties, become the 
rule. Therefore, we need to think about a third scenario that brings together the 
 
 
 
 
 
International Investment Agreement Regime: The Path Ahead’ from 25-27 February 2015, and the 
second ‘Taking Stock of IIA Reform’ from 16-17 March 2016. 
18 United Nations Conference On Trade And Development. 
19 Catharine Titi, "The European Union's Proposal for an International Investment Court: 
Significance, Innovations and Challenges Ahead" (2016) TDM, www.transnational-dispute- 
management.com. 
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various positions that demonstrate more concern for an internal transformation of 
the regime. 
New trends in the doctrine have emerged in this sense, creating a third 
scenario of reaction to the international investment regime, where there is either 
tacit or expressed concern about the quality and legitimacy20 of the system from an 
internal perspective and about developing jurisprudence specifically for the 
international investment regime. Within the scope of these aims, any intended 
change implies taking into account not only the normative dimensions of treaties, 
but also operating within the transnational community that shapes investment 
arbitration. 
In this scenario, South America is one of the regions that can help to better 
understand how legitimacy operates within the international investment law regime 
for two reasons. First, because the decisions enacted by arbitral tribunals have been 
a topic for public debate for several years, and these debates have gone beyond 
analysis by specialized practitioners and scholars, have crossed disciplinary 
boundaries and have even been included in people’s everyday conversation. In 
some countries, such as Ecuador and Bolivia, decisions made by arbitral tribunals 
have been debated by the constitutional assemblies of new constitutions. The 
second reason relates to the activity in various South American nations with respect 
to conflicts derived from arbitration proceedings under the current international 
investment regime. Of the more than 700 known investment cases around the world, 
more than 200 involve a Latin American State; 150 of which can be linked to South 
America. 
Therefore, discussing the legitimacy of the investment regime as a whole 
involves a precise discussion of the moral and sociological justification for an 
exercise of public authority by arbitrators and the capacity of substantive rules 
within the system to generate voluntary compliance with its implementation in 
Latin American societies. This is precisely one of the advantages offered by this 
conceptualization, since it is not necessary to wait for the normative dimension of 
the regime to be changed. 
 
 
 
20 Franck (n 9). 
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Finally, looking for a systemic internal transformation of the international 
investment regime from within, beyond the two scenarios described above (i.e. 
leaving the regime or transforming it from the outside), allows new questions to 
rise: How can international investment law achieve legitimacy? Should legitimacy 
be pursued differently in the regional context, and if so, how would this differ from 
the legitimacy of the exercise of power of investment arbitrators in the South 
American region? 
These questions should fall within the scope of legal scholarship, since the 
study of any legal system must include an assessment of the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the principles and rules within the society that applies them. 
 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
In order to answer the aforementioned set of questions, the following argument will 
be developed throughout this thesis: It is possible to internally (systemically) 
reform the international investment regime and legitimize the authority exercised 
in the global legal space by investment adjudicators in South America, through the 
insertion of a set of regional public law principles. Further, a regional legal 
discourse for the region is required to develop these principles. 
First, however, we must verify the premises at the basis of this argument. 
Most importantly, we need to first establish that investment arbitrators within the 
current network of more than 3,200 investment agreements are not only solving the 
disputes brought forward by the parties, but are indeed exercising a particular type 
of public authority outside the state. If arbitrators exercise this type of authority, the 
consequence is that the consent of the state to arbitration is not enough to legitimize 
the authority of a tribunal, as happens with commercial arbitration. 
In adopting these central premises, there is also a need to review the 
methodology used to understand the international investment regime. The classic 
approach originally used a definition of international economic law as ‘rules of 
public international law which directly concern economic exchanges between 
subjects of international law.’21 Under this conception, it is possible to see only the 
normative dimension of the international investment regime; however, a closer look 
 
 
21 Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law (Nijhoff, 1989) 1. 
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at the discipline indicates that there is also a transnational dimension composed of 
an epistemic community that has had a role in shaping its conceptual repertoire. 
This dynamic can be better understood from pluralistic accounts of law outside the 
state, usually grouped under the label of global legal pluralism, that acknowledge 
the existence of global sectors of society that develop different criteria for the 
validity of norms alongside those developed within states. 
The argument will be presented in the following way. First, a general 
understanding of legitimacy in international law needs to be provided. Studies have 
struggled with the concept of legitimacy, since it has been used in many different 
contexts with different meanings. Chapter 2 takes on the task of providing a concept 
of legitimacy for international investment law, arguing that legitimacy operates as 
a concept which describes the pull of self-compliance – as explained in terms of 
the legal, moral, or sociological grounds for law or acts of authority – but can also 
act as a veil that covers up the struggles of several authorities in the global legal 
space. 
Second, we need to reassess international investment law discipline and its 
system of arbitration from the conceptual standpoint of global legal pluralism. 
Chapter 3 decomposes the international investment regime into two dimensions. 
The first, the normative dimension, refers to the network of International 
Investment Agreements first signed in 1959 by European countries but which later 
extended as a practice to the rest of the world. The second, the transnational 
dimension, involves the study of that fragment of global society, or those 
communities, that have shaped the discipline of international investment law in 
parallel with the evolution of treaties, i.e. it explores the dynamics that work 
towards building an arbitral jurisprudence. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, the findings of previous chapters are used to develop 
a basic framework for the construction of South American principles for 
investment. This chapter provides a historical analysis of the most important 
conceptual trajectory for dealing with foreign investment in the region, the Calvo 
doctrine, and explains how it has re-emerged in some South American countries. It 
will be argued that the region must reshape its approach to some extent, by using a 
legal discourse based on three clusters of principles for the legitimation of authority. 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Removing the Veil of ‘Legitimacy’ from International Investment Law 
Discourse 
 
Legitimacy is synonymous with self-compliance or obedience to the commands or 
dispositions of a normative order, based on any grounds other than fear of sanctions. 
The concept is not a new one and has been present in philosophical discussions of 
law for centuries. 
However, the word legitimacy was used in international legal debates at the 
end of the 20th century, and later in International Investment Law at the beginning 
of the 21st century, to veil the sectorial social struggles taking place between 
overlapping transnational communities in a globalizing society. These struggles of 
authority represented a break from the conceptual scope of International Law as it 
had been conceived in Emer de Vattel’s works in the early years of the discipline. 
In this context, the following chapter advances a simple yet straightforward 
argument: Legitimacy in International Investment Law is a linguistic label that 
functions as a veil for the claims put forward by investment arbitrators and their 
resistance to a type of sectorial relative public authority. Once we remove this veil 
of ‘legitimacy’, we can more realistically assess the validity of the relevant rules 
and the extent to which this type of public authority can be justified. 
The current chapter seeks to remove this veil. First, by providing a concept 
of legitimacy in general and by further decomposing this notion into three 
constituting concepts: validity (legal legitimacy), obedience (sociological 
legitimacy) and justifiability (moral legitimacy). Second, by following the 
conceptual construction of these ideas in the development of international law, to 
take on the status of a “second order observer”. Specifically, we follow the 
trajectory of the Vattelian arrangement in international law, still present today, to 
explain how departures from these arrangements by new forms of public authority 
outside the level of the state can generate tensions. Third, by adopting a form of 
global pluralism as a method to process challenges in international investment law. 
13 
 
 
Finally,  by  explaining  that  a  discursive  approach  to  principles  represents  a 
conceptual alternative for South American nations. 
 
 
2.1 The Concept(s) of Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a word used in so many contexts that it can hardly be seen as a 
singular concept. Often this term is used without specific meaning, simply to 
discredit an opinion or judgment; therefore, a claim of illegitimacy can also be an 
act of resistance to someone else’s authority. For this reason, it is necessary to 
specify the context and specific reference of this term in any type of legal argument. 
The  concept  has  been  brought  to  the  attention  of  both  scholars  in 
international law, who are mostly concerned with the legitimacy of rules, and 
academics in International Relations who mainly focus on the legitimacy of the 
exercise of power by either leaders or institutions. These two types of concerns 
about legitimacy—authority and rules—are connected because it is difficult to 
separate authority from the rule itself: most often authority comes from a rule, while 
the exercise of authority can also generate new rules, as in the case of judicial 
decision making. 
Regarding the legitimacy of rules, one of the clearest conceptions comes 
from the work of Thomas Franck, who defines legitimacy as ‘the capacity of a rule 
to pull those to whom it is addressed towards consensual compliance’22. On the 
other hand, the legitimacy of institutions has been defined as the ‘right to exercise 
authority—right to rule’23, or as a justification of ‘the exercise of public 
authority’24.  In  this  sense,  as  Franck  has  also  acknowledged,  the  notion  of 
 
 
 
22 Thomas M. Franck, "The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law 
in an Age of Power Disequilibrium" (2006) 100 The American Journal of International Law 93. 
23 Daniel Bodansky, “Legitimacy: concepts and conceptions/normative and descriptive” in Jeffrey 
L. Dunoff, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations the 
State of the Art (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013) 324; See also John Tasioulas, Parochialism and the 
Legitimacy of International law in Mortimer N. S. Sellers, Parochialism, Cosmopolitanism and 
the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012) 17. 
24 Rüdiger Wolfrum, "Legitimacy in International Law", Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law 2011) para 1. 
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legitimacy is not the sole factor that explains why actors (individuals or states) obey 
the law, but it proves helpful in understanding how normative systems become 
binding. 
If these two conceptions are connected, it is possible to form a general 
understanding of the concept of legitimacy as: 
 
Capacity— of normative orders and acts in the exercise of authority—to generate 
voluntary compliance from those who are addressed for reasons beyond the use of 
force or coercion. 
 
This definition makes it possible to see legitimacy as a sort of force 
generated by normative orders, gravitating towards self-compliance. In addition, it 
refines the conceptual nature of what is ‘law’ moving beyond the simple 
explanation offered by early positivist conceptual accounts of law as rules enforced 
through coercion.25 
Understanding normative orders as a system of rules that are applied with 
the use of force, does not allow us to distinguish legal rules from ‘commands of 
outlaws’, as H.L. Hart pointed out in his refined positivist version.26 For this reason, 
when a rule or an institution is believed to be legitimate, it is followed for reasons 
other than fear or coercion. 
However, this definition is only a starting point, considering that a universe 
of assumptions exists to explain the roots of the capacity to pull participants towards 
consensual compliance, and how this capacity can be evaluated. Understanding 
 
 
 
 
 
25 See especially the understanding as: “rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by 
an intelligent being having power over him” in John Austin and Wilfrid E. Rumble, The Province 
of Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge University Press 2001) 18. 
26 In the development of his theory, H.L. Hart was troubled by the idea that coercion can define the 
nature of a norm as ‘legal’. In that case, the mere command of a gunman to an unarmed man cannot 
be distinguished from law. Even though the ideas expressed in his book ‘The Concept of Law’ have 
been subject to a lot of criticism in the last decades, this idea is still useful in the discussion of 
Legitimacy without coercion according to the core concept of bindingness. On this point see Herbert 
L. A. Hart and Penelope A. Bulloch, The Concept of Law (Oxford Univ. Press 1994) 82-84. 
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legitimacy is a methodological issue —understood as an applied theory27 —because 
it takes the analysis into the deepest conceptual assumptions of each observer. For 
this reason, when the issue of legitimacy arises in a legal debate it may involve 
diverse ideas. In order to systematize the wide variety of assumptions, we need a 
framework of analysis that can help us distinguish between the concepts of 
‘legitimacy’ used in various theoretical arguments. 
In this sense, one of the clearest efforts to systematize the debate 
surrounding the word ‘legitimacy’ is found in the work of Richard H. Fallon.28 He 
identified three standards, or criteria, used to discuss legitimacy in the context of 
judicial decision making on constitutional law. These criteria in turn, produce 
different categories of legitimacy that are contained or implied in a debate: (i) legal, 
(ii) sociological and (iii) moral. 
 
2.1.1 Legitimacy as a Legal Concept 
The first category, legal, is based on the assumption: that “which is lawful is also 
legitimate”29. Here, the idea of legitimacy is equivalent to validity. As such, a norm 
should be followed because it has fulfilled the criteria of validity in every system. 
Most of the discussions about these criteria of legitimacy are therefore closely 
aligned to the standpoint of legal positivism. In other words, debates about the 
concept of legal legitimacy are in turn debates about the sources of law. 
The legal criteria, according to Fallon, comprises two sub-categories. On 
the one hand, ‘substantive legal legitimacy’30  is understood as the correctness or 
 
 
27 We adopt the definition of method as discussed by Anne-Marie Slaughter and Steven R. Ratner, 
"The Method Is the Message" (1999) 93 The American Journal of International Law 410. Other 
nomenclatures used in the doctrine refer to conceptual assumptions as: ‘approach’, (see Anne Peters, 
"There Is Nothing More Practical than a Good Theory an Overview of Contemporary Approaches 
to International Law" (2001) 44 German Yearbook of International Law) and ‘methodology’, see 
Robert Cryer, Tamara Hervey, and Bal Sokhi-Bulley, Research Methodologies in Eu and 
International Law (Hart 2011). 
28 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr, "Legitimacy and the Constitution" (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review. 
(Thank you to Abdul Salim Amin for pointing me towards the work of Fallon, and for discussing 
the application of this framework to his own work on the Afghanistan Constitutional Reform). 
29 ibid 1794. 
30 ibid. 
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reasonableness of a ruling as a matter of law. Therefore, this criterion focuses on 
understanding if a particular decision is based on valid law. On the other hand, there 
is the concept of ‘authoritative legitimacy’31 when the authority that enacts a 
decision is perceived to be legitimate, meaning that it has the right to determine 
rules within a system regardless of the legality of the decision. In this case, the 
debate over legitimacy will be equivalent to casting doubts on the jurisdiction of an 
adjudicator. 
For example, if adjudicator A makes a decision about the legal situation of 
subject B, and B challenges the legitimacy of this decision, B’s argument will make 
use of the substantive legal criterion if the label illegitimacy/legitimacy is used to 
replace the idea of illegality/legality. In other words, claims that fall into the 
‘substantive legal criteria’ are focused on the legality of an act, including its 
conformity with a superior norm, such as the constitution of a national system, or 
foundational treaties in the case of an integration process. 
On the other hand, a claim that falls under the criterion of ‘authoritative 
legitimacy’ means the authority that has enacted a particular decision or ruling does 
not have ‘the right to rule’ regardless of the correctness of the decision. In the 
example provided, this is the case if B has built an argument around the powers of 
the adjudicator A, and labels his claim using the legitimacy/illegitimacy wording. 
In the legal criterion, the capacity to pull someone towards self-compliance 
lies in the recognition of a rule as law. In addition, the interaction of these two sub- 
categories (authoritative and substantial) opens the space for judicial error, where 
judicial decision is recognized, and its decision is followed despite a perceived legal 
misapplication, just because the adjudicator is believed to be legitimate. 
 
2.1.2 Legitimacy as a Sociological Concept 
The second criterion, or standard, is a sociological concept. Fallon describes how a 
regime, institution or decision possesses legitimacy when: “a relevant public, 
regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support for reasons 
beyond  fear  of  sanctions  or  mere  hope  for  personal  reward”32.  If  the  word 
 
 
 
31 ibid 1795. 
32 ibid 1795. 
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legitimacy is used in this context, it implies that the pull of self-compliance of a 
norm or an institution is rooted in a social belief in obedience. 
The development of legitimacy as a sociological concept can be traced to 
the work of Max Weber, especially in his book Economy and Society33. Weber 
focused a part of his work on trying to understand authority, by analyzing the 
concepts of domination34 and obedience. In his work, he attributes at least five 
meanings to the word legitimacy, 35 but central to his analysis of legitimacy as a 
sociological concept is an understanding of the existence of a claim authority, 
together with the acceptance of this claim. 
This separation of elements allows him to categorize the type of legitimacy, 
in terms of the nature of the claim of authority36. He determines three types of 
authority. First, a rational, or legal type that is based on belief in the legality of 
enacted rules, and the right of those elevated to authority to issue commands. In this 
case, obedience is objective and detached from any person. Second, a traditional 
type that is based on belief in the “sanctity of immemorial traditions”, where 
obedience is therefore owed to a person, due to the position they represent. Finally, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (University of California 
Press 1978). 
34 Weber understood domination as “the probability that certain specific commands (or all 
commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons” and assimilated it with the idea of authority, 
see ibid.p.212 
35 Throughout his work, Weber used the word Legitimacy as: 1) Claim (of authority); 2) Justification 
of a regime; 3) As a promise of a regime, specifically analyzing the charismatic type of authority; 
4) Self-justification by the fortunate; 5) As a Belief (of promises, claims justification). For a 
discussion of the way that the word legitimacy is used in the work of Weber, see Joseph; Bensman, 
From Joseph Bensman: Essays on Modern Society 2014 Chapter 10: Max Weber’s Concept of 
Legitimacy 325-371. 
36 He explains this separation in the following way: “Every such system attempts to establish and to 
cultivate the belief in its legitimacy. But according to the kind of legitimacy that is claimed, the type 
of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising 
authority, will all differ fundamentally. (…) Hence it is useful to classify the types of domination 
according to the kind of claim to legitimacy typically made by each(…)” Weber 213. 
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a charismatic type, based on devotion to the exemplary character of an individual 
person; obedience to this type of authority is rooted in loyalty.37 
The study of authority and obedience in these categories separates the 
debate on legitimacy from the purely legal dimension because it helps to distinguish 
the concept of the validity of norms from the concept of acceptance of authority in 
a society. In other words, it offers an external point of view on the phenomenon of 
self-compliance, where the internal point of view involves a debate on the validity 
and sources of law. 
 
2.1.3 Legitimacy as a Moral Concept 
Finally, there is a third dimension and criterion: when legitimacy is treated as a 
moral concept. In this case, legitimacy is not only considered in terms of valid 
norms, or sociological explanations of compliance, but also in terms of the moral 
‘justifiability’38 of rules and authority. Under this conception, a rule exerts the pull 
to self-compliance, not merely because it is a rule, but because it is fair, thus moving 
the debate to philosophical considerations. When treated as a moral concept, 
legitimation refers to the process by which power is not only institutionalized but, 
more importantly, given moral grounding39. Under this concept, the term 
‘legitimacy’ becomes interchangeable with ‘authority’, when such authority is 
considered valid. 
Jurgen Habermas provides a clear definition of legitimacy as a moral 
concept by linking it to one of the characteristics of political orders. He states: 
‘Legitimacy means that there are good arguments for a political order´s claim to be 
recognized as right and just; […] Legitimacy means a political order´s worthiness 
to be recognized’.40 Habermas further distinguishes the ‘legitimating grounds’ from 
the given levels of justifications and analyzes how the need for legitimation has 
 
 
 
 
37 ibid 215-216. 
38 Fallon Jr (n 28) 1796. 
39 Scott John and Marshall Gordon, "Legitimacy", A Dictionary of Sociology (Oxford University 
Press', 2009). 
40 Jü rgen Habermas and Thomas McCarthy, Communication and the Evolution of Society,(Beacon 
Press, 1979) 178. 
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grown over time,41 transitioning from the use of ‘myths of god’ in early societies to 
the use of the principle of reason to justify actions in modern political orders.42 
The understanding surrounding the word legitimacy as a moral concept — 
therefore a philosophical one— also raises the problem of systematization because 
of the wide variety of theories that have tried to provide answers to the justifiability 
of rules and authorities. In order to tackle this diversity, Fallon further elaborates a 
distinction within this dimension of his conceptual framework by distinguishing 
between ideal and minimal moral theories43. 
The ideal moral category tries to include theories that aim to determine the 
conditions that maximize respect for authority in a determinate society. In this 
moral sub-category, different types of political ideas justify the exercise of authority 
as based in the consent of the people, or in substantial objective principles of justice. 
On the one hand, the moral consent-based ideal theories postulate that the 
primary source for the exercise of authority comes from the people, as is the case 
with the fundamentals of constitutionalism in the United States.44  On the other 
hand, the moral ideal substance-based theories focus more on the justification of 
the  principles  themselves,  under  the  premise  that  a  just  regime  ought  to  be 
legitimate  even  without  the  consent  of  the  people,45    because  this  regime 
intrinsically possesses the values of fairness. 
Moral minimal theories, on the other hand, study the ‘sufficient just’ 
conditions of legitimacy in the absence of viable alternatives46. This notion 
acknowledges that social interaction requires at least some minimal degree of 
authority and hence government. Following this argument, in case the highest 
 
 
 
41 ibid 182. 
42 ibid 184. 
43 Fallon Jr (n 28) 1797 
44 Fallon refers to the principles contained in The Federalist. For example, the description of consent 
as the primary source by Alexander Hamilton in the conclusion of Federalist No 22: “The fabric of 
American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people. The streams of national 
power ought to flow immediately from that pure original fountain of all legitimate authority”. 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist (Liberty Fund Inc 2001) 112. 
45 Fallon Jr (n 28) 1797. 
46 ibid 1798. 
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standards of justice or fairness cannot be met, a minimal legitimacy is better than 
none. It can also be said that moral minimal theories are based on the ideal of 
civilized coexistence within a society. 
There are clear differences between discussions of legitimacy as a moral 
(either minimal or ideal), or as a legal or sociological concept, even when analyzing 
similar events. For example, when commenting on the authority of an influential 
individual, a sociological account will focus on the Weberian concern for the 
charismatic attributes of that individual, while the same discussion of legitimacy as 
a moral concept will focus on the justifiability of the delegation of authority by a 
specific society to this particular individual47. 
 
2.1.4 Remarks on the Tridimensional Approach to Legitimacy 
The Fallon three-dimensional framework—legal, sociological, and moral— does 
not seek to answer these questions related to the debates surrounding the word 
legitimacy, but rather proves useful in terms of at least structuring them. It provides 
structure in two ways: first, it allows us to determine what particular interests led to 
the use of this word in arguments, and; second, the use of this framework allows us 
to build an argument or discussion using more concrete or narrowly defined 
concepts, mainly: validity, social acceptance, and justifiability. 
First, by framing the concept of legitimacy using these categories we can 
determine what interest a person making a claim using this word may have. The use 
of legitimacy as a legal concept represents an interest in fidelity48 to the law 
understood as respect for legal norms, and it is no surprise that a broad range of 
legal doctrine sees legitimacy as synonymous with legality. The use of the concept 
legitimacy within a sociological context presents challenges, because it can be used 
 
 
 
47 See for example the discussion of James Madison, in the Federalist No 38: ‘It is not a little 
remarkable, that in every case reported by ancient history, in which government has been established 
with deliberation and consent, the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men; 
but has been performed by some individual citizen, of pre-eminent wisdom and approved integrity 
(…) What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have in their respective establishments, 
or how far they might be clothed with the legitimate authority of the people, cannot, in every 
instance, be ascertained’. 
48 Fallon Jr (n 28) 1851. 
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to enhance the authoritative character of judicial or arbitral decisions, or to 
acknowledge the decrease of authority during crises. It is no surprise that many 
debates about legitimacy as a sociological concept arise during times of uncertainty 
such as revolutions or changes of constitutional orders. Finally, the use of 
legitimacy as a moral concept raises a wide variety of philosophical concerns 
related either to setting high goals in the architecture of a specific regime or to 
pressuring for reform. 
The second advantage of the use of these categories is that they permit a 
framework for the analysis of more specific concepts that would otherwise be 
grouped under the same label as discussions about ‘legitimacy’. For instance, the 
legal dimension of legitimacy focuses more on the issue of the validity of legal 
norms, while the sociological and moral dimensions focus more on issues related 
to the acceptance and justifiability of authority49. 
However, the use of the three-dimensional framework also has its 
downsides and these ought to be acknowledged. First, it can be argued that it is not 
always possible to make this clear-cut division into three-dimensions of legitimacy. 
For instance, an argument about the legal dimension of legitimacy may underscore, 
in the final analysis, a moral concern regarding the primacy of principles such as 
democracy. The consideration of the primacy of the state as the source of valid 
norms in international law is, ultimately, an argument that pursues the integrity of 
some type of chain of legitimacy, with the state as the minimal representative of the 
people’s will. In this way, the whole political debate on legitimate authority 
includes both sociological and moral dimensions. In such cases it can be said that, 
even though there are some points of connection between the dimensions, some 
aspects are more prominent in the debate. 
Second, Fallon conceived this three-dimensional approach to the study of 
constitutional legitimacy in a very different context. He was working with the 
assumed premises of having a defined territory and population, along with the 
existence of some kind of center of power. For this reason, adopting this framework 
is only the first step in building an understanding of legitimacy in international law 
 
 
49 Sociological legitimacy will focus more on the sources of authority, while moral legitimacy will 
be concerned with the justifiability of such authority. 
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and international investment law, where there is no center of power: neither a 
defined population nor a limited territory. 
 
2.2 Removing the Veil of the Word ‘Legitimacy’ from the International Law 
Debate 
The debates concerning the term legitimacy in international law have become 
increasingly relevant over the last few decades because of the expansion —both 
normative and institutional— of law outside the state. A great majority of this 
expansion is due to increasing activity by states since the Second World War, that 
have either concluded a great number of treaties or created a considerable number 
of international organizations and adjudication bodies50. This transformation has 
already left behind the questions that troubled legal scholars for centuries: is 
international law, ‘law’? Can sovereigns be bound by agreements between them? 
Nowadays, the discipline has entered a ‘post-ontological’51 stage where new sets of 
questions regarding the quality rather than the existence of international law have 
been on the rise, and some of these questions are related to the word ‘legitimacy’. 
In this sense, over the last decades, the word ‘legitimacy’ has served as a 
veil that covers the complexity of the production of norms outside the nation-state, 
and if this veil is removed, what can be seen is a methodological gap, between the 
conceptual model that has held sway over the discipline of international law for 
centuries, and the reality of the production of normativity in the global legal arena. 
In other words, the debates about legitimacy not only describe specific legal 
problems, but also highlight the struggle for the rise of different types of public 
authorities beyond the nation state, as explained below. The argument that follows 
in this chapter is that international investment law is a regime that has developed 
precisely within the borders of this methodological gap. Therefore, debates about 
legitimacy in this field are not only a specialized technical matter, but, on the 
contrary, demand an understanding of the conceptual situation of the global legal 
arena as a whole. 
 
 
 
50 This transformation will be discussed in detail in Ch 2. 
51 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press 
1997) 6. 
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The development of this argument in the present chapter goes as follows. 
First, the conceptual model that explains the system of authority and justifiability 
in which international law was constructed, as a discipline, will be discussed. This 
conceptual setting, traced back to the work of Emer De Vattel (1714-1767), a Swiss 
diplomat and legal theorist, consists of an arrangement for the exclusive territorial 
type of public authority that was exercised by states after the peace of Westphalia. 
Second, we describe how the rise of positivism in the 19th and 20th century 
redefined the issue of validity in terms of state consent as a way to replace the 
foundations of natural law in the Vattelian model. However, despite the 
introduction of state consent, the conceptual construction of exclusive territorial 
authorities in the Vatellian model was left intact. Third, we present an analysis of 
the major transformation of the structure of authority from the end of the Second 
World War to the 1990s, by reviewing how commentators during those decades — 
from a second observer perspective—understood the legal setting that surrounded 
them. Finally, we will briefly map theoretical responses to these changes in the 
structure of authority in a global setting, trying to update or complement the original 
Vattelian conceptual arrangement for international law. 
 
2.2.1 The Vattelian Conceptual Arrangement for International 
law 
At the dawn of the discipline of international law in the years following the peace 
of Westphalia, the fundamental question of the doctrine was the existence of a 
positive law of nations that could regulate the relations between sovereigns. One of 
the first challenges to this possibility came from the ‘Enlightenment Naturalism’ 
school52. 
 
 
 
52 Enlightenment Naturalism had a different conception of traditional natural law. There were at 
least three important differences: First, the enlightenment’s conception of natural law did not make 
use of a moral, ethical and rational standard. The basis was an individualistic empirical/descriptive 
standard resting upon the state of nature before the social contract. Second, it rejected, to some 
degree, the function of custom and tradition as sources of authority or as restraints on political action. 
Third, Enlightenment Naturalism implied a decay in legal theory because it transformed the 
traditional natural law of the time from an objective “metaphysical idea” into a “nominalist political 
theory”, in order to justify the political changes of the time. These differences were reflected in the 
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Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) did not consider the possibility that 
agreements between States could be called ‘laws’ because their nature was 
‘incongruous’, instead arguing that such agreements should be the subject of the 
study of other disciplines, such as history53. Since the only two kinds of law 
considered at that time were natural law and positive law, it occurred to him that 
only natural law could regulate international relations.54 
Vattel also considered that relations between nations must be governed by 
natural law, though his contribution to the development of international law was 
more significant, with his book Law of Nations becoming a defining work for the 
discipline. 
Vattel, under the strong influence of Hobbes,55 saw nations and states as 
synonymous in defining societies of men united together for promoting mutual 
safety and the advantage of combined strength.56 According to this logic, if states 
are composed of naturally free men, sovereign states ought to be considered as a 
multitude of free people living together. By the same logic, the law of nature that 
applies to men must also be applied to the common will of nations, a perspective 
which he synthesizes thus: ‘the law of nations is originally no other than the law of 
nature applied to nations’.57 However, this natural stance alone did not fully explain 
the binding character of the written and tacit conventions that states were 
celebrating between them. 
In order to attempt an explanation, Vattel sketches the concept of a ‘lawful 
convention’58 between states (nations) that represents an agreement in conformity 
 
 
 
use of the term ‘Law of Nature’ instead of other terms such ‘ius naturale’ or ‘natural law’. See 
Stephen Hall, "The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order and the Limits of Legal 
Positivism" (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 274-276. 
53 Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations: Eight Books 1717. Book II, Ch III, 152. 
54 Hall (n 52) 274. 
55 Vattel refers to Hobbes work as the ‘hand of a master’ in Emer Vattel, The Law of Nations or 
Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns 
(Clarke 1811) vii. 
56 ibid. Preliminaries iv and Book I Ch 1, 1. 
57 ibid lvl. 
58 ibid lviii. 
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with the law of nature, whether this convention was tacit in the form of customary, 
or written in the form of a treaty. This distinction allows a conceptual space for 
states to celebrate any type of agreements as long as they do not contravene the law 
of nature. In Vattel’s terms, that implied the ability of a state to enter into any 
particular engagement with others, while remaining bound to the performance of 
their ‘duties to the rest of mankind’59 embodied in the respect of natural law. 
Vattel was not the first thinker of his time to analyze the nature of the 
agreements between sovereigns as a separate field of study, but he did so with the 
greatest depth and provided a clear conceptual model for understanding the new 
field. For instance, Alberico Gentili (1552-1608) had earlier undertaken a 
systematic analysis of international law as a different field from the domestic law 
of states, and from theology60. However, Gentili did not provide a clear explanation 
about the nature of this law, when he referred to the agreements between nations as 
‘contract of sovereigns’61 based upon good faith, and regulated ‘so far as possible 
by civil law and reason’.62 
Vattel went further and arrived at a more detailed conception of the positive 
law of nations that encompasses a clear standard of self-compliance and a concept 
of authority that was not evident in the work of his predecessors. Emmanuelle 
Jouannet refers to this as the ‘Vattelian moment’, where everything came back to 
the state, ‘as a juristic person and the exclusive subject of international law, with 
the list of its rights and duties’ in times of peace and war63. 
Vattel’s model allows one to further divide this type of law into three 
categories: voluntary, for presumed consent of the state; conventional, for express 
 
 
 
59 ibid lx. 
60 Gezina Hermina Johanna Van Der Molen, Alberico Gentili and the Development of 
International Law His Life Work and Times (Paris 1937) 241. 
61 Alberico Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres: The Photographic Reproduction of the Edition of 1612 
(Clarendon Pr 1933) Book III, ch XIV, 361 
62 Gentili mentioned: ‘The treaties and agreements of princes ought to be regulated so far as possible 
by civil law and reason, says Alciati’, ibid 365. 
63 Emmanuelle Jouannet, The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations a History of International Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 112; see also Vincent Chetail, Vattel's International Law from 
a XXIst Century Perspective (Nijhoff 2011). 
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consent; and customary for tacit consent of the state. In addition, it provided a 
standard of self-compliance —that would fall under the label of moral legitimacy— 
in conformity with the degree that agreements between states followed natural 
law.64 Finally, it provides a clear definition of the source of public authority. Vattel 
wrote: 
 
it is necessary that there should be established a public authority, to order and direct 
what is to be done […] this political authority is the sovereignty; and her or they who 
are invested with it are the sovereign […]65. 
 
With this definition, Vattel encompasses the forms of government of the 
time (i.e. democracy, aristocratic republic, and monarchy), but most importantly he 
provided a definition that was compatible with the reality created a century before 
during  the  arrangements  of  the  peace  of  Westphalia.  This  means  that  the 
construction of a positive law of the states is made compatible with the existence 
of a political configuration of territorial exclusive public authorities. This is what 
would henceforth be termed the Vattelian setting or configuration of international 
law, meaning that one nation possesses only one exclusive public authority (state) 
over a defined territory which in turn can be engaged in agreements with equals, as 
long as those engagements do not contradict the law of nature (fairness). The 
science that ought to study such types of agreements was the positive law of nations. 
The nature of this concept of a positive law of nations, as the product of the 
will of sovereigns, can be better understood in this passage where Rafael Domingo 
notes how Vattel has transferred the concept of patres familia, from Roman law to 
the law of nations. Domingo notes: 
 
In order to describe his notion of the modern state in the cosmos of the community of 
states, Vattel took into account the figure of the Roman pater familias, especially in 
his relations with other patres familias, as full subjects of applicable law, the ius civile. 
For Vattel, each state was basically like a Roman family, subject to the absolute power 
 
 
 
64 Vattel (n 55) lxvi. 
65 ibid Book I, ch 1, 1. 
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of the pater. He saw relations between sovereign states as similar to those between 
patres familias.66 
 
In this way international law has a Vattelian nature in which states are still 
seen as patres familias, the only representatives of their people’s interests, and 
where international law is reduced to the conventions – tacit or express – between 
them. Vattel did not use the word legitimacy, as it was not a word included in the 
legal discourse of those times, but he created a conceptual model and logic that took 
on the issues of validity, public authority, and the justification of the authority in 
his day. 
Below, it is argued that this logic was maintained in the following centuries, 
despite the switch from natural law to positivism. However, the break in this logic 
in the years after the Second World War, with the arrival of new non-state actors in 
the international legal sphere, meant political and legal debates came to be 
discussed by scholars under the veil of ‘legitimacy’. International Investment Law, 
like some of the normative regimes that were created at the end of the 20th and the 
beginning of the 21st centuries were developed precisely due to this departure from 
Vattelian logic, as will be explained in further detail. 
 
2.2.2 The Revision of Positivism and the Debate on the Validity 
of International Law 
The classical legal positivism that arose in the 19th century in response to the earlier 
naturalistic trends, impacted the development of international law as a scientific 
discipline, and introduced a debate that had been absent in previous years on the 
validity of norms. However, it will be argued below that these debates about validity 
did not replace the Vattelian conception of international law as based on the 
exclusive authority of states over territories: on the contrary, it radicalized this 
conception. The emergence of classic positivism removed any reference to natural 
law, and by doing so it removed the standard of lawfulness for obedience that the 
Vattelian conception had provided. Later, the positivistic trend would evolve with 
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the addition of debates about the validity of legal systems, but the conception of 
international legal settings under exclusive legal authorities would remain. This 
meant that the justifiability of international law moved from the dogma of natural 
law, to one of state consent. 
Categorizing the conventions between states as ‘law’ was the first problem 
addressed by the new trend of classical positivism, which denied this condition to 
international law. The grounds for denial were different from those put forward by 
early naturalists like Pufendorf, who also refused to consider international law in 
the category of positive law. 
The positivist’s classical understanding of the word ‘law’, especially that of 
John Austin (1790–1859), was a vertical one. This conceptualization of law cannot 
be better described than in the strong opening line of his book ‘Providence and the 
Jurisprudence Determined’67. In fact, this sentence was powerful enough to trouble 
theorists68 for the following century: ‘The matter of jurisprudence is positive law: 
law, simply and strictly so called: or law set by political superiors to political 
inferiors.’69 
This implied that in order to establish the existence of law, one needed a 
sovereign who could impose rules on an independent political society, based on fear 
of sanctions70. Under this vertical perspective, the source of law was connected to 
the will of the sovereign, and since international law represents agreements between 
equals, its study should fall in the domain other sciences such as ‘positive 
morality’71, but could not be considered within the science of jurisprudence. 
This original understanding of law did not capture the reality of the behavior 
of the states that tended to deal with the agreements between them as ‘law’. In other 
words, in the absence of a political superior among nations, states felt the duty to 
 
 
 
 
 
67 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1954). 
68 For the impact of this phrase in the following century, see David Kennedy, "International Law in 
the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion", (1998) 17 Quinnipiac L.R. 
69 Austin and Rumble (n 25) 18. 
70   See ibid 18. 
71 Hall (n 52) 281 
29 
 
 
comply with the set of rules that had been accorded either expressly in treaties or 
by custom. Stephen Hall summarized this situation in the following way: 
 
States continued to regard international law as real law, they continued to abide by its 
rules in the vast majority of cases, their diplomatic communications continued to 
bristle with claims and counter-claims of legal right, and they continued to sign treaties 
by which they regarded themselves and other states as legally bound’72 
 
In order to adjust the positivist core ideas to the reality and practice of the 
time, at least two revisions of the Austinian vertical idea of law were generated by 
the doctrine. The first one was proposed by Georg Jellinek (1851 -1911), who 
sought an answer to the debates among German constitutional law scholars 
regarding the scientific foundations of the so called ‘modern law of nations’73. He 
believed that there could be no other conceptual grounding for international law 
than the free will of nations. He argued that the binding nature of the law was not a 
normative-theoretical manifestation, but a psychological manifestation of ‘the 
feeling to have obliged oneself’74. Therefore, states could impose upon themselves 
international obligations by the self-limitation of their own sovereignty75. 
The shortcoming of this idea was that if the source of international legal 
obligations was the will of the states, the same state could retreat from the binding 
character of an agreement by removing the same will —making the existence of 
any international legal system outside the state fragile. In order to maintain the core 
ideas of positivism, he referred to international law as the public law of an 
international legal community, where a type of ‘proto-constitution’ existed 
somehow liberated from State-consent76. 
Heinrich Triepel (1868-1946) also contributed with a second idea refining 
this positivistic stance towards international law. He did this by moving the source 
 
 
 
72 ibid 282 
73 Jochen von Bernstorff, "Georg Jellinek and the Origins of Liberal Constitutionalism in 
International Law"   (2012) 3 Goettingen Journal of International Law 4, 660. 
74 ibid 669. 
75 Hall (n 52) 
76 Bernstorff (n 73) 662. 
30 
 
 
of bindingness in international law, away from the sole will of one state, and placing 
it in the idea of a common will of states77. This idea meant that if states gave their 
consent to the creation of an international obligation, they were no longer free to 
remove such consent by a unilateral act. 
The establishment of the core ideas of positivism78 for the justification of 
international law —mainly to restrict the basis for international law to the consent 
of sovereigns instead of some universal natural law— implied new logical puzzles 
for theorists. Most of these new questions were related to the notion of the validity 
of norms, and resulted in the monistic vs. dualistic approaches to the legal system 
that continued to dominate for decades.79 
In the following years, new ideas in the positivistic vein maintained the 
concept of the vertical structure of law, and extended it to the notion of legal order. 
For example, Kelsen was very careful to maintain the distance between legal order 
and other types, such as moral law. He insisted that positive moral orders could not 
attach a sanction, while law prohibits behavior specifically by attaching negative 
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sanctions to the contrary behavior80. In addition, Kelsen distinguished himself from 
early trends in the vertical conception of the law, such as Austin’s, in the sense that 
he constructed his theory considering the existence of validity drawn from a 
superior norm. This construction allowed him to distinguish law from other orders, 
such as moral ones, but it did not make coercion a central element in the concept of 
law. As a result, and after the influence of the thinkers in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, this construction came to be considered positivistic for the most part since 
its conceptual configuration of international law made state consent the source of 
validity. 
This without a doubt influenced the emergence of article 38 of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice (SICJ) as the center of the argumentation and 
analysis of legal obligation for adjudicators in general. The text of the article is the 
same as that in the Statute of the Permanent Court of arbitration of 1920. The 
version incorporated into the SICJ in 1948, added a second part to the article that 
recognizes the ability of the International Court to decide cases in ex aequo et bono. 
This inclusion puts an emphasis on the character of the first part of the article as 
sources of ‘law’.81 
The article is supposed to recognize that the International Court will decide 
the cases submitted for its adjudication considering the following sources: (a) 
international conventions; (b) international custom; (c) general principles of law 
recognized by ‘civilized nations’ as primary sources and (d) judicial decisions and 
teachings of a ‘qualified publicist’ as subsidiary means. The first two sources come 
directly from state consent either in an express or tacit form, while the contours of 
the third —general principles of law— are different because they even make a 
reference to the sources recognized by nations rather than states. 
Even though the text of Article 38 does not make any distinction or mention 
any type of hierarchy between the sources of the law, Kelsen goes further and 
questions the existence of these principles. For him, it is doubtful whether such 
principles common to the legal orders of the civilized nations exist in the context 
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of the ideological antagonism between communist and capitalist countries, as well 
as between autocratic and democratic legal systems.82 Therefore, if the principles 
referred to by Article 38 exist, for Kelsen they may only be used in the absence of 
a norm that can be derived from state consent. 
During the years of the interwar period of the 20th century, the natural law 
standard was removed and replaced by state consent. Then Article 38 (a), (b) of the 
Statute of the Court of Justice became the center of normativity. However, a closer 
look at this conceptual move away from natural law as the standard of lawfulness, 
and as a justification of obedience to state consent, only results in the modification 
of the Vattelian construction of international law. 
Furthermore, the shift from natural law to state consent resulted in an even 
more radical model than the Vattelian one, by placing the validity of the agreements 
between states as Patre Familias, the sole representatives of individuals, at the 
center. While in the 18th century these agreements could not contravene the 
standard of lawfulness conceptually embodied in natural law, in the 20th century, 
agreements took center stage, using the same logic of exclusive territorial authority. 
Therefore, the world would start to reconstruct its economic order after the 
Second World War, with a radicalized version of the Vattelian arrangement. Soon 
after, the global society would begin to change as new forms of normativity started 
to emerge. Normative —as well as political tensions— would arise and inevitably 
result in claims and resistance to (and from) the newly emerging types of public 
authorities. 
 
2.2.3 The Road from Schwarzenberger to Franck and the 
Emergence of a New Global Legal Setting in the Second Part of 
the 20th Century 
The process of development of international law into the current configuration in a 
global setting began after the Second World War, but accelerated over the last 
decade of the 20th century when the Soviet Union collapsed. The changes 
experienced  by  a  global  society  caused  the  development  of  norm  generation 
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processes outside of nation states, with the emergence of new forms of public 
authority. 
This development comprised two main features: (i) the normative 
specialization into treaty regimes in international law; and (ii) the activity of 
different ‘social spheres’83 beyond the authority of nation-states, which generated a 
series of clashes between legal systems along vertical, horizontal, and transnational 
dimensions. 
First, the normative specialization must be tracked back to the post-war 
period in the middle of the 20th century. In order to understand the state of 
international law in this post-war period, it is useful to recall the picture that Georg 
Schwarzenberger (1908–1991) sketched of the problems faced by scholars who 
attempted to analyze the situation of International Economic Law during these 
years. He wrote: 
 
The science of international law is confronted with an issue which has been faced long 
ago by every mature and self-respecting system of municipal law. Any such system 
required the kind of treatment which one may expect to find in a competent book or 
course on Jurisprudence or English Legal System. Side by side, however, with these 
general topics, there are the various branches of municipal law. They are recognized 
as proper subjects for separate and technical treatment. An English lawyer would not 
expect to find a detailed picture of the laws of Contract, Tort, Evidence, Commercial 
Law or of Conflict of Laws in a bird's-eye view of English law. Yet this is the 
amorphous state in which international law still is. […] It would seem that the time 
has come for the establishment of separate branches of international law.84 
 
International law was not responding to the exigencies of societies which 
needed legal instruments on an international level to address problems such as the 
reconstruction of the economic world order in the post-war period. It is not a 
coincidence that Schwarzenberger used the word ‘amorphous’ in order to describe 
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the state of international law. In the following decades, the establishment and the 
foreseen development of branches, as well as a substantive expansion (e.g. Human 
rights, International Economic Law, International Criminal Law, International 
Investment Law, etc.) took place. This normative development was accompagnied 
by an increase in the number of institutional adjudicative bodies. In the case of 
International Economic Law, the discipline witnessed the creation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) after decades of rounds of negotiation, and an 
exponential increase in Bilateral Investment Treaties - BITs. 
By the end of the 20th century a completely different arrangement was 
evident with the presence of a robust normative and institutional universe. Thomas 
Franck (1931–2009), four decades later in the same line, as if answering 
Schwarzenberger´s concerns, noted: 
 
The time when any one scholar could give a definitive overview of the whole of Public 
International Law is past. Nowadays, scholars and practitioners choose to specialize 
[…]85. This specialization reflects the fact that the law of the international community 
has, through maturity, acquired complexity.86 
 
The doctrinal visions of commentators provide pictures of the legal world 
that they face, so it is useful to recall the evolution and direction of these changes. 
Somehow, the international community had managed to move from 
Schwarzenberger´s ‘amorphous’ global legal world to the mature and complex 
one perceived by Franck. In fact, this perception of the state of international law 
is one of Franck’s premises for considering a post-ontological form, in which 
questions regarding the discipline must switch to concern for the fairness and 
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legitimacy of a complete legal system.87 International law as a science began to 
include the word ‘legitimacy’ in its debates. 
In order to analyze the debate surrounding legitimacy in the current legal 
setting we also need to understand the deep changes that took place in global 
society during those decades. These changes were not only political, but involved 
the structure of global society as a whole, and consisted in the emergence of 
fragments of society that generated epistemic and transnational communities 
producing normative orders and new types of relative authorities at the 
sociological level. These sociological dynamics were the engine behind the 
expansion of normative creation outside of nation-states. 
Therefore, the decades after the great wars represented the erosion of the 
concept of absolute sovereignty, with the result that states in their Westphalian 
form started to lose their monopoly on the creation of law outside their own 
territory. This statement does not mean that states no longer control the process of 
creation of international law but rather that they are no longer the sole actors. They 
now co-exist not only with international organizations that limit their power, but 
also with a series of norm generation processes arising from global sectors of 
society outside their sphere. 
Concepts like the role of the state have dramatically changed in the last 
decades, and international law cannot be seen only as the law or as agreements 
between sovereign nations that exercise a limiting and exclusive authority over a 
specific territory. In this sense, today´s legal problems, such as the ones posed by 
International Investment Law, cannot be dealt with only by states with exclusive 
territories, populations and ‘governing arrangements’,88 because they arise from 
realities that include not only the flows of capital and trade around the world, but 
also the creation of communities and social networks beyond a specific territory. 
The first description of such changes in the doctrine can be found in the 
Storrs lectures of Philip Jessup (1897-1956), who already noted: 
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Part of the difficulty in analyzing the problems of the world community and the law 
regulating them is the lack of an appropriate word or term for the rules we are 
discussing. Just as the word “international” will not do. (…) My choice of terminology 
will no doubt be equally unsatisfactory to others. Nevertheless, I shall use, instead of 
“international law “the term “transnational law” to include all law which regulates 
actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private 
international law are included, as are other rules which do no wholly fit into such 
standard categories89 
 
I do not intend to embrace the term ‘transnational law’ introduced by 
Jessup in the context of an entirely legal academic discipline90 because it is beyond 
the scope of this analysis, but his words provide a close look at changes and how 
they impacted legal science. Jessup refers explicitly to the problems of ‘world 
community’. It is not a reference to a community of states and even more it 
acknowledges that the term “international law” is misleading for describing all the 
activities that have begun to be undertaken outside the state. 
Even the integration processes that were originally conceived as 
organizations created by states started to behave otherwise; it is useful to recall 
the famous lines of the European Court of Justice, in the foundational Van Gend 
En Loos Case: 
 
the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.91 
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The reference to a ‘new legal order’ was then clarified one year later in the 
Costa vs. ENEL case where the same court referred to its ‘own legal system’92 
created in the EEC Treaty. Even though the new legal order was conceived in the 
EEC Treaty, the arrangements were different: states were no longer the sole actors 
and the patres familias logic was starting to change. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, a couple of years later in 1968, 
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, were engaged in their work and the 
development of their New Haven Jurisprudence school. They felt the need to 
describe the world society that they were facing and therefore wrote: 
 
People cross national boundaries in numbers and with a regularity which have never 
before been achieved. The ebb and flow of persons has not been restricted to the highly 
publicized inter-governmental contacts. People for all sectors of national communities 
travel and intermingle in striving to maximize their wealth, their skill, their 
understanding and, even, their prestige93. […] The quality of a harvest in the Ukraine 
affects the commodities ex-change in Chicago; a rail strike in Sweden disrupts or 
debilitates rail traffic in France; a copper strike in Chile closes factories in the US. 
Business planning here must concern itself, not only with labor relations in an 
American city, but in the mines of Africa and Latin America from which some of its 
vital raw materials come, the maritime and transport unions of a number of states, 
which participate in distribution, and national marketing unions at many different 
points of final consumption […]94 
 
Those lines could perfectly describe the economic turbulences of our times, 
yet the description is from 1968, a time before the internet. In particular, it is also 
relevant that in their legal theoretical writings, the proponents of such schools 
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entered into such detailed descriptions of the changes they witnessed, as premises 
for their methodological propositions. 
Nowadays, the picture of our global society is very different from that of 
1968; people are now directly connecting around the world, new transnational 
actors have gained relevance in the international context, from multinational 
corporations, NGOs, hedge funds, offshore markets, and many more —even 
criminal and terrorist groups operate in a transnational way. The dynamics that 
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman witnessed at the end of the sixties did not stop: 
they intensified. 
The Vattelian arrangement was and still is present because states have 
continued to base their relations on international law and treat their agreements as 
law, but these relations coexisted with emerging types of authority from different 
normative orders created by various sectors of global society. Indeed, public 
authority stopped being territorially exclusive and new forms of authority, 
generated in different normative orders, started to coexist. Each normative order 
that emerged brought its own sectorial logic, its own values, its own ‘legitimacy’. 
Clashes between authorities became inevitable when points of contact 
between two or more authorities started to occur, especially where there were no 
territorial limits. Each clash represented an encounter between rationalities that 
might have been in contradiction with one another. This in turn led to intersystem 
conflicts of law in three dimensions: horizontal, between normative systems of 
states; vertical, between states and supranational structures; and transnational 
between normative systems developed by fragments of society, as will be explained 
(Section 1.3). Many of the tensions described would be placed behind the veil of 
the linguistic term ‘legitimacy’ over the ensuing years. 
 
 
2.3 The 21st Century and the New Theoretical Gap 
The Vattelian conceptual arrangement, designed for inter-state relations, and 
modified by the positivists in the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th centuries, 
did not capture the whole complexity of the global legal setting by the beginning of 
the nineties; furthermore, neither the theoretical tensions between naturalists and 
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positivists, nor the old dichotomy between monism and dualism, provided clear-cut 
answers to normative conflicts. 
In the 21st century, the states as Patres familias of their populations are not 
alone  in  the  norm  generation  processes  outside  their  borders.  Not  only  have 
individuals started to gain access to international adjudicative mechanisms, but also 
functional fragments of society have started to generate overlapping normative 
orders, along with the creation of forms of relative public authority outside the state. 
These  fundamental  changes  have  also  implied  the  existence  of  a  new 
conceptual gap, between the Vattelian arrangement of inter-state law and the new 
types of normativity. New theoretical enterprises have emerged to fill this gap along 
with new vocabulary which began to appear in legal debates from the nineties. In 
this context, words like ‘fragmentation’, ‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘governance’, and 
‘pluralism’, along with an evocation of the notion of ‘the global’95, began to be 
developed and used for specific political purposes. 
As Jacob Katz Cogan said: ‘fragmentation is an idea, and like all ideas, it 
has a history and a politics’.96 The same can be said about other vocabulary, but 
especially about ‘legitimacy’, which implies —contrary to fragmentation— a 
resistance or a claim of authority. The insertion of new vocabulary attempts to 
complete the Vattelian setting for international law. It is not inside the scope of this 
work to provide a full map for all of these theoretical enterprises, but the following 
lines will provide an approximation of the trends and vocabulary that affect the 
perception of international investment law. 
 
 
2.3.1 Tomas Franck and Legitimacy Debates in International 
Law. 
Thomas Franck witnessed how the new configuration affecting the production of 
norms in international law at the end of the 20th century intensified, though it was 
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not exclusively caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union97. He described the times 
as constituting the ‘post ontological’ era of the discipline, meaning that existential 
questions had been left behind. It was clear that despite the major normative 
generation of new treaties, states continued to comply with them, as Louis Henkin 
famously noted: 
 
It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time. Every day 
nations respect the borders of other nations, treat foreign diplomats and citizens and 
property as required by law, observe thousands of treaties with more than a hundred 
countries98 
 
Franck started to wonder about the existence of an ‘X factor’99 that makes 
states comply with international norms in the absence of factors of coercion as 
suggested in the Austinian conception of law. In 1987, Franck introduced the 
question ‘Why a Quest for Legitimacy?’100 in the international law legal debate, In 
the following years, he would advance a theory of legitimacy for international law, 
beginning with his 1990 book ‘The Power of Legitimacy among Nations’. In 1992, 
he presented a paper at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association in Chicago101; later at The Hague Lectures in Public International 
Law102, and finally expanded his argument in 1995 with his book ‘Fairness in 
international law and institutions’103. Even though he would continue to refine his 
theory in the following years, this book can be considered the centerpiece of his 
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work because it encompasses the description of legitimacy as a sociological concept 
and also addresses the component of distributive justice (moral legitimacy). 
Franck helped to introduce a debate about ‘legitimacy’ in the context of 
international law. He was probably not the first author who used the word 
‘legitimacy’ but he addressed this issue in a way that had the greatest influence on 
the legal scientific debate. The scholars that followed him either contested104 or 
expanded on his ideas105. 
The relevance of Franck´s work can also be attributed to the fact that his 
theory uses all forms of positivism to address non-typical positivist questions such 
as the fairness of international law. In other words, he managed to present a 
sociological and legal version of legitimacy, moving away from the concept of 
distributive justice as justifiability (moral legitimacy). For Franck, two Vectors106 
are the requisites for fairness in international law: legitimacy is concerned with 
order (procedural fairness), while distributive justice is concerned with change 
(moral fairness).107 
The fairness construction of Franck is constructed within the paradigms of 
the positivistic evolution. He presents a collection of ideas from Austin, to revisions 
of Jellinek and Triepel —even though he does not mention them— and finishes 
with the rules of recognition of Hart. His paradigms are as follows: first, states are 
sovereign and equal; second, sovereign states can only be restricted by consent; 
third, consent binds; and fourth, states joining the international community are 
bound by the rules of the community.108 Then, in the same vein, he appeals to 
Herbert L. A. Hart’s (1907–1992) distinction between primary and secondary 
rules.109 Hart established that any mature system needs two types of rules. Rules of 
the first type, or primary rules, are the ones that determine rights and obligations, 
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and rules of the second type, or secondary rules, are the ones that specify the 
process by which primary rules are created or modified. This latter type are also 
known as ‘rules of recognition’. If primary rules are not based on the secondary 
rules or rules of recognition, it seems logical that legitimacy is at stake. However, 
the fact that a primary rule comes from a secondary rule does not mean that it is 
always legitimate, so Franck provides indicators of legitimacy, especially for the 
primary rules. 
Franck´s four indicators of legitimacy are: first, textual ‘determinacy’, 
meaning the ability of a text to convey a clear message110; second, ‘symbolic 
validation’, implying that the attribute of law to communicate authority is being 
exercised in accordance with right process (e.g. ritual and pedigree111); third, 
‘coherence’, involving the generality of the principles that apply,112 and the 
predictability of their application; and four, adherence, defined as the ‘vertical 
nexus’113 between a single primary rule and a pyramid of secondary rules in a 
system. Therefore, the fourth element is the verification of the ‘rules of recognition’ 
of every system in Hart’s conceptualization. 
This theory is still based on the inter-state conceptual setting, meaning that 
it only sees normativity coming from or linked to state consent, so in this sense it 
does not fill the theoretical gap to help us understand and operate in a context of 
overlapping communities. In other words, in the context of pluralism, different 
concepts of determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence can 
coexist or collide. 
 
2.3.2 The Debate on Fragmentation 
Despite this resistance to change, some sectors within the discipline reacted to the 
new global setting as the debates on the fragmentation of international law began. 
It was not a coincidence that the dangers of the proliferation of courts and norms 
were brought into the legal debate by two judges of the International Court (ICJ), 
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whose Statute contains Article 38, the core of the conceptual arrangements of 
international law as a discipline. 
In the year 1999, the president of the International Court of Justice ICJ, 
Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, welcomed the development of the creation of 
specialized international tribunals that were ‘forced’114 into existence by the 
entrance of new actors. However, at the same time, the possibility for ‘substantial 
conflict’115 among new adjudication bodies remained; this could have been 
prevented if the ICJ had been empowered through an extension of its capacities and 
by allowing other international tribunals to request advisory opinions from the ICJ 
on issues of international law. 
In the next year, Schwebel’s successor, Judge Gilbert Guillaume, introduced 
a deeper concern,116 by contributing another new term to the legal debate: the word 
‘fragmentation’ contextualized as a danger. Once again, this manifested the need 
for the International Court of Justice to be empowered with resources to overcome 
these challenges. He said: 
 
Judges themselves must realize the danger of fragmentation in the law, and even 
conflicts of case-law, born of the proliferation of courts. A dialogue among judicial 
bodies is crucial. The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations, stands ready to apply itself to this end if it receives the necessary 
resources.117 
 
In this context, in 2000, the International Law Commission decided to 
include the topic of fragmentation in its scope of work. In 2002, the Commission 
expanded research by establishing a Study Group118 on this issue that concluded in 
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the year 2006 with the report: ‘Fragmentation of international law: difficulties 
arising from the diversification and expansion of international law’119. The report 
chose to deal only with the substantial or normative side of fragmentation, meaning 
those conflicts that arise in a particular case: ‘where two rules or principles suggest 
different ways of dealing with a problem’120. 
It is not clear to what extent substantial fragmentation can be understood 
without dealing with institutional fragmentation. However, the report does 
acknowledge the idea of functional differentiation, understood as ‘the increasing 
specialization of parts of society and the related autonomization of those parts’121. 
In addition, while the report acknowledged the existence of self-contained regimes 
containing their own principles, their own form of expertise and own ‘ethos’122, in 
its conclusion it stated that problems arising with these regimes must be understood 
as problems of interpretation. The report concludes with a strong call for unity in 
international law, and a clear statement on international law as a legal system123. In 
this context, any conflict between ‘ethos’ must result in a normative conflict where 
there is only one criteria of validity, and in case of two valid norms, one should 
prevail for any of the interpretative criteria developed in the report. 
In the full report and in the conclusions, there is only one mention of the 
word ‘legitimacy’.124 While referring to the development of international law in a 
regional context, the report states that: ‘The presence of a thick cultural community 
better ensures the legitimacy of the regulations and that they are understood and 
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applied in a coherent way’125. On the other hand, the report introduces references 
to concepts of validity (invalidity) no fewer than 90 times. 
 
2.3.3 The Influence of Political Science on International Law 
Legitimacy Debates 
Along with the evolution of Franck’s ideas, other international jurists opened the 
door to new approaches in international law. One of those lines was the 
development of approaches that combined international law with theories from 
international relations. Anne Marine Slaughter was one of the first in this line with 
her landmark paper in 1993 ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: 
A Dual Agenda’126. In this work, she calls for conceptual adjustments, in part 
inspired by Franck’s work127. These conceptual changes entailed a combination of 
analytical tools from scholarship in both International Relations and International 
Law (IR/IL). This idea was an answer to a call for cooperation between these 
disciplines that Kenneth Abbott had pioneered in an earlier work,128 and that would 
evolve into the IR/IL school or approach to international law129. 
The extensive use of International Relations methodologies in the discipline 
of international law, mainly by US academics, resulted in the analysis of a large 
quantity of political science literature by legal scholars. Consequently, approaches 
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from certain schools, mainly institutionalism130 liberalism131 and constructivism132, 
among others regained importance in international legal scholarship. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, political science also influenced law in 
debates on legitimacy using the vocabulary from studies on the legitimacy of the 
European integration process. Specifically, while considering the variable of 
legitimacy in his study on non-compliance133, German Fritz W. Scharpf introduced 
a distinction between ‘input-legitimacy’ and ‘output-legitimacy’ in his 1999 book 
Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? a distinction that has influenced 
the debate at the European level. 
It is believed that the vocabulary developed by Sharpf was inspired by 
Abraham Lincoln’s famous description of democracy referring to a government ‘by 
the people, of the people and for the people’134, and later inspired the work of David 
Easton who used input and output vocabulary to distinguish citizens’ demands from 
government actions135. 
With this background, Scharpf first distinguished ‘input-legitimacy’ as 
meaning ‘government by the people’136. This refers to the degree to which the 
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‘procedures used to decide upon a rule were in accordance with the basic principles 
of democratic governance’137. Contrarily, ‘output-legitimacy’ refers to 
‘government for the people’138 meaning that under this concept, legitimacy is 
obtained when a rule is ‘accepted by its addressees as adequate, just or fair, 
independently of the procedures that were used in its enactment’139. The discussions 
of legitimacy vary between these two ideas, where, for instance, it is argued that 
output-legitimacy140could be better obtained outside the nation-state level because, 
among other things, it does not require a common identity but rather ‘common 
interests’. However, these two concepts do not exclude each other; in this sense, 
Neyer and Wolf conceptualize ‘input-legitimacy’ as participation, while ‘output- 
legitimacy’ is categorized as social acceptance. 
In the following years, the input-output EU legitimacy debate would be 
completed, with the conceptualization of a ‘throughput legitimacy’ that 
encompasses not only internal processes and outcomes but also what happens in a 
political system141. From a ‘throughput legitimacy’ perspective, the focus is on 
accountability, transparency, and openness to “civil society”142. 
The input, output and throughput concepts mostly impact EU law 
scholarship, but sometimes they have been exported to international law debates as 
well, specifically for the purpose of analyzing the legitimacy of international 
organizations. In this case, the three main concepts dealing with ‘throughput 
legitimacy’ —accountability, transparency, and access— have become relevant for 
pluralistic accounts. 
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Whether considering IR/IL scholarship or EU’s ‘input-output-throughput’ 
enthusiasts, political science had an unquestionable impact on international law 
scholarship at the end of the 20th and start of the 21st centuries. This is because 
self-compliance and obedience to power have been primary points of concern; 
however, as with any cross-disciplinary research agenda, one must sound a note of 
caution regarding the challenges of implementing two sciences with different 
objectives and methodologies143. 
 
2.3.4 The Kantian Cosmopolitan Approaches 
In recent decades, there has also been a rise in the number of conceptual 
arrangements related to the idea of cosmopolitanism, either as descriptive or ideal 
forms. These approaches, in one way or another, seek an alternative to the current 
inter-state conceptual system (Vattelian arrangement), and are opposed to the 
existence of a political unity that will take the ideal form of a “world state”. 
These cosmopolitan trends can be traced, at least in part, to the work of 
Immanuel Kant and his 1795 essay ‘Perpetual Peace’144. It is remarkable that Kant, 
who never left his hometown of Königsberg (present day Kaliningrad) in the 18th 
century, is now an inspiration for current global cosmopolitan and liberal ideas145. 
Kant’s  ‘Perpetual  Peace’  is  structured  in  two  sections  containing  six 
‘Preliminary’ and three ‘Definitive’ articles for achieving such peace. The text is 
characterized by a degree of ambiguity that allows each reader to interpret it 
according to his conceptual preferences. There is no clear understanding as to why 
Kant chose to develop his essay using the aforementioned articles nor regarding his 
division between preliminary and definitive articles. As Fernando Tesón remarks, 
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readers and commentators who focus on the role of the state, such as realists146 who 
are concerned with international relations, pay more attention to the preliminary 
articles. On the other hand, readers who have adopted cosmopolitan or political 
liberal stances tend to focus on the definitive articles. 
There are three ‘definitive articles for perpetual peace among states’. The 
first one —‘the civil constitution of every state is to be republican’—deals with the 
type of state that is needed, i.e. a Republic, for achieving perpetual peace. It is not 
a surprise that supporters of liberal democracies embrace the republic as the Kantian 
version for the organization of states, and even see the postulate of this article as a 
motivation for spreading liberal principles among nations,147 something that Kant 
probably did not have in mind.148 
The second article —‘the Law of Nations is to be founded on a Federation 
of Free States’— develops the idea of a league, which Kant proposed be called a 
league of peace, that, at the same time, would not amount to a concentration of 
power as in the state: 
 
So there must be a special sort of league that can be called a league of peace (focdus 
pacificum), aiming to make an end to all wars forever, to be distinguished from a treaty 
of peace (pactum pacis) which only ends one war […] The league of peace would not 
be concerned with the acquisition of power by any state […]149 
 
Therefore, the proposal of Kant involves the organization of states in order 
to abstract them from the ‘state of nature’ just as at the domestic level, but without 
creating a new sovereignty among states. This idea resembles the proposition of 
governance without government that has also been developed under the rubric of 
new governance approaches within this century. 
The third article—‘world citizenship is to be united to conditions of 
universal hospitality’— explains the right of a visiting foreigner not to be treated as 
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an enemy150. The basis for Kant´s hospitality is a claim that “no one had more right 
than another to be in any one particular place”151, and this article established the 
premises to approach the idea of a constitution of ‘world citizenship’, or 
‘cosmopolitan constitution’. 
These three short definitive articles were written in the same century as 
Vattel’s Law of Nations, and yet contested the latter. Whereas the Vattelian setting 
saw the law of nations only in the agreements between states, the patres familias 
representatives of their people, the ideal Kantian setting set forth clear ideas for the 
justifiability of the exercise of authority. First, states needed to be organized or 
constituted as republics (Definitive Article I), a concept equivalent to what today 
can be termed liberal democracies. Second, these types of states should associate in 
a form of alliance with the sole function of achieving peaceful coexistence 
(Definitive Article II) and without the concentration of power in a new world 
sovereign entity to avoid the imminent danger of creating a world tyrant. Finally, 
and under these conditions, humankind could seek the development of a 
cosmopolitan constitution (Definitive Article III) or world citizenship constitution, 
where universal rights could be assured. The Kant proposition attacks the idea of 
exclusive public authority from within the state and from the outside. 
Therefore, the cosmopolitanism ideas linked to Kant regain importance 
again in the current period, because these fundamental ideas could be used for any 
actor that is not a state to promote a specific agenda, outside the strong version of 
inter-state law based on consent. In other words, a great majority of thinkers became 
cosmopolitans —following Kant or his postulates— either to promote liberalism, 
human rights or other agendas. 
Nowadays, the term cosmopolitanism implies individualism, universality 
and generality152: First, individualism, because the ultimate concern is the human 
being rather than communities, nations, or states153; second, universality as the 
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scope of concern is every living human being154; and finally, generality because 
human beings are the concern of everyone155. 
These characteristics can be externalized, according to Thomas W. Pogge, 
in either a moral or a legal cosmopolitanism. Legal cosmopolitanism implies a 
commitment to the ideal of a global order for equal rights and duties for everyone156, 
while moral cosmopolitanism holds that all persons stand in certain moral relations 
to one another.157 Therefore, the cosmopolitan stances have the risk of becoming 
too ideal or too vague, if they are not spelled out in a more concrete definition. 
The shortcoming of cosmopolitan ideas is the risk of missing dynamics that 
are being produced by fragments of society, with their norms generating power. In 
addition, the use of universal and general stances involves intrinsic danger that 
cannot be overlooked. 
 
2.3.5 Global Governance Trends 
A number of other notable conceptual enterprises can be grouped under the 
category of Global Governance or New Governance trends158. In many of these 
attempts, we can still see the influence of Kant, although sometimes this is not 
explicitly recognized by its authors. The use of these terms can be traced back to 
international relations scholar James Rosenau’s ‘Governance without Government’ 
published in 1992.159 
The concept of governance without government clarifies the relation 
between order and governance—as distinguished from the simple absence of 
government160 which equates with anarchy. For Rosenau, governance is a ‘system 
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of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority’161, whilst government can 
function even in the face of opposition. The idea of Global Governance is further 
developed in the creation and later report of a Commission of Global Governance 
founded under the initiative of Willy Brandt, a former German Chancellor.162 
The term Global Governance was later used in the European context, in a 
2001 report of the Commission known as a ‘white paper’, where it was stated that 
many people were losing confidence in a poorly understood system and at the same 
time demanding the right to seize the opportunities offered by globalization163. The 
document stated that the European Union should seek to apply the principles of 
good governance to its global responsibilities164. 
From this point on, different research agendas started to gain ground. This 
included scholars focused on the relation between International and Global 
Governance,165 as well as the emergence of projects like Global Administrative 
Law (GAL) which began to gain more visibility. GAL sees global governance as 
administration166 where many administrative and regulatory functions are 
performed in a global —rather than national— context. The literature of GAL starts 
to use the word legitimacy along with global governance. Kirsch and Kingsbury, in 
their opening statement on Global Governance and GAL, used the word in the 
following way: 
 
Yet central pillars of the international legal order are seen from a classical perspective 
as increasingly challenged: the distinction between domestic and international law 
becomes more precarious, soft forms of rulemaking are ever more widespread, the 
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sovereign equality of states is gradually undermined, and the basis of legitimacy of 
international law is increasingly in doubt.167 
 
The use of the word ‘legitimacy’168 is not casual; indeed, it is used several 
times but most of the authors relate it to GAL. However, the idea of Global 
Governance was not new and can, in fact, also be understood as an evolution of 
cosmopolitan trends. The use of the word legitimacy in this context would signal 
the intention to undermine the state consent paradigm as a source of normativity on 
the international level. In other words, there is no such thing as a treaty that 
establishes what principles of administrative law should apply under international 
law. Therefore, when GAL scholars talk about legitimacy they contest the Vattelian 
model- or at least try to exist alongside it. 
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3. International Investment Law from the Standpoint of Global Legal 
Pluralism169 
 
The development of an investment treaties regime cannot be seen as an isolated 
phenomenon. International norm-creating processes are part of a wider 
phenomenon, i.e. the expansion of norm generation processes outside of nation- 
states encompasses almost all aspects of human activity. It is also necessary to draw 
attention to this chaotic picture of the global legal setting in its entirety so as to 
understand that disputes in international investment law are only one facet of a 
much wider question. 
Thinking about normative disputes in the context of international law is 
usually framed by the concepts of validity and hierarchy. Validity refers to the 
application of the sources expressed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ). This article is believed to recognise a system of sources for 
international law170 in a way that resembles the ‘secondary’ rules of national law 
systems, because in the absence of a global legislator, this article reflects the criteria 
of legal validity for international law.171 On the other hand, hierarchy implies that 
in the case of a conflict between two valid norms, one must prevail. 
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In the case of international law, the question of validity will then depend on 
the ‘pedigree’ of the traditional sources of international law.172 However, this 
approach to dealing with the expansion of norms and adjudicative bodies does not 
help us to fully understand developments and issues in international investment law 
because it only examines the production of legal norms by the state and misses the 
transnational dimension inherent in many areas including foreign investment. The 
case of international investment law implies a normative regime that is shaped by 
states using treaties, but there is also normative production by autonomous 
fragments of global society. These fragments have added criteria for validity 
beyond Article 38, which will be discussed below. 
An additional perspective is needed to analyse the transnational component 
of international investment law. If we see the current global setting only through 
the lens of Article 38 of the Statue of the ICJ, whatever we analyze will look like 
customs, treaties, or general principles. For exactly this reason, because 
international investment law cannot exist in an ‘intellectual vacuum’,173 this 
theoretical concern was already recognised as a weakness in the early years of the 
discipline.174 It is clearly necessary to find a different perspective, using maps to 
highlight special issues that were previously ignored.175 Consequently, a full 
understanding of international investment law cannot emerge from within the 
borders of the network of treaties and awards, but rather requires an examination of 
the structure of global society. 
The present chapter argues that the conceptual standpoint of global 
pluralism can help us better understand such dynamics because it highlights the idea 
of the coexistence of norms at different levels: national, international and 
transnational. For this reason, it may be useful to capture the current state of the 
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debate on globalisation and international investment law. It will further be claimed 
that from this perspective, the international investment law regime is composed of 
two dimensions: normative and transnational. The first one is composed of norms, 
embodied in International Investment Agreements, while the second one represents 
the development of norms within transnational sources, i.e. arbitral decisions and 
investment contracts, where the responsibility of states is established. 
 
3.1 Conceptual Notes on Global Legal Pluralism 
The term ‘pluralism’ has emerged in the legal debate in the last years, but this 
conception may include a widely diverse set of understandings as to what ‘legal 
pluralism’ and ‘global legal pluralism’ mean; thus, one should be careful when 
using these terms, especially because in recent years, scholars from different legal 
areas have addressed the phenomenon in different ways. 
The first distinction involves the word ‘pluralism’ and the differentiation of 
at least three types of concepts that this word may represent: cultural, political, and 
legal. Cultural pluralism implies the coexistence of different common identities, 
while political pluralism expresses the idea of the coexistence of factions or interest 
groups inside a political system. On the other hand, legal or normative pluralism in 
a broad sense refers to a situation in which ‘two or more laws (or legal systems) 
coexist in (or are obeyed by) one social field’176. Legal pluralism will be the concept 
developed in this work. 
With this broad definition, it is possible to draw a distinction between two 
associated but different ideas of legal pluralism. The first one is the traditional legal 
pluralism that has been studied in anthropology and sociology of law which 
analyses overlapping normative orders and is concerned only with the interplay of 
Western and non-Western laws in colonial and postcolonial settings.177 The second 
idea is a global legal pluralism that sees the overlap of normative orders not only 
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by geographical criteria, but also according to sectorial criteria, such as the concepts 
stemming from studies on globalisation and trans-nationality. 
The idea of global pluralism has been approached from two sides. On the 
one hand, there is a three-step evolution process in the traditional legal pluralism 
doctrine. The first perspective on legal pluralism referred to the existence of parallel 
legal orders after colonisation under the territorial authority of a state178, while a 
later perspective on pluralism recognised the coexistence of legal systems also in 
the so-called ‘Western States’, with an acknowledgement that the pluralist 
phenomenon was not confined to colonies.179 The last step was to arrive at a global 
legal pluralism that involves trans-nationality.180 On the other hand, globalisation 
scholars and theorists approach global legal pluralism with an interest in its legal 
structures and institutions rather than in the communities that created them.181 
These two evolutionary paths both arrived at the concept of the coexistence 
of legal systems in three dimensions: the internal (traditional pluralism), the 
external and the transnational dimensions. The concept of global legal pluralism 
therefore implies a response to globalisation whereby multiple assertions of legal 
authority exist over the same act.182 However, among these dimensions, the 
transnational one is perhaps the most controversial because it implies abandoning 
the idea of the state as the sole lawmaker, as well as the concept of territorially- 
based authority183 which was the base of the Vattelian arrangement for international 
law. This form of legal pluralism carries with it the risk of tensions and conflicts 
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where overlapping legal authorities184 exist, for example when both an international 
investment and a human rights adjudicator exercise authority over the same facts. 
From this perspective, global society may be seen as working through 
sectorial interdependences that can generate conflicts whose origin lies not only in 
the encounter of diverse countries, but also in the collision between distinct global 
social sectors.185 The relationship between sectors is the core of the transnational 
element, as the latter goes beyond the nation-state and lies in the creation of hybrid 
spaces. The international investment law regime was built on a system of bilateral 
international treaties, but the conceptually connected decisions of investment 
adjudicators have extended part of its substantive rules to a hybrid dynamic. 
These sectorial interdependencies within the current global society 
represent a break from the traditional conception of international law because they 
entail not only the collision of norms but also the collision of legitimacies and legal 
discourses. In other words, the tensions that can be seen in disciplines like 
international investment law cannot be considered only as a problem of 
interpretation. Taking this into account, the existence of these global sectors - 
generating the current inter-systemic conflicts– demands a space of coexistence, a 
space for “legitimate difference”,186 which has already been created through the 
inter-systemic and “inter-judicial dialogue”187 between adjudicators in other fields 
of law, and is starting to take place in international investment law as well. 
Finally, the choice of global pluralism and the interest in the normative 
production of communities as a conceptual base for the present work acknowledges 
the possibility of normativity beyond the state and inter-state systems, though that 
does not imply a defence for law without the state, such as that which a radical 
pluralist point of view would provide. The difference appears subtle, but it has 
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considerable implications: in the end, any type of normative production outside 
state borders comes into contact with a national legal system, especially in terms of 
its execution. 
For the aforementioned arguments, the advance in this conceptual stance 
also implies some conceptual and terminological rigor because, as has been shown, 
a word not only carries its history, but also a structure. In this case, we need to 
clarify three concepts for a pluralistic understanding of international investment 
law, mainly: authority, normative order, and communities. 
 
3.1.1 Authority 
The term authority has been defined by Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas Biersteker 
as ‘institutionalized forms or expressions of power’188. If authority is the 
institutionalized expression of power, it represents a degree of evolution from the 
mere use of force as domination. However, the definition needs clarification 
regarding the characteristics of what is understood as institutionalization. 
Kelsen also distinguished power from authority, where power can be 
defined as the capacity ‘of forcing others to a certain behavior’,189 and, according 
to him, this capacity does not suffice to constitute authority. Kelsen later connects 
the need for a link between the origins of this capacity (power) and a normative 
order. This characteristic allows one to better redefine the idea of 
institutionalization of power in Barnett’s definition. Only a normative order can 
produce authority; therefore, it is different from plain power obtained by physical 
force. However, Kelsen’s conception of authority is included in his coherent 
hierarchical vision of law. According to him, only a sovereign—state can exercise 
authority. He states: 
 
Authority is thus originally the characteristic of a normative order. […] only a 
normative order can be ‘sovereign’ that is to say, a supreme authority, the ultimate 
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reason for the validity of norms which one individual is authorized to issue as 
commands and other individuals are obliged to obey190 
 
However, if the existence of a plurality of normative orders is 
acknowledged, there is also the possibility for a plurality of public authorities. In 
the context of plurality, Bogdandy adopts the following definition of authority as: 
‘legally grounded capacity to actually, or legally, restrict the freedom of other actors 
or otherwise  determine how  they use their  freedom’191.  The first  part of  the 
definition is similar to Kelsen’s in that the origin of authority must come from a 
normative order. In addition, the definition encompasses both ‘obligatory legal 
acts’192, understood as acts that modify the legal situation of a subject, and ‘non- 
binding acts’193 of International Organizations. The latter can be explained when 
such non-binding acts exercise a pressure that can be withstood only with a ‘degree 
of difficulty’194. This wider conception of authority includes and explains the 
effects of acts that traditionally have been termed ‘soft law’195. 
Finally, in order to justify this capacity in the context of plurality, authority 
can be non-exclusive, implying the possibility of several overlapping and 
interacting authorities that co-exist. Rughan uses the term ‘relative authority’ to 
describe this situation. Two types of relative authority can be distinguished: same- 
domain plurality, where there are two or more authorities in the same domain, and 
interactive-domain plurality, where authorities with separate domains interact with 
one another.196  The existence of relative authority can only be justified in its 
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relationship—which includes cooperation and coordination, toleration, and 
conflict197— with other authorities. 
 
3.1.2 Normative Orders, Systems and Regimes 
If the definitive element that distinguishes power from authority is its legal 
character, then the definition of normative order also becomes relevant. The word 
‘order’ can be understood as a body of rules to regulate or conduct behavior, or as 
‘shared expectations governing a particular social situation’198. For Kelsen, the 
function of an order, social in the case of law, was to induce men to ‘refrain from 
certain acts which for one reason or another are deemed detrimental to society and 
to perform others which for one reason or another are regarded as useful to 
society’199. Along this line of thought, law as a coercive order implied the use of 
sanction, and that element differentiates it from other types of orders —such as 
religious and moral orders— which are based on voluntary obedience. This idea of 
order is linked with the vertical concept of law developed by Austin that was left 
behind by later positivist accounts, such as that of Hart. 
In any case, the general definition of ‘order’ that can be established away 
from that vertical idea of order as a ‘set of rules’ can be a starting point. However, 
there is a need for a clearer definition of the concepts and structures of such rules. 
In this sense, distinguishing between a regime and system can prove useful. 
The International Law Commission (ILC) refers to ‘regime’ and ‘self- 
contained regime’ as equivalents for ‘rule-complex’ or ‘new and special types of 
law’200 that seek to respond to new technical and functional requirements. From the 
report, it can be established that each regime is characterized by its own principles, 
expertise and its own ethos,201 with the claim of its binding force made by the 
relevant actors to be covered.202 
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The ILC fragmentation report refers to three types of regimes. First, where 
the violation of a ‘particular group of (primary) rules is accompanied by a special 
set of (secondary) rules concerning breach and reactions to breach’203. Second, 
regimes where there are special rules relating to a particular subject matter, and 
finally, rules and principles that regulate a certain problem area.204 The term 
‘regime’ used by ILC must be understood in the context of the main conclusion of 
the report: ‘International law is a legal system’205; therefore, a regime must come 
from state consent. In this case, the reference to principles in the third type of self- 
contained regime can only be understood in the light of article 38(c) of the ICJ 
Statute. 
The ILC report includes neither the normative production nor forms of 
authority that are outside of the state consent in its definition of regime. However, 
it is useful to recall the logical distinction that is made between the concepts of 
‘regime’ and ‘system’. In the logic of the report, a system (international law) can 
be composed of several regimes; therefore, the differentiating element for a system 
is the existence of ‘meaningful relationships’ between rules expressed on a 
hierarchical level206. 
The word ‘regime’ has also been used in international relations theory. 
Specifically, the definition of regime by Stephen Krasner has been widely used by 
international law scholars. Krasner defines the concept in the following way: 
 
Sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior 
defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for 
making and implementing collective choice.207 
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Krasner’s definition was originally thought to apply to relations between states, but 
several authors have used this concept because it can also be adapted for normative 
production by fragments of society on a transnational dimension. However, the 
concepts expressed in the definition do not allow us to distinguish between certain 
elements such as between values and principles. 
In light of the descriptions provided, it can be concluded that while a regime 
involves the production of norms, such as rules and principles, with some coherence 
between them, a system implies a larger structure of hierarchy between those rules. 
In that case, it is possible to speak of transnational regimes to describe systems of 
rules that have not achieved a full hierarchical structure. 
If this conceptual understanding is accepted, it is still necessary to clarify 
when a set of norms has enough coherence to be considered a regime in the first 
place. In this case, the distinction between rules of the first and second type made 
by H.L. Hart can help as a measure of the complexity of a set of norms. To make a 
distinction between primary and secondary rules, he stated: 
 
While primary rules are concerned with the actions that individuals must or must not 
do, these secondary rules are all concerned with the primary rules themselves. They 
specify the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, 
introduced, eliminated varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively 
determined208 
 
On this basis, one criterion that can help to differentiate a group of rules 
from a legal regime is the existence of special criteria of validity that allow norms 
to be internalized by a regime. The absence of secondary rules that determine the 
content of the primary rules is what allows Hart to refer to a system as ‘primitive’. 
International law, according to Hart’s analysis, did not have those secondary rules. 
Later, several authors209, including Franck in his work on legitimacy, adopted 
 
 
 
208 Hart and Bulloch (n 26) 94 
209 See Cohen, Harlan Grant Cohen, "From International Law to International Conflicts of Law: The 
Fragmentation of Legitimacy" (2010) 104 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of 
International Law) 
64 
 
 
Hart´s distinction between primary and secondary rules but argued that 
international law does possess secondary rules though in a different form from those 
of national systems. 
If this criterion is incorporated in transnational dynamics, a normative order 
can also arise when fragments of society have developed criteria of validity, a type 
of ‘rules of recognition’ or loose? ‘secondary rules’ within or beyond the national 
and international systems. Therefore, conflicts on the current global setting can 
result not only from overlapping authorities but also from the use of overlapping 
criteria of normative validity. 
 
3.1.3 Communities 
States are not the only actors in the global legal setting: individuals and corporations 
have also been active in recent decades directly accessing international adjudicative 
bodies. In addition, the present work argues for the inclusion of the analysis of non- 
territorially-based sectors of global society that shape rules and generate types of 
authority that can coexist and sometimes compete with the authority of states. In 
this scenario, it is also important to clarify the terminology used. First, one needs 
to distinguish between society and community. Schwarzenberger provides a clear 
distinction between these concepts, defining community as a ‘social group in which 
behavior is based on the solidarity of members, a cohesive force without which the 
community cannot exist’210. On the other hand, society can be understood as a social 
group that coexists in a system that provides ‘adjustment of diverging interests’211. 
Therefore, society is a broader term and a society can be composed of a multiplicity 
of communities such that a single person could possibly be a member of several 
communities but is usually a member of just one society. 
The term community was also studied in the context of states by Karl 
Deutsch (1912–1992) who developed the idea of ‘security communities’ to describe 
the pluralistic formation of states that become integrated with a ‘sense of 
community’, which in turn creates the assurance that disputes will be settled without 
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war212. However, Deutsch’s ‘sense of community’ can be assimilated by 
Swazenberger’s idea of ‘solidarity’ for the purpose of this analysis. It is notable that 
Swazenberger draws this distinction in a 1936 article analyzing the term community 
in the context of states, when a Vattelian arrangement was intact, and did not aim 
to describe transnational communities. However, his definition allows for a 
distinction from the concept of society prevalent today. 
The transversal social dynamics that operate in forms of communities 
outside the territory of the state borders have generated a conceptual and 
terminological puzzle for international lawyers and scholars. In order to solve this 
riddle, there have been a series of terms imported into the legal debate to describe 
communities formed by such transversal dynamics, for instance: legal, 
transnational, epistemic, scientific, and normative dynamics. 
Some authors incorporate the term ‘legal communities’ and ‘communities 
of practice’ in their analyses. The latter term was taken from the international 
relations scholar Emanuel Adler213 who defines communities of practice as: 
 
People who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in 
learning and applying a common practice. (…) Such a common practice, “in turn, [is] 
sustained by a repertoire of communal resources, such as routines, words, tools, ways 
of doing things, stories, symbols, and discourse214 
 
Another term that has been incorporated into the debate215 is ‘epistemic 
communities’   which   originally   was   used   as   an   equivalent   to   ‘scientific 
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communities’ to refer to groups of professionals specifically in natural science,216 
but in 1992, Peter Hass, also an International Relations scholar, used it in an 
expanded context: 
 
An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area […] they have (1) a shared set of 
normative and principled beliefs […] (2) shared causal beliefs, (3) shared notions of 
validity- that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating 
knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise-that 
is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their 
professional competence is directed […]217 
 
The German legal scholar Günther Teubner has advanced a concept of transnational 
communities in the following terms: 
 
Transnational communities, or autonomous fragments of society, such as the 
globalized economy, science, technology, the mass media, medicine, education and 
transportation, are developing an enormous demand for regulating norms which 
cannot, however, be satisfied by national or international institutions. Instead, such 
autonomous societal fragments satisfy their own demands through a direct recourse to 
law. Increasingly, global private regimes are creating their own substantive law. They 
have recourse to their own sources of law, which lie outside spheres of national law- 
making and international treaties.218 
 
The transnational communities concept of Teubner, refers to ‘fragments of 
society’, which can be grouped together as a community cohesive enough to self- 
operate. He adds the element of the need for a normativity that is not satisfied under 
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the state or inter-state system, and the further production of ‘transnational legal 
regimes’ that are functionally differentiated rather than territorially219. Adopting 
Teubner’s terminology is useful; however, we should clarify that most of his theory 
is based on an evolution of Niklas Luhmann’s system theory,220 where the 
individual as a concern can get lost in the analysis, therefore the incorporation of 
this definition is not a blind addition to Teubner’s system theory. 
In order to avoid linguistic and conceptual confusion, two concepts of 
communities will be used in the present work: transnational communities and 
epistemic communities. The first one is shaped along the lines sketched by Teubner, 
and is compared to the idea of a normative order, explained later (see section 1.3 
b). In this case, a transnational community implies: an autonomous —self- 
directed—fragment of society, with solidarity as a cohesive force, that has 
developed or is in the process of developing a set of rules of recognition, or criteria 
of normative validity, within or beyond the nation state or the international legal 
system. 
In addition, the concept of epistemic communities taken from Peter Hass will 
be used to differentiate an autonomous fragment of society from a network of 
professionals that may be related to several transnational communities. This allows 
us to distinguish between transnational communities engaged in economic 
transactions and the epistemic arbitration community that is developing the 
international investment regime. 
The distinction is not a minor one because it hides a degree of complexity 
in the current legal setting. Global society has become so complex that there are 
several transnational communities engaged in different economic activities in need 
of normativity at the global level. So, the need for normativity has determined the 
development of regimes that can be shaped by a community of professionals —an 
epistemic community. 
The idea of a global or world society can further be analyzed221 at a level 
where all transnational and epistemic communities are integrated. However, it is far 
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beyond the focus of this work to study the existence (or non-existence) of such an 
entity. The only aim in the distinction of these two types of communities is to better 
understand normative developments in the field of foreign investment. 
The dynamics of the International Investment Law regime cannot be 
analyzed only from the inter-state logic of norm generation processes. This mean 
that additional ‘secondary rules’ on H-L. Hart terms —norms that allow other rules 
to be introduced to a legal system or regime— are shaping the regime. These 
dynamics lead us to distinguish the International Investment Law as a regime that 
has developed some coherence through the use of these types of ‘secondary rules’ 
and ‘decision-making procedures’222. 
 
3.2 The Normative Dimension of the International Investment Regime 
The investment regime is composed of two dimensions. The first —a normative 
one—constituted by the chaotic network that already had more than 3,268 
International Investment Agreements (IIAs) by the end of 2015, of which 2,923 
were bilateral investment treaties (BITs)223. Despite the great number of these types 
of treaties, they share a common structure composed of substantive rules and 
clauses introducing international arbitration as a means to solve disputes. In 
addition, there is a second dimension of the regime –a transnational one— that 
relies primarily on the decisions of a universe of state-investor disputes, and on the 
incorporation of investment contracts. There are already more than 700 known 
investor-state cases224, and more than 200 awards, that have developed a type of 
jurisprudence taken into consideration by new tribunals in future cases. 
Despite the high number of cases, there is only a single? group of arbitrators 
that actually decides these disputes, which means that a considerable number of 
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arbitrators are appointed several times.225In this context, lawyers, arbitrators and 
scholars specializing in investment constitute the International Investment 
Arbitration community226. However, this does not imply that the whole investment 
regime is based on the decisions of this group of people, because this so-called 
Investment Arbitration Community is only the visible part of a series of networks, 
ensembles, and other forms of global interactions involving cross-border 
transactions. This has promoted the creation of values, norms and principles that 
have been adopted from two epistemic communities: public international and 
international commercial lawyers.227 
The next two sections explain how the dynamics between these two 
dimensions—normative and transnational— of the international investment regime 
have created a type of authority outside the state level. It also explains how the 
regime has generated its own understanding of the three topics that have been 
covered by the word ‘legitimacy’: criteria of validity (legal legitimacy), acceptance 
(sociological legitimacy), and values for justifiability (moral legitimacy). 
Therefore, the conflicts that have arisen from the use of investment arbitration are 
conflicts not only of norms or interpretation of those norms, but also conflicts 
between global sectors of societies, and the forms of authorities created by them. 
The principal source of what is referred to as international investment law 
is the universe of more than 3,200 International Investment Agreements. The first 
agreement of this kind was the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between Germany 
and Pakistan on November 25, 1959228. This was followed by a second treaty signed 
on December 16th of the same year between Germany and the Dominican Republic. 
Over the next years, several European countries began negotiating similar treaties, 
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such as the following: France concluded an agreement with Chad in 1960, 
Switzerland with Tunisia in 1961, The Netherlands also with Tunisia in 1963, Italy 
with Guinea in 1964, and later a series of other European states followed the same 
practice229. 
These types of Investment agreements began to be used after several failures 
to achieve a multilateral agreement on investment, and represented a more suitable 
alternative for the protection of investment than other existing types of bilateral 
agreements such as the Friendship Navigation and Commerce treaties (FCN). 
The FCNs were a type of treaty originally used in the 18th and 19th centuries 
to strengthen alliances between nations, and usually covered a wide range of areas. 
For this reason, a second generation of FCNs re-emerged after the Second World 
War. Mainly, there were two types of post-war treaties: one used by the Soviet 
Union and another by the United States. The Soviet FCNs where characterized by 
a very broad scope of areas and with a limited development of substantial rules of 
protection230. On the other hand, the United States’ post-war FCNs provided a more 
comprehensive set of substantive rules. However, in the long run, these types of US 
FCN treaties lost ground against the European BIT programs. 
The BITs were preferred to the FCNs for several reasons. First, the scope of 
FCNs was too wide compared with that of the BITs. The FCNs developed 
substantive rules, but were focused on a series of other topics besides investment 
(i.e. trade, navigation rights, human rights) which meant that they were not so easy 
or quick to negotiate. Further, the focus of the protection was ‘property’. By 
contrast, European BITs contained the same substantive standards of protections as 
FCN treaties, but the scope was very specific: to protect ‘investment’231. Second, 
the FCNs usually used a reference to interstate mechanisms for the solution of 
disputes by the International Court of Justice. Since the end of the 1960s232, BITs 
started to use arbitration mechanisms from which investors could directly demand 
compensation for the breach of standards of treatment. 
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Consequently, many more BITs were negotiated, even though both types of 
treaties co-existed for some time. For instance, until 1972, Germany concluded 46 
BITs while in the same period the US signed only 2233. The US eventually put aside 
its FCN program to launch its own BIT negotiation program in 1977 during the 
presidency of Jimmy Carter, but it took time to ratify the new treaties in the US 
Senate. Finally, in March of 1989, the first USA BIT entered into force with 
Granada234 determining the beginning of an active program of negotiation of BITs 
that shaped the rules of these treaties over the next years. 
Despite the fact that the vast majority of BITs have been negotiated, most 
of them share a common structure of substantive provisions that can be divided into 
at least three groups of clauses used by states: scope of application provision, 
specific treatment provisions and general treatment provisions (standards of 
treatment). The following lines will briefly describe the substantive provisions by 
giving an overview of these three categories. 
 
3.2.1 Scope of Application Clauses 
The first type of provision seeks to determine the scope of application of an 
International Investment Agreement (IIA) either by defining the definition of the 
investment, the definition of nationality, or the definition of territory. 
 
3.2.1.1 Definition of Investment 
The definition of investment is crucial because it determines the scope of 
application of the whole treaty. There is not a single definition of investment, and 
the lack of a multilateral agreement has led to a wide variety of definitions emerging 
in the network of IIAs. The ICSID convention does not contain a definition; it only 
defines the jurisdiction of the Center of Disputes in the following way: 
 
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of 
an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency 
of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
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Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the 
Centre235 
 
The ICSID convention therefore limits its jurisdiction to ´legal disputes´ in 
order to rule out other types of situations like conflicts of interest that might arise 
from an investment, without providing any specific definition of the term. The 
underlying motive for this was to allow enough flexibility for the parties of a dispute 
to decide what constitutes an investment.236 Consequentially, the definition tends 
to be broad enough to include almost all type of economic activity arising from the 
mobilization of assets. 
In South American practice, states have usually adopted the model of 
developed countries such as the United States or European nations. In the case of 
the United States, there are three types of models that were used in the region —the 
BIT models of 1991, 1994, and 2004. The USA 1991-BIT model retained the 
structure of the clause from the previous models used in that country, especially the 
wording formula of the 1984 USA BIT model, but introduced changes to the 
illustrative list of assets included in the definition.237 One example of this type of 
treaty can be found in the Argentina-USA BIT of 1991: 
 
‘Investment’ means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned 
or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, 
such as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes without 
limitation: (i) tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as 
mortgages, liens and pledges; (ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests 
in a company or interests in the assets thereof; (iii) a claim to money or a claim 
to performance having economic value and directly related to an investment; 
(iv) intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to: literary 
and artistic works, including sound recordings, inventions in all fields of human 
endeavor, industrial designs, semiconductor mask works, trade secrets, know- 
 
 
 
235 art 25, "Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States" 1965. 
236 para 27 Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention 
237Vandevelde 119. 
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how, and confidential business information, and trademarks, service marks, and 
trade names; and (v) any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses 
and permits pursuant to law238 
 
In following years, the USA BIT Model that influenced the region was the 
introduction of the concept ´covered investment´ incorporated in the 1994 model, 
defined for example in the USA-Bolivia BIT as ´investment of a national or 
company of a Party in the territory of the other Party´239. As noted by Vandevelde, 
the distinction incorporated between ´investment´ and ´covered investment´ is 
useful because the treaty refers both to investments to which the treaty applies and 
other investments that are not covered, such as investments of nationals of the host 
state240. 
Finally, the 2004 USA-BIT model maintained the differentiation of covered 
investment and investment, but increased the scope of coverage by changes in the 
illustrative list of assets, such as the use of the word enterprise instead of company. 
It also introduced a new wider wording formula to define investment that would be 
included later in the BIT negotiated in the region with Uruguay, and in the Free 
Trade Agreements with Colombia and Peru. For example, the Uruguay-US BIT, 
uses the following formula: 
 
‘investment’ means every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, 
that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the 
commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the 
assumption of risk”241 
 
 
 
 
 
238 Article 1 "Treaty between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment", 1991). 
239 Article 1"Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the Republic of Bolivia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment," 1998). 
240 Vandevelde 120. 
241 art 1 "Treaty between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment" 2005. 
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The definitions of investment also incorporated by European negotiation 
programs used broad definitions, but not as detailed as the aforementioned USA 
models, while using the phrase ´every type of asset´ plus an illustrative list scheme. 
One example is the Peru-Netherlands BIT: 
(a) the term ‘investments’ shall comprise every kind of asset and more particularly, 
though not exclusively: i. movable and immovable property as well as any other rights 
in rem in respect of every kind of asset; ii. rights derived from shares, bonds and other 
kinds of interests in companies and joint ventures; iii. title to money and other assets 
and to any performance having an economic value; iv. intellectual and industrial 
property rights (such as copyrights, patents, industrial designs and models, trade or 
service marks and trade names), technical processes, goodwill and know-how; v. 
rights granted under public law, including rights to prospect, explore, extract and win 
natural resources242 
 
The same ´every type of asset´ formula has been used in the region by other 
European states; for instance, Germany has used very similar wording in its 
agreements with Chile243, Paraguay244, and Ecuador.245 
In the following years, after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the 
competence to negotiate treaties related to Foreign Investment was incorporated 
into the European Union Common Commercial Policy- established in article 3 of 
the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) - by the addition of the words ´foreign 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
242 art 1 "Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Peru" 1994. 
243 art 1 "Tratado entre la Republica de Chile y la Republica Federal de Alemania sobre Fomento y 
reciproca proteccion de Inversiones" 1991. 
244 art 1 "Tratado entre la Republica Federal de Alemania y la Republica del Paraguay sobre 
Fomento y recíproca protección de Inversiones de Capital" 1993. 
245 ibid. 
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investment´ in articles 206246 and 207247 of the Treaty of Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). In the use of this competence, the European Union started 
to negotiate IIAs with a different formula, similar to the one that appears in the 
consolidated text of CETA, which has not yet been ratified.248 However, this 
formula with is concept of investment has not yet entered into force in any country 
in South America. 
With the influence of both the USA and the European BIT Models, the 
South American countries incorporated the same wording formulas to define 
investment in the treaties celebrated between them. For example, the Ecuador-Chile 
BIT states the following definition inspired by the USA 1991 BIT-Model: 
 
El término ´Inversión´ designa, de conformidad con las leyes y reglamentaciones de 
la Parte Contratante en cuyo territorio se realiza la inversión, todo tipo de bienes y 
derechos relacionados con una inversión efectuada por un inversionista, de una Parte 
Contratante en el territorio de la otra Parte Contratante, de acuerdo con la legislación 
de esta última249 
 
Other inter-regional IIAs incorporate an express reference to the compliance 
with legal system of the host state, as one element in the definition of investment. 
 
 
 
246 art 206: “By establishing a customs union in accordance with Articles 28 to 32, the Union shall 
contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive 
abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of 
customs and other barriers.” 
247 207 TFEU.- “The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly 
with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade 
in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, 
the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization (…)” 
248 The text is the following: “Every kind of asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or 
indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, which includes a certain duration and 
other characteristics such as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain 
or profit, or the assumption of risk. Forms that an investment may take include” Available in <> 
accessed 23 September 2015. 
249 art 1 "Tratado Entre El Gobierno de la República de Chile y el Gobierno de la República del 
Ecuador para la promoción y Protección recíprocas ee Inversiones" 1993. 
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In this sense, the Paraguay– Chile BIT incorporates the condition of conformity 
with the legal framework of the host state. The wording formulation is the 
following: ´as long as it was made in accordance with the laws and regulations of 
the Contracting Party in whose territory it took place´250. 
Along the same lines, the Venezuela-Belarus BIT shows how the structure 
of drafting agreements is even adopted by countries that have been critical of the 
regime. In this case, the parties to the treaty are Venezuela, a South American 
country that has terminated most of its IIAs, and Belarus, a country resistant to 
participating in international economic regimes, uses a translation of the same 
wording formula included in the European treaties. In this treaty, there is the use of 
the word ´activo´251 as a reference to the English word ´asset´ used in the European 
treaties, while other countries have chosen the use of the Spanish word ´bien´ which 
has a broader doctrinal development in the legal tradition of the region. 
The aforementioned demonstrates that the structure of IIAs in South 
America has been influenced by European and US models, even when those states 
are not parties involved in the negotiations. 
 
3.2.1.2 Definition of Nationality 
The second delimitation of the scope of application of an Investment Agreement is 
determined by the nationality of the investor that accesses the legal protection. In 
much the same way as happened with the definition of investment, the USA and 
European models have influenced the South American region. 
The US models’ use of the word ´national´ in preference to ´citizen´ 
explains, in part, the use of this term in other agreements. In the US legal system, 
the term national has a broader meaning, and it was explicitly included for this 
purpose in a letter of submission presented on April 24, 2000 by the Secretary of 
the State at the time, Madeleine Albright, who explained: ´a native of American 
 
 
250 Author´s translation of the original in spanish: “siempre que ésta se haya efectuado de 
conformidad con las leyes y reglamentos de la Parte Contratante en cuyo territorio se realizó”, 
contained in art 1 of  "Acuerdo entre la Republica de Chile y la Republica del Paraguay para la 
Promocion y Proteccion Reciproca de las Inversiones" 1995. 
251 "Acuerdo entre la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la República de 
Belarús sobre Promoción y Protección recíproca de Inversiones" 2007. 
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Samoa is a national of the United States, but not a citizen´252. Taking this into 
account, the usual definition of a national of a party is as follows: “´national´ of a 
Party means a natural person who is a national of that Party under its Applicable 
law”.253 
In the evolution of the BITs program in the United States, dual criteria were 
included for each of the parties to the agreement regarding the nationality of the 
investor. For instance, the USA- Uruguay BIT includes each party’s legal standard 
of nationality254. In further treaties that were based on the 2004 USA- BIT model, 
such as the investment chapter of the Free Trade Agreement with Colombia, there 
is further use of the term ´investor of a party´ and the inclusion of state enterprises 
and a reference to dual nationality, absent in previous treaties. The text of the FTA 
Colombia-USA includes the following: 
 
investor of a Party means a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an 
enterprise of a Party, that attempts through concrete action to make, is making, or has 
made an investment in the territory of another Party; provided, however, that a natural 
person who is a dual national shall be deemed to be exclusively a national of the State 
of his or her dominant and effective nationality255 
 
The European Agreements usually choose the double standard of nationality 
for persons, where the law of each state determines the nationality criteria, as in the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
252 Letter of Submittal, US. Department of State, 24 April 2000, 
253 art 1 Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of Bolivia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment,. 
254 The text of the article 1 is drafted in the following way: “national” means: (a) for the United 
States, a natural person who is a national of the United States as defined in Title III of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act; and (b) for Uruguay, a natural person possessing the citizenship 
of Uruguay, in accordance with its laws., in Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Oriental  Republic  of  Uruguay  Concerning  the  Encouragement  and  Reciprocal  Protection  of 
Investment. Article 1. 
255 art 10.28 "Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and Colombia, Chapter 
X Investment" 2006. 
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Ecuador-Germany BIT256 and the Chile-Germany BIT.257 Other European models, 
such as that of the Dutch, use broader criteria of nationality that includes natural 
persons; legal persons constituted under the law of that Contracting Party; and legal 
persons wherever located, controlled, directly or indirectly, by nationals of that 
Contracting Party258. 
The intra-regional IIAs in the region were based on the European model, 
specifically the Dutch one. For example, the Chile-Paraguay BIT uses a concept 
that includes natural persons and a broad concept of legal entities, either established 
in the territory of the contracting parties or that conduct ´effective economic 
activities´.259 On the other hand, the Paraguay-Venezuela BIT incorporates the 
concept of legal entities established in the territory where the investment is made, 
which are ´effectively controlled´260 by nationals of the controlling parties. 
 
3.2.1.3 Definition of Territory 
The last concept that defines the scope of application of a treaty is the definition of 
a territory. This concept can be problematic since the duration and situation of each 
state is quite particular, and for these reasons each state can have an underlying 
motive for the inclusion of a particular element in the concept. For example, in the 
Argentina-USA BIT, there is mention of ´the territorial sea established in 
accordance  with  international  law  as  reflected  in  the  1982  United  Nations 
 
 
 
256 art 1.3 "Tratado Entre la República del Ecuador y la República Federal de Alemania sobre 
Fomento Y Recíproca Protección de Inversiones" 1996. 
257 art 1 Tratado entre la Republica de Chile y la Republica Federal de Alemania sobre Fomento y 
Reciproca Proteccion de Inversiones. 
258 art 1 (b) Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Peru. See also: the art 1 of the now terminated 
Venezuela-Netherlands BIT "Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Venezuela" 1991, and 
the art 1 of the Bolivia-Netherlands BIT "Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Bolivia" 1992. 
259 art 1.1 Acuerdo entre la Republica de Chile y la Republica del Paraguay para la Promocion y 
Proteccion Reciproca de las Inversiones. 
260art 1.2 "Convenio sobre la Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones entre el Gobierno 
de la República de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la República del Paraguay", 1996). 
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Convention on the Law of the Sea´.261 This reference to the Law of the Sea is 
peculiar considering that the United States is not a party to that Convention262. One 
typical clause introduces a definition of territory for each of the parties. For 
instance, the Uruguay- USA BIT introduces a different formula: 
 
(a) with respect to the United States, (i) the customs territory of the United States, 
which includes the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico; (ii) the foreign 
trade zones located in the United States and Puerto Rico; and (iii) any areas beyond 
the territorial seas of the United States within which, in accordance with international 
law and its domestic law, the United States may exercise rights with respect to the 
seabed and subsoil and their natural resources. 
(b) with respect to Uruguay, the land territory, internal waters, territorial sea, and air 
space under its sovereignty, and the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf 
within which it exercises sovereign rights and jurisdiction, in accordance with 
international law.263 
 
There are exceptional cases where because of political motives there is no 
express definition of ‘territory’ as in the case of the USA – Morocco FTA, because 
as noted by Vandevelde, the United States does not recognize Morocco’s claims to 
the Western Sahara 264. 
 
3.2.2 Specific Treatment Clauses 
The second category groups together specific commitments concerning the 
treatment of the investor of the other contractual party related to a range of topics, 
such as taxes, financial services, transparency, war, civil disturbance, etc. The 
following section will describe the nature of these specific treatment clauses, by 
illustrating the specific provisions that are used for the responsibility derived from 
armed conflicts. 
 
 
261 art 1. F) of Treaty between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment. 
262 See Vandevelde 170-171. 
263 Treaty between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment. 
264 Vandevelde. 
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The importance of any war-like provision is crucial in the adjudication 
process because it can contain the tacit or express recognition by the parties that 
they will enforce the treaty, even in the case of armed conflict. 
There can be two types of ‘war clauses’: compensation for losses clause, 
and security clauses. First, there is a compensation of damages for losses clause, 
when the state’s part of an International Investment Agreement (IIA) recognizes an 
express obligation to compensate for any damages that may be caused by the effects 
of a situation of violence. Compensation clauses can be sub-divided into two types: 
those having either an absolute or relative standard of responsibility. Absolute 
responsibility entails an obligation to compensate losses regarding the treatment to 
third parties, while relative responsibility entails a non-discrimination obligation to 
repair the losses of other nationals. 
The use of this type of clause introduces an understanding of armed conflict, 
as any type of violence that can generate losses for an investment. This tacit broad 
concept of ‘armed conflict’ distances itself from the conventional debate on 
distinguishing between international and non-international armed conflicts. This 
distinction is founded on public international law, and is based on the fact that States 
do not want to legitimize rebels or other armed groups265 or grant them some type 
of international personality. On the contrary, the conceptualization of armed 
conflict used for this type of clause is so braod that it can also include violence 
arising from ‘internal disturbances’. 
The broad concept of armed conflicts introduced in these types of clauses 
also increases the threshold of responsibility for States, because it can include recent 
armed conflicts that have been hard to categorize under the international/non- 
international distinction. Considering this, it is difficult for States to accept an 
absolute standard of compensation, and for this reason, it is more common to 
include a relative standard of treatment for compensation. For this reason, it is also 
extremely important to recognize the existence of transversal obligations that can 
arise either from the interpretation of general or specific ‘Most Favored Nation’ 
provisions in the treaty. For example, if State A grants investors from State B an 
 
 
265   Thilo Marauhn and Zacharie F Ntoubandi, "Armed Conflict, Non-International", Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law [MPEPIL]2011). 
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absolute standard of compensation of losses and later State A grants investors from 
State C a relative standard but with a non-discrimination obligation—either in the 
same compensation clause, or in a general MFN standard of treatment clause— it 
can result in spreading the absolute responsibility standard throughout its network 
of IIAs. 
The second types of clause that can be applied to armed conflicts are 
‘security clauses’. Their function is different from compensation clauses, because 
they do not impose an obligation to compensate266 on the state, but rather seek to 
exclude acts of the states from the threshold of responsibility. In other words, the 
function of a security clause is to limit the public authority of arbitrators for action 
related to security interests. 
The ‘war clauses’ are only an example of an investment treaty provision that 
can cluster together specific standard categories. As mentioned previously, others 
include a variety of specific commitments or standards that could vary from one 
model of treaty to another. 
 
3.2.3. General Treatment Clauses – Standards of Treatment 
This category groups the standards of treatment that are conceived as general and 
undetermined concepts which grant the arbitrators a wide range of interpretative 
powers. There are two types of standards: the absolute and the relative. The first 
evaluates the actions of the state without comparing them to the treatment granted 
to others (e.g. Fair and Equitable Treatment and Full Protection and Security). On 
the other hand, relative standards of treatment refer to norms that allow one to 
evaluate the lawfulness of the conduct of the state, compare it to the treatment 
received by either a national or the investor of another country, and embody the 
principle of non-discrimination (e.g. Most Favored Nation, National Treatment). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
266Josef Ostřanský, "The Termination and Suspension of Bilateral Investment Treaties Due to an 
Armed Conflict" (2015) 6 Journal of International Dispute Settlement. 144. 
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3.2.3.1 Relative Standards of Treatment 
Relative standards have been broadly defined as ´principles which define the 
required treatment by reference to the treatment accorded to other investment’267. 
In other words, relative standards are the expression of a principle of Non- 
discrimination that is embodied in two specific treatments: National Treatment 
(NT), and Most Favored Nation (MFN). In international trade law, these two 
standards are located at the core of World Trade Organization (WTO) legal 
frameworks, and have been incorporated into the general practice of IIAs. 
The inclusion of a National Treatment standard in an IIA determines the 
obligation of the host State to treat foreign investors in the same way as ´similarly 
situated national investors´268. The use of this standard has been traced back at least 
to early treaties in the 12th and 13th centuries269 and has been present in different 
forms in almost every international economic agreement. The insertion of NT in 
the normative dimension of the current investment regime was no exception. It can 
be found in the first BIT between Germany and Pakistan, and it has been used alone 
or in connection with other standards270. However, despite its wide use, NT has 
one limit within the investment regime: protecting investors against measures that 
the investor considers to be ´arbitrary´, when those measures are directed at both 
nationals and foreigners. This limit means that in investment law, unlike 
international trade law, relative standards need to engage with absolute ones. 
The second standard of treatment is Most Favored Nation status and can be 
understood as a ´provision in a treaty under which a state agrees to accord the other 
contracting party treatment that is no less favorable than that which it accords to 
 
 
 
 
267 "Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law”, Oecd Working 
Papers on 
International Investment, 2004/03, OECD Publishing < 
http://Dx.Doi.Org/10.1787/675702255435", 2004 2 
268 Andrea K. Bjorklund, “National Treatment” in August Reinisch, Standards of Investment 
Protection (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) 28. 
269 ibid 34. 
270 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral I Nvestment Treaties. History, Policy, and 
Interpretation,(Oxford Univ. Press 2010) 373. 
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other or third states’271. Its origins can be traced back at least to the 17th century272, 
but since then it has been used frequently in international trade agreements. Like 
the NT, the MFN clause was incorporated into the current normative dimension of 
the investment regime since the first BIT273, and during the first decades it was 
viewed more as a ‘relic’274 of old international economic practice. With the rise of 
investment arbitration at the end of the 19th century, the MFN acquired a special 
systemic importance for the investment regime. In this sense, MFN is perceived to 
create a ‘level playing field’275 among different foreign states that in turn also 
produces a horizontal integration effect across the universe of agreements. 
 
 
3.2.3.2 Absolute Standards of Treatment 
Absolute standards can be defined as the ones that establish a treatment for foreign 
investments in terms ´whose exact meaning has to be determined by reference to 
specific circumstances of application´276, and not in relation to the treatment offered 
by the host state to its own nationals, or the nationals of other states. There are 
usually three basic absolute standards incorporated in international investment 
agreements: Customary Minimum, Fair and Equitable Standard (FET), and Full 
Protection and Security (FPS). 
The absolute standards possess a dual nature: (a) as a source of public 
authority, and (b) as rules of recognition that allow adjudicators to internalize 
further norms in the process of interpretation. The standards have truly become 
secondary rules in themselves, in Hart’s terms, because they allow arbitrators to 
 
 
 
271 Andreas R. Ziegler, “Most-Favoured-Nation (NFN) Treatment” in Reinisch 60 
272 ibid 61. 
273 Vandevelde. 
274 Reinisch. 59 
275 Wenhua Shan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment a Comparative Study (Hart 2012) 
21. 
276 Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law”, OECD Working 
Papers on 
International Investment, 2004/03, OECD Publishing <http://Dx.Doi.Org/10.1787/675702255435. 
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create special primary rules in the exercise of interpretation. The most prominent 
example of standards of treatment acting as secondary norms is the Fair and 
Equitable Standard of Treatment (FET), used by arbitral tribunals in investment 
disputes in recent years, and the Full Protection and Security (FPS). These standards 
and their dual nature will be analyzed in more detail below. 
 
3.3 The Transnational Dimension of the Investment Regime 
In addition to the dense network of more than 3,200 treaties that compose the 
normative dimension of the international investment law regime, there is also a 
transnational dimension composed of the production of norms generated by 
transnational and epistemic global communities that have developed criteria of 
validity embodied in the standards of treatment. For this reason, the legitimacy of 
international investment disputes cannot be analyzed without acknowledging the 
transnational dynamics that are beneath the network of treaties and that have 
developed special obligations for States. These obligations have been developed in 
more than 700 arbitral awards that have created a type of arbitral precedent in the 
absence of one multilateral treaty or one single adjudicative body like an 
international court of arbitration. 
The following section will advance this idea by first pointing to specific 
‘sectorial constitutional’ moments of this transnational dimension that have gone 
unnoticed in historical accounts of the discipline, or have been mentioned only as 
anecdotes, without highlighting their importance. The next subsection within this 
section will discuss the role of previous awards and absolute standards of treatment 
at the center of the transnational dimension of the IIL regime. 
 
3.3.1 Two Sectorial Constitutional Moments 
The creation of a national legal system can be traced back to the origins of the state, 
where it is possible to determine the precise moment of its creation. Domestic legal 
orders are created with the enactment of a constitution — a legal starting point — 
that will set the foundational principles, and the rules of recognition, which indicate 
how norms will be created in the future. By contrast, regimes that have been created 
within the international arena, outside the state level, usually do not have such a 
definitive starting point; however, there is usually a series of legal developments 
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that can be termed constitutional moments, meaning legal pieces that can be 
identified as the starting point of a regime. In this case, the term ‘constitutional’ is 
used in a broader sense to designate those moments in which the systemic 
characteristics of a regime are being developed. 
This is the case for International Investment Law and its transnational 
dimension which was not created by one single treaty as in the case of the World 
Trade Organization, but rather across several constitutional moments. 
The normative dimension of the regime can be traced to the signature of the 
first Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), celebrated between Germany and Pakistan 
in 1959 and the BIT between Germany and the Dominican Republic, the first treaty 
of this kind that entered into force. In addition, another moment inside the 
normative dimension was the signature of the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID 
Convention) in 1965. 
There has been insufficient attention to the history of the development of 
the transnational dimension and most references to it have been included in the 
general narrative of the evolution of the protection of investment in international 
law. However, if the argument is for the existence of a transnational dimension that 
interacts and shapes the normative one, then it is important to establish a trajectory 
for its historical development. In this sense, there are important moments in the 
construction of the transnational dimension of international investment law. Two 
are brought up here: The Abs- Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad 
and the AAPL vs. Sri Lanka case. 
 
3.3.1.1 Abs-Shawcross  Draft  Convention  On  Investments 
Abroad 
The first constitutional moment of the transnational dimension of the international 
investment law regime was the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments 
Abroad. The Draft convention emerged from the evolution of several non- 
governmental efforts over the last decade but, more precisely, resulted from the 
combination of two works. The first was a draft developed by the Society to 
Advance the Protection of Foreign Investments, led by Herman Abs, the Director- 
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General of Deutsche Bank277. The second was the work of a group of lawyers, 
headed by Lord Shawcross, in 1959278. The combined result has become known as 
the Abs-Shawcross Draft. Its main characteristic is that no government, state or 
international organization of states conceived the Convention; on the contrary, it 
was conceived by professionals with legal and economic backgrounds who actually 
engage in trans-border economic transactions. For this reason, this convention is 
the expression —a sort of manifesto— of the transnational character of 
international investment law. 
The draft was an answer to a question that Lord Shawcross posed a couple 
of years earlier in the following way: 
 
[…] Private investors invest to make profit, not for reasons of benevolence. They are 
prepared to take the often very considerable commercial risks, which are inherent in 
the establishment of new enterprises. But if they make profits they not unnaturally 
expect that, subject to normal taxation, they will be entitled to keep them. If they 
acquire property they expect to be entitled to keep it. It is the feeling of insecurity in 
these respects, caused by bitter experience in the past, which is perhaps the main 
deterrent to the flow of private capital to the developing countries. What then does 
Public International Law do, or can it do, to regulate these relationships and provide 
the order and security that we are accustomed to find for them under civilized 
municipal systems? 
 
The answer to this specific question, ´What then does public international 
law do to provide order and security? ´, synthesizes the essence of the development 
of a regime based not on the regulation of a transaction, but exclusively on the 
protection of investment with an emphasis on the need to create279 a specific ‘order’. 
 
 
 
277 Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties Standards and 
Treatment (Wolters Kluwer 2009) 21. 
278 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment "the World Bank Guidelines" 
(Nijhoff 1993). 
279 This explains the conception of this investment regime as one which “protects” investors and it 
is for this reason it is criticized by the current regime. For a current critique of the “protective” 
character of international investment law see Yadira  Castillo Meneses, El Sesgo de Debilidad a 
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The final version of the Abs-Shawcross Draft addressed the quest for ‘order 
and security’ for foreign investors with a structure that has become the basis for the 
transnational dimension and later also shaped the normative dimension, in the sense 
that it came to determine the structure of IIAs. It did so by establishing a wide range 
of standards of treatment as the substantive element and arbitration as the only 
procedural answer. In this sense, the very first article of the Abs-Shawcross Draft 
contained an extensive version of the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard and 
constant protection: 
 
Each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of the 
nationals of the other Parties. Such property shall be accorded the most constant 
protection and security within the territories of the other Parties and the management, 
use, and enjoyment thereof shall not in any way be impaired by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures280 
 
The standards elaborated within the above article are not a minor provision, 
because they would evolve in the following decades along dual paths, as criteria of 
validity, and as norms that generate a type of public authority. For these reasons, 
this particular Convention can be considered a defining constitutional moment in 
the history of the current international investment law Regime. It became a sort of 
manifesto. 
The importance of this instrument has been underestimated by the doctrine, 
maybe due to the fact that the convention, as such, never entered into force. For this 
reason, references to the convention are included in the list of failed attempts by 
non-governmental initiatives to construct agreements for foreign investment. The 
first of these non-governmental attempts was the ´International Code of Fair 
Treatment for Foreign Investments drawn´ and was created by the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC).   The text was developed by the Committees on 
 
 
 
Favor del Inversionista Extranjero un Límite a la Responsabilidad Internacional de las 
Corporaciones Transnacionales (Universidad de los Andes 2015). 
280  Georg Schwarzenberger, "The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad: A 
Critical Commentary" (1960). 
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Foreign Investments and Foreign Establishments in 1949, and the Code included a 
reference to ´fair treatment, as hereinafter defined´,281 which limits its scope of 
application to the text of the code, and is not so wide as the absolute ´fair and 
equitable treatment´ formula that would later be developed. In addition, this Code 
did not include an investor-state arbitration282 process for resolving disputes and 
only stated an obligation to provide access to the domestic courts under the same 
conditions as nationals and to be entitled to ´appear before the competent 
administrative authorities´.283 
During the same time, another attempt, the ´Draft Statutes of the Arbitral 
Tribunal for Foreign Investment and the Foreign Investments Court´ was made by 
the International Law Association (ILA). The importance of this instrument was 
that it provided a private-public arbitral mechanism in the following terms: ´A 
national of one of the Parties claiming that between him and a Party there exists a 
dispute within the meaning of Article 1 may institute proceedings against this 
Party´284. This idea of private-public arbitration was later incorporated into the Abs- 
Shawcross Draft, in the following way: 
 
A national of one of the Parties claiming that he has been injured by measures in 
breach of this Convention may institute proceedings against the Party responsible for 
such measures before the Arbitral Tribunal referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, 
provided that the Party against which the claim is made has declared that it accepts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
281 art 2 of the International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments drawn up by the I.C.C.'s 
Committees on Foreign Investments and Foreign Establishments and approved by the I.C.C.'s 
Quebec Congress (June 1949). Text available in "International Investment Instruments: A 
Compendium. Regional Integration, Bilateral and Non-Governmental Instruments" (UNITED 
NATIONS 1996). 
282 The draft contemplates the possibility of state-state arbitration. 
283 art 5 of the Code at International Investment Instruments: a Compendium. Regional Integration, 
Bilateral and Non-Governmental Instruments. 
284 art 3 of "Draft Statutes of the Arbitral Tribunal for Foreign Investment and the Foreign 
Investments Court", available in ibid. 
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the jurisdiction of the said Arbitral Tribunal in respect of claims by nationals of one 
or more Parties, including the Party concerned.285 
 
The Abs-Shawcross, is therefore the refined and concrete expression of 
previous efforts by fragments of society involved in the transnational economic 
activities of the time. First, it developed a better and broader clause for a minimal 
absolute standard than that provided in the draft of the International Chamber of 
Commerce; and, at the same time, it included an improved version of the procedural 
private-public mechanism from the draft of the International Law Association. 
These unique features differentiate the Abs-Shawcross from other non- 
governmental attempts such as the Harvard Convention on the International 
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, drafted in 1961 by Lous Sohn and 
Richard Baxter at the request of the UN Secretariat. This effort was an attempt to 
codify the existing rules of State responsibility and for this reason it contained 
neither a reference to the Fair and Equitable Standard of Treatment (FET) nor a 
private-public process for the resolution of disputes. 
The Abs-Shawcross never achieved the form of a multilateral treaty, as was 
the original objective of its drafters. However, its importance should not be 
underestimated. The Draft was a transnational manifesto that contained both the 
substantive and procedural features that four decades later—for better or for 
worse— began to work as a regime with two dimensions. 
 
3.3.1.2 The APLL vs Sri Lanka case 
The APLL vs Sri Lanka case has special significance for the construction of the 
investment regime. There are two reasons. It was the first known case286 that arose 
from the network of BITs that had begun to be signed in the second half of the 
century and was submitted to the ICSID for arbitration. Second, it is the only 
investment arbitration case involving a conflict with a State undergoing a major 
 
 
 
285 art 7, Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (Abs-Shawcross draft convention), available in 
"International Investment Instruments: A Compendium" (UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 
ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 2003). 
286 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (Aapl) V. Republic of Sri Lanka, International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disput ICSID Case No. ARB/87/31990 para 18. 
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armed conflict. Although there had been some important cases involving violence, 
none came close to the scenario of the civil war of Sri Lanka. 
The background of the conflict in Sri Lanka includes decades of internal 
struggles. The tensions, between the Sinhalese dominated government and the 
ethnic group of Tamils, were triggered on the 4th August 1983 when a 
constitutional amendment287 banned political parties and individuals that advocated 
separatism from the country288. This amendment put an end to the agenda of the 
Tamil to operate from inside the system to create their own state,289 giving license 
to the armed branches, especially the group known as the Tamil Tigers. The result 
was a conflict that continued for the next three decades between the Sri Lankan 
government and the radical sector of the Tamils. 
The arbitration proceeding arose from an investment made by Asian 
Agricultural Products Ltd, a Hong Kong corporation, in the form of equity capital 
of the public company Serendib Seafoods LTD. with the purpose of undertaking 
‘shrimp culture’290 in Sri Lanka. The company constructed and operated a shrimp 
farm in the north part of the country- a place where most combat took place. In 
January of 1987, this farm was destroyed in an armed operation by the government 
of Sri Lanka. There is no certainty about what exactly happened that day. The 
 
 
 
 
287 See Alan J. Bullion, India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Crisis 1976 - 1994 ; an International 
Perspective (Pinter 1995) 32-34. 
288 The circumstances that lead to this conflict are without any doubt far more complex than the 
amendment of 1983. However, this moment has been recognized, even by people very close to 
Jayewardene’s government at the time, as the turning event that precluded any attempt to find an 
understanding between the Sinhalese government and the Tamil. Bullion writes in his memories: 
“The Tamil United Liberation Front, could have negotiated the details of such an arrangement with 
a Sinhalese government. But the Sinhalese government committed the error of enacting the Sixth 
Amendment…” Alfred Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil 
Conflict (Hurst 1988) 228. 
289 The main political party was the Tamil United Liberation Front TULF that re united the so- 
called Ceylon Tamils, the Indian Tamils and the Tamil speaking Muslims that united in the year of 
1976 in the Pannakam convention. One of the objectives of the convention was a mandate to 
establish a sovereign secular socialist State of Tamil Eelam. See ibid 89-95. 
290 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) . Republic of Sri Lanka  para 3. 
91 
 
 
arbitral tribunal concluded that there was no ´convincing´ or ´reliable´291 evidence 
to sufficiently sustain the investor´s allegation that the fire?, which caused the 
destruction of the property, resulted from acts committed by government troops. 
Six months later, the investor requested an ICSID arbitration to seek 
compensation for the loss of the property of the company during military actions, 
and it based its claim on the provisions contained in the 1980 UK-Sri Lanka BIT292 
that had been extended to Hong Kong the next year293. In this treaty, two clauses 
can determine the responsibility of the State. First, article 2 contains the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment, and Full Protection and Security standards294. The second 
provision is article 4 of the UK- Sri Lanka BIT, which includes a specific 
compensation for losses clause with two provisions. One established a non- 
discrimination treatment —national and MFN treatment— in terms of restitution or 
compensation to be paid by the Sri Lankan government in the case of armed 
conflicts.295 A second provision in the same article extends the obligation to 
compensate in the cases of losses during armed conflicts excluding those damages 
that arose in ´combat action´296. 
To summarize, the UK-Sri Lanka BIT included three clauses that were 
possibly applicable to the case: (i) FPS standard; (ii) Non- Discrimination for 
 
 
 
291 ibid para 59. 
292 "Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments" 1980). 
293 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v Republic of Sri Lanka para 1. 
294 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments. art 2. 
295 The text reads as follows, article 4: “(1) Nationals or companies of one Contracting Party 
whose investments in the territory of the other Contracting Party suffer losses owing to war or 
other armed conflict, revolution, a state of national emergency, revolt, insurrection or riot in the 
territory of the latter contracting Party shall be accorded by the latter Contracting Party 
treatment, as regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or other setdement, no less 
favourable than that which the latter Contracting Party accords to its own nationals or companies 
of any third State.” Ibid. 
296 ibid art 4.2 (b) 
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compensation of losses, (iii) and a specific provision to exclude necessary actions 
during combat.  In  this sense,  the tribunal recognized that rebel Tamil forces 
occupied   the   territory   where   the   company   was   operating297.   Second,   it 
acknowledged  the  existence  of  a  combat  situation298;  and,  third  that  the 
circumstances of the destruction of the farm were not clear.299 In any case, it was 
determined  that  the  State  had  responsibility  for  lack  of  due  diligence  under 
international law that in connection with the Full Protection and Security Standard. 
There appears to be a contradiction in the reasoning of the Tribunal, because 
it is not clear how the tribunal found that Sri-Lanka had not exercised Due Diligence 
in the first place, if the same tribunal concluded several times that what actually 
happened could not be known.300 
As a result, the Tribunal argument represents a four-step chain of elements 
that can be summarized in the following way: The government of Sri Lanka was 
given the burden of proof regarding the necessity of its actions as a pre-condition 
for the exclusion of the losses of the investor (article 4.2 BIT), and excluded its 
application. (b) It established that article 4.1 should be applied in the absence of the 
elements that exclude responsibility in article 4.2 of the BIT. (c) It also determined 
that the FPS standard should be applied as a renvoi from article 4.1. (d) It 
determined that due diligence was part of the FPS concept. (e) Finally, it analyzed 
that the government did not use a channel of communication that existed to 
 
 
 
297 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v Republic of Sri Lanka para 62. 
298 ibid paras 61, 62. 
299 Ibid paras 64, 85. 
300 The argument of the tribunal seems to be contained in the following text: 
´The Tribunal is of the opinion that reasonably the Government should have at least tried to use such 
peaceful available high level channel (referring to communication between security forces and the 
government explained in previews paragraph) of communication in order to get any suspect 
elements excluded from the farm's staff: This would have been essential to minimize the risks of 
killings and destruction when planning to undertake a vast military counterinsurgency operation in 
that area for regaining lost control. (…) 
Accordingly, the Tribunal considers that the Respondent through said inaction and omission violated 
its due diligence obligation which requires undertaking all possible measures that could be 
reasonably expected to prevent the eventual occurrence of killings and property destructions´ ibid. 
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communicate with the farm of the investor in order to prevent the destruction of the 
property. Therefore, for the Tribunal, this omission violated the due diligence 
obligation that was believed to be part of the Full Protection and Security standard. 
This extensive interpretation gives rise to at least two observations. First, 
the tribunal did not need to undergo such complex reasoning when it had a specific 
provision for the parties for armed conflicts, contained in article 4.2 of the BIT, as 
has been criticized both by the dissenting opinion of the third arbitrator, and by 
commentators301. Second, the tribunal determined the violation of due diligence 
even when the facts were not clear. 
The AAPL case illustrates the degree of authority —which in this case could 
have been unlawful— granted to arbitrators by the use of absolute standards, such 
as the Full Protection and Security, and it considerably raises the threshold of 
responsibility. It can be said that the Tribunal does not refer to the FPS as an 
absolute standard, but the reality shows that even with an express provision on the 
matter, a State that was involved in a complex armed conflict, at the end was 
responsible, not even for actions during hostilities, but for inactions. 
The AAPL case therefore is a moment of considerable importance in the 
development of the transnational dimension of the regime; this is because the 
Tribunal developed a capacity, coming from a treaty, to assess the actions of the 
state, using a direct remedy initiated by an investor. This case represents a break 
from the way in which investment disputes were dealt with in the past, not only 
because it allowed a private company to directly hold a State accountable, but also 
because of the power granted to arbitrators. In other words, this case was not the 
typical case involving an expropriation of an investment over the previous decades, 
or a matter related to commercial disputes. On the contrary, in this case the Tribunal 
directly evaluated, in great detail, the conduct of the state in the exercise of its 
competences during an armed conflict, and determined responsibility not for an act, 
but rather for what the State did not do. 
From this point on, states that entered into the normative dimension of the 
international investment regime by signing international investment agreements 
 
 
301 James Thuo Gathii, "War's Legacy in International Investment Law" (2009) 11 International 
Community Law Review 370-375. 
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started to lose a part of the control of the regime that was instead yielded to a new 
type of authority exercised by investment arbitrators. In addition, it was also the 
beginning of a transnational dimension that cannot be seen only as a mechanism to 
solve disputes, but also as an exercise of public authority that, in the present case, 
there are reasons to argue was unlawful. 
The importance of the AAPL award had also been undermined, and this case 
is usually referred to when explaining the FPS standard. However, it was the 
starting point for a trajectory that would expand and become more complex. It is 
without a doubt a moment that shaped the discipline and that showed the deficits of 
the regime that would arise in the following years302. 
 
3.3.2 Arbitrators Previous Decisions 
There are many criteria that can be used to interpret the nature of previous arbitral 
decisions on investment arbitration. In general international law, the previous 
decisions of courts are not, on their own, considered as sources, but rather seen as 
a subsidiary means to determine the content of an existing norm. This view is 
reinforced by the text of Article 38 (d) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (SICJ) which expresses that the ICJ will apply: ‘subject to the provisions of 
Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of ´rules 
of law´’. In this case, the language of the article clearly specifies ´judicial decisions´ 
as an auxiliary means to determine the ‘rules of law’. Even more, Article 59 in the 
article clarifies that ´the decision of the Court has no binding force except between 
 
 
 
302 These new types of cases generated a branch of law literature that started in the same decade and 
has continued up until the present. Among the important treaties that began to discuss the new 
regime after AAPL see: Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Nijhoff 
1995), Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary on the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2001), M. Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law 
International, 2000), M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment,(Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2004), Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment 
Law (Oxford Univ. Press 2008), Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International 
Investment Law (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). 
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the parties and in respect of that particular case´. In the light of the reasoning 
expressed in the SICJ there is no doubt that a previous decision would not constitute 
‘law’ by itself. In addition- strictly speaking in the formal sense- there is no 
connection between the different investment treaties since there is not a single one, 
but more than 3000 IIAs and there are as many adjudicative bodies as conflicts. 
However, the observation of international investment arbitration shows that 
parties of the system accorded previous decisions important value. In other words, 
there not only do investment arbitrators use past decisions to determine breaches of 
international norms, but also investors and the same respondent States who 
elaborate their own arguments also make specific reference to previous cases. This 
way of dealing with precedent can be found when reading almost every investment 
arbitration process. For example, it is common to see fragments like the following 
when a State is expressing an argument: 
 
Argentina argues that there are very few awards and authors that postulate the 
assertion that the standard of fair and equitable treatment is different from the 
minimum international standard. Based on the findings of the tribunals in Genin, 
Azinian, and S.D. Myers, Argentina considers that the meaning of this standard is 
“related to the purpose of providing a basic and general principle”, “constitutes a 
minimum international standard”, and “for it to be violated it is necessary that the 
State receiving the investment incur in acts that demonstrate a premeditated intent to 
not comply with an obligation, insufficient action falling below international standards 
or even subjective bad faith.” The Respondent emphasizes that in Myers the tribunal 
stated that Article 1105(1) of the NAFTA imposes “fair treatment at a level acceptable 
to the international community, measured with the highest degree of deference 
towards domestic authorities.” Thus, “[o]nly the reasonableness of the measure 
claimed to be grievous must be measured, and this, with deference.303 
 
This quoted text comes from the award in the case of Azurix Corp. vs. La 
República Argentina, and it can be seen that in a single argument Argentina uses 
three previous decisions with different legal backgrounds —based on different 
treaties  and  different  parties.  This  is  just  an  example,  but  the  same  way  of 
 
 
303 Azurix Corp. v La República Argentina, ICSID CASE No. ARB/01/12 2006 para 333 
96 
 
 
expressing arguments can be found by simply reading almost any current dispute, 
where the recurrence to previous decisions is not casual nor merely referential. 
Actually, it is the opposite: previous decisions are at the center of almost any legal 
argument on investment arbitration. Furthermore, new categories of concepts that 
were not expressly inserted in a treaty text have appeared in the last decade, i.e. 
Investor’s ‘legitimate or basic expectations´, among others. 
This observation of the state of international arbitration gives rise to a 
question that can be summarized in the following way: Why are previous arbitral 
decisions being used so actively to determine breaches by States and why are 
arbitral tribunals relying so much on them as a basis for their decisions? There are 
two trends that can subsume the possible answers given to this question. The first 
one denies any ‘law-a-like nature’ to previous decisions and looks at them just as 
‘sources of inspiration’ or reference, while the second one implies the 
acknowledgement that previous decisions indeed possess a degree of normativity 
but provides no consensus as to its nature. 
 
 
3.3.2.1 Previous decisions as a source of inspiration 
The first trend can lead to framing previous arbitral decisions as merely referential 
for the process of interpretation. This step was taken by some of the doctrine and 
arbitral tribunals304 during the beginning of the last decade, especially during the 
early NAFTA awards, where it was stressed that preview decisions cannot be 
considered as a source of obligations. Probably, one of the clearest statements in 
this sense comes from an award in 2002, where the Tribunal of UPS v. Canada 
stated: 
 
the many bilateral treaties for the protection of investments on which the argument 
depends vary in their substantive obligations; while they are large in number their 
coverage is limited; […] there is no indication that they reflect a general sense of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
304 See, Mills 475. 
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obligation. The failure of efforts to establish a multilateral agreement on investment 
provides further evidence of that lack of a sense of ob1igation305 
 
However, in the following years the number of references to previous cases 
would qualitatively and quantitatively increase306. An explanation for the emerging 
importance of previous decisions that nevertheless did not grant them any 
normative value would lead to redefining them not as de iure but rather as de facto 
sources, referring to them as ´material sources´307. From this perspective, arbitral 
decisions are in some way ´ sources of inspiration’,308 where they constitute valuable 
guidelines to investment tribunals since other arbitrators have been confronted with 
similar facts under different treaties that share a similar structure. In addition, this 
understanding also allows for framing a reference to previous decisions as ´sources 
of inspiration´ in the search for the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a treaty in the context of 
the article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention. 
The problem with this view is that it falls short of explaining three key 
developments in the practice of arbitral tribunals in recent years. The first one is 
that categorizing previous decisions only as ´sources of inspiration´ does not in 
itself explain the more frequent use of new concepts in investment awards, e.g. 
investors’ basic expectations or the principle of proportionality, that were not 
included in investment treaties in the first place. These new concepts are produced 
while analyzing claims over breaches of absolute standards that are vague like ´Fair 
and Equitable treatment´. In this case, it rather seems that investment tribunals, 
when quoting one another, are not only ‘looking’ for the ´ordinary meaning´ of 
standards in a treaty but are, in fact, ‘creating meaning’. 
 
 
 
305 United Parcel Service of America Inc v Government of Canada, Award on Jurisdiction 2002 
para 97, commented also on Mills 474-476. 
306 Jeffery P. Commission, "Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation Analysis of a 
Developing Jurisprudence", (2007) 24 Journal of International Arbitration,  Kluwer Law 
International. 
307 Eric De Brabandere, "Arbitral Decisions as a Source of International Investment Law", in 
Tarcisio Gazzini and Eric de Brabandere (eds.), International Investment Law : The Sources of 
Rights and Obligations (M. Nijhoff Publishers  2012) 247 
308 ibid 264. 
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The second feature that cannot be fully explained by seeing previous 
decisions only as ‘sources of inspiration’ is the systemic characteristics of the 
regime as a whole where a sense of community can be observed. While still chaotic, 
inside the universe of arbitral decisions we can observe at least trajectories —lines 
of decisions under the same logic— or ´dialogues´ between investment arbitrators, 
and the existence of an awareness on the part of arbitrators of the impact of the 
concepts that they are developing. One clear statement in this sense can be found in 
the 2010 award of the Tribunal of Global vs. Ukraine. This tribunal expressed the 
existence of a ‘responsibility to contribute’ in the following curious way: 
 
This is, to the Tribunal’s knowledge, only the third occasion on which a decision has 
had to be taken on an objection under Rule 41(5). The Tribunal is thus particularly 
conscious of its responsibility to contribute to shaping both an understanding of the 
Rule itself and of the procedure which ought to be followed under it,309 
 
The understanding of previous decisions as ‘sources of inspiration’ cannot 
cope with the current practice of investment arbitration, where tribunals are not only 
looking at and shaping the meaning of abstract provisions of treaties in themselves 
but are doing so by massively interacting with each other. 
The third feature that cannot be explained as ‘sources of inspiration’ or the 
search for the ‘ordinary meaning’ of absolute standards of treatment is that an 
arbitral award has the capacity to influence the outcome of future cases even if the 
new case will be based on a different treaty, with different parties, and different 
procedural rules, e.g. ICISD or UNCITRAL. 
In addition, even in the case that an arbitration tribunal does not resort to the 
use of a particular previous decision, it is enough that a past award could be used 
by one of the parties, and as has been shown, both States and investors refer to past 
awards frequently. In such cases, a group of arbitrators confronted with a specific 
previous decision must ‘resist’ applying it in their argumentation. If they just omit 
 
 
 
309 See Global Trading Resource Corp. And Globex International, Inc. And Ukraine, ICSID Case 
No ARB/09/11, International Centre For Settlement Of Investment Disputes December 1, 2010 
para 29; and see Brabandere 276. 
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to analyze a specific argument by one of the parties that was based on a previous 
decision, the group of arbitrators can be triggering a future annulment remedy in 
the context of ICSID or cause the non-enforceability of their own award in the case 
of? UNCITRAL based awards. This is because the omission to analyze the non- 
application of a concrete previous decision invoked by one of the parties could be 
used by the losing party in front of a domestic judge, to stop enforceability by 
arguing that it was not able to ‘present a case’ under art 5.1 (b) of the New York 
Convention for UNCITRAL cases, or in front of an Annulment ICSID panel to 
argue that the award failed to state the ‘reasons on which it is based’ according to 
rule 50.1 (iii) of the Arbitration Rules for ICISD awards. 
 
 
3.3.2.2 Previous Decisions as Expression of Normativity 
The second trend comprises positions that consider previous awards with sufficient 
coherence as having normative relevance rather than as a source of inspiration. In 
this sense, the first clear attempt can be traced back at least to Thomas Wälde’s 
separate opinion of 2006 in the case of Thunderbird v. Mexico, where he expressed 
the idea of ‘emerging jurisprudence’. Here he stated: 
 
I wish  to highlight  the need to  pay attention  and  respect to  the consolidating 
jurisprudence coalescing out of pertinent decisions of other authoritative arbitral 
tribunals, in particularly the more recent decisions applying the NAFTA and 
international investment treaties which have a similar methodology, procedure and 
substantive content to NAFTA Chapter XI. While there is no formal rule of precedent 
in international law, such awards and their reasoning form part of an emerging 
international investment law jurisprudence. This is again a significant difference from 
commercial arbitration where there is little authoritative and persuasive precedent, 
largely because the awards are exclusively formulated for the private parties and 
because they are generally not publicly available. Investment treaty tribunals should 
therefore place themselves in the centre of emerging international investment law 
rather than at or beyond the margin. 
While individual arbitral awards by themselves do not as yet constitute a binding 
precedent, a consistent line of reasoning developing a principle and a particular 
interpretation of specific treaty obligations should be respected; if an authoritative 
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jurisprudence evolves, it will acquire the character of customary international law and 
must be respected. A deviation from well and firmly established jurisprudence 
requires an extensively reasoned justification. This approach will help to avoid the 
wide divergences that characterises some investment arbitral awards – not subject to 
a common and unifying appeals’ authority. Otherwise, there is the risk of discrediting 
the health of the system of international investment arbitration which has been set up 
as one of the major new tools in improving good governance in the global economy. 
But it is also mandated by the reference to applicable rules of international Law (Art. 
1131 NAFTA) and thereby Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: 
An increasingly continuous, uncontested and consistent modern arbitral jurisprudence 
is part of the authoritative source of international law embodied in “judicial decisions” 
(Art. 38 (1) (d)) and will develop, with an even greater legally binding effect, into 
“international custom (Art. 38 (1) (b)), in particular as an arbitral jurisprudence defines 
in a contemporary treaty and factual context the “general principles of law”310 
 
This strong argument for the recognition of the role of investment tribunal 
awards advances the categorization of awards as ‘consolidating jurisprudence’, and 
links this jurisprudence to sources of international law, while expressing that the 
decisions could constitute ‘general principles’ of customary international law in the 
context of Article 38 (b) of the SICJ. Wälde’s vision of the role of previous 
decisions could be considered as a body of precedents suspended in the process of 
materializing into customary international law. The problem with this view is that 
in these decisions, the States are not actually participating in the formation process, 
because it is the arbitral tribunals that are shaping the principles, which means 
customary law without a specific state practice. 
To answer this problem —the existence of customary international law 
without  concrete  State  practice—  the  defenders  of  this  view  provided  an 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
310 Thomas W. Wälde, Separate Opinion International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The 
United Mexican States, NAFTA arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Januart 26, 
2006 para 15 
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explanation by insisting that awards are forming customs inside a ‘new customary 
international law’311 paradigm- a position that has been resisted in the doctrine312. 
Other authors in the same decade explained the nature of previous decisions 
with different hypotheses like Matthew C. Porterfield’s idea of the ‘common law 
of investor’s rights’313. He draws a parallel between the formation of the ‘minimum 
standard of treatment’ of foreign investment —including the ‘fair and equitable 
standard’ that he sees as its new component— and the formation of Common Law 
by domestic courts in order to argue that such cannot constitute a ‘legitimate norm 
of international law’314. By attacking their legitimacy —in this case used as legal 
concept— he actually acknowledges the existence of the exercise of a questionable 
‘authority’ to create a continuously evolving international ‘common law of investor 
rights’315 that does not come from democratic expressions at the state level and 
where domestic parliaments —Porterfield refers to the US Congress— could not 
easily be amended. 
Over the next years, the number of investment cases, and therefore arbitral 
tribunals, would dramatically rise from the 300 known cases in 2007 to more than 
700 cases by the beginning of 2016316. This quantitative increase in cases also 
situated the use of previous decisions as a more constant feature in argumentation. 
This inclusion was explained by new arbitral tribunals in different ways, some of 
them following a similar pattern of argumentation, first pointing out that previews 
decisions are not binding for future cases but then giving them a systemic value. 
For instance, the Glamis Gold tribunal sees previous decisions as 
‘trajectories’ giving them a systemic importance. It argues this by drawing a 
 
 
 
 
311 Matthew C. Porterfield, "An International Common Law of Investors Rights" (2006) 27 
Journal of International Law, Available at:< http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss1/2> 
84-85 
312 See  Bernard Kishoiyian, "The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of 
Customary International Law" (1993) 14 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business. 
313 Porterfield. 
314 ibid.81. 
315 ibid. 
316 See the data of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. IIA Note issue 2, 2015. 
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distinction between the ‘primary mandate’317 of an arbitral tribunal which is to solve 
a dispute, and its subsidiary role in terms of an ‘awareness of the context in which 
it operates’. Inside this ‘awareness of the context’ previous decisions do not have 
‘precedential effect’ for the tribunal but an arbitral tribunal needs to communicate 
its reasons in case of ‘departing from major trends present in previous decisions’318. 
In this case, the sense of belonging to a system that generates the need of the tribunal 
to see other cases is evident. 
There are cases where, with no formal connection, the use of the same 
wording in an award by an arbitrator explains his reliance on previous decisions. 
Such cases are: Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, Saipem v. 
Bangladesh and AES Corporation v. the Argentina, where the same paragraph that 
argues for a ‘duty’ to adopt solutions established in consistent cases and to 
contribute to the development of investment law as a part of the ‘rule of law’ can 
be found. The fact that the same text is being reproduced in different and apparently 
unconnected awards is explained because all the awards share one arbitrator, 
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler. This is the text inserted in the three awards: 
 
The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, it 
is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international 
tribunals. The majority believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a 
duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also believes that, 
subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it 
has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of investment law, 
and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and 
investors towards the certainty of the rule of law.’319 
 
Other tribunals do not make any particular claim about their role or 
reference their duties, but simply heavily rely on previous decisions in their 
arguments.  Probably  the  strongest  categorization  comes  from  the  tribunal  of 
 
 
 
317 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v United States of America, UNCITRAL rules, award 7 june 2009 para 7. 
318 ibid. 
319 Burlington Resources Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/52010  para 100. 
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Occidental vs. Ecuador where, while analyzing the use of a principle of 
proportionality in investment arbitration, the tribunal made a reference to a growing 
body of ‘arbitral law’320, to refer to the previous decisions that were discussed. The 
Occidental tribunal does not provide any definition of the nature of this ‘body of 
arbitral law’, but they refer to past decisions as ‘law’, indicating that in the current 
practice previous decisions matter more than just ‘material sources’. 
We can conclude that despite the absence of a clear doctrine of binding 
precedent in the field, through the extensive citation of earlier awards, arbitrators 
have acquired a “quasi-legislative”321 power that operates either as a ‘material 
source’ or as a sort of Razian ‘exclusionary reason’322 that narrows the field of 
reasons that an arbitrator can rely upon in reaching a new decision inside an 
epistemic community. Since awards are based on international law norms they 
constitute an ‘institutionalized power’ —an exercise of public authority— that is 
not so strong as to be labeled as ´law´, but neither so weak as to be labeled as a 
´source of inspiration´. 
 
3.3.3 The Systemic Nature of Absolute Standards of Treatment 
The standpoint of legal pluralism can be useful for a better analysis of the dynamics 
involved in international investment law, including the use of previous decisions, 
but in order to differentiate a transnational dynamic context, at least two elements 
must be present. The first is the existence of autonomous fragments of society that 
can be conceived as transnational communities whose demands for rules cannot be 
satisfied only at the national level.323  The international investment law regime is 
shaped as an autonomous fragment of global society rooted in the economic 
structures of cross-border transactions that are acknowledged in instruments like 
 
 
 
 
320 Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The 
Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No ARB/06/11) para 404. 
321 Catharine Titi, "The Arbitrator as a Lawmaker: Jurisgenerative Processes in Investment 
Arbitration" (2013) 14 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 851-852. 
322 Zachary Douglas, "Can a Doctrine of Precedent Be Justified in Investment Treaty Arbitration? 
" (2010) 25 ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal paras 6-7. 
323 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 1010. 
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the ICSID Convention,324 and it is visible in the emergence of an international 
“arbitration investment community” composed of lawyers, arbitrators and scholars 
specialising in investment arbitration.325 The second element is the existence of 
particular sources that are outside the national law-making process.326 These 
sources give life to specialised primary norms, and procedural norms on law making 
and law recognition.327 
The transnational sources of investment protection are rooted in investment 
contracts and the emerging interpretation of standards of treatment through the use 
of previous decisions. Among these the ‘fair and equitable’ and ‘full protection and 
security’ standards are the most dominant. 
 
 
3.3.3.1 Fair and Equitable Standard of Treatment 
Christoph Schreurer explains this standard by analogy with the tale of ‘sleeping 
beauty’328 because the wording ‘Fair and Equitable’ was included over decades in 
several international instruments but was only used by different actors and 
arbitrators in claims, from 2002 when the Mafezzini vs. Spain Tribunal used the 
FET for the first time329. This analogy synthesizes the history of the Standards that 
can be grouped into three periods or generations: the sleeping stage, awaking stage, 
and a third one that can be labeled as the limiting scope stage. 
 
 
 
 
324 See the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States, art 25(2)(b). 
325 M Hirsch, ‘The Sociology of International Investment Law’ in Douglas; Pauwelyn; Viñuales 
(eds), The Foundations of International Investment Law Bringing Theory into Practice (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2014) 146. 
326 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner. 1010. See also Teubner. 
327 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 1015. 
328 Christoph Schreurer, "Fair and Equitable Treatment in Investment Treaty Law, Introduction", 
Investment Treaty Law Current Issues II (The British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law 2007) 92. 
329 Rudolf Dolzer, "Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today's Contours" (2014) 12 Issue 1 
Symposium on the Law and Politics of Foreign Investment Santa Clara Journal of International 
Law. 
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The first period is the sleeping stage in which the FET wording can be 
considered void of any meaning. The main reason for this is that many international 
instruments that included the FET had not yet entered into force. The words ‘fair’ 
and ‘equitable’ were used in early treaties; specifically there is mention in the 
Treaty of Versailles in 1919 to the Members of the League of Nations to ‘make 
provision to secure and maintain (…) equitable treatment for the commerce of all 
Members of the League.’330 However, it is generally accepted that the starting point 
of the standard was the Havana Charter in 1948, and a few months later in the 
Bogota economical agreement, inside the Ninth International Conference of 
American States331. Both instruments did not have the support of the international 
community, yet remained important as the first instruments where the wording 
‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ was used.332 In the following decades, it was present in several 
instruments, most of them attempts at multilateral investment treaties, like the 
OECD Convention of 1967,333 and the UN Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations of 1983.334 
Still later, the evolution of the FET entered the awaking stage, which refers 
to the time where the wording was re-discovered in NAFTA litigation in the 
nineties. It was at this moment that the FET developed its nature as a rule of 
recognition, contributing to the expansion of investment regulation in the 
transnational dimension and, therefore, moving away from its traditional dimension 
 
 
 
330 Treaty of Peace with Germany, 28 June 1919, Article 23. Quoted by Steve Charnovitz, "What 
Is International Economic Law?" (2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 9 
331 art 22 of the “Convenio Económico de Bogotá los Estados Americanos representados en la 
Novena Conferencia Internacional Americana 2, Bogotá, 02 May 1948. 
332 See, José Gustavo Prieto Munoz, El Trato Justo y Equitativo en El Derecho Internacional de 
Inversiones (Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar y Corporación Editora Nacional 2013). 
333 See art 1.(a) “Each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property 
of the nationals of the other Parties”. In "Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreing 
Property", in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - OECD (ed.), 1967. 
334 See art. 48: “Transnational corporations should receive fair and equitable and non- 
discriminatory treatment under in accordance with the laws, regulations and administrative 
practice of the countries in which they operate (…) in "Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporation, Doc. E/C.10/1983, S.7", in UNITED NATIONS (ed) 1983). 
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of operation within international law. At this stage, arbitrators started to develop 
concepts applicable to investment that were not expressly drafted in treaties while 
trying to find an appropriate interpretation formula for these abstract words. In this 
context, the FET standard started to puzzle scholars and adjudicators who filled its 
content with a range of concepts between basic rights such as ‘denial of justice´ to 
more creative solutions like the ‘legitimate expectations’ of investors. 
In addition, two factors added complexity to the task of finding content in 
the FET wording. First, there is no single method for drafting the FET standard in 
the universe of IIAs, because every treaty uses different drafting formulas335. The 
many FET clauses in treaties can be organized into three groups: (i) when the 
wording 'Fair and Equitable’ appears alone in a clause. This case raises the question 
as to whether the FET wording implies a new standard of treatment or if it is an 
extension of the Customary Minimum Standard (CMS). (ii) The FET wording 
appears with a reference to the CMS. In this case, the FET standard is believed to 
be limited by the CMS; (iii) the FET standard appears next to other standards (e.g. 
National treatment, full protection and security). In this context, the logical question 
is whether the FET should be understood in context, or in relation to the other 
standard. The second factor to be considered is if the FET wording does or does not 
appear in the preamble of the Treaty. The preamble is important under the Vienna 
convention rules of interpretation, because it can help determine the context of a 
norm. Therefore, many tribunals used the wording of the preamble to boost 
creativity in applying the FET to a particular case. 
The combination of these two factors results in a very broad range of 
possibilities for the construction of the FET, and therefore, for its interpretation. 
The response to this complexity can follow two paths, using either restrictive or 
expansive criteria for interpretation of the scope of the standard. The restrictive path 
 
 
 
335 For a complete account of how the Standard is drafted see Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment (Oxford Univ. Press 2008). 
Also Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law”, OECD Working 
Papers          on          International          Investment,          2004/03,          OECD          Publishing 
<http://Dx.Doi.Org/10.1787/675702255435>; Patrick Dumberry, The Fair and  Equitable 
Treatment Standard a Guide to Nafta Case Law on Article 1105 (Kluwer Law Internat. 2013). 
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assumes that the FET must be understood restrictively, meaning no further than the 
CMS. In contrast, the broad or expansive view sees the FET as an independent 
standard. However, in any case, it retains the underlying task of giving a context to 
the Customary Minimum Standard applied to an investment, if such a thing exists 
in the first place. This unresolved task has led to creativity on the part of some 
adjudicators who have put forward the idea of an evolved CMS ‘on steroids’ as in 
the Pope vs. Talbot case. 
In this context, the FET, as a norm of international public law, empowered 
arbitrators - along with other provisions- with the sectorial constitutional capacity 
to internalize concepts that had never before been dealt with in public international 
law. The use of this constitutional power granted in the FET, was evident when 
arbitrators of investment disputes started encircling the described labyrinth of 
interpretative possibilities by quoting one another in order to internalize concepts - 
reasonable or not - to shape the current investment regime. The dual nature of the 
FET had been formed. 
The logical reaction was a response from states, even those who supported 
the regime, as they faced the increasing powers granted to arbitrators. This reaction 
brought about the third and current stage of the FET where there is an effort to limit 
the content of the standard by reducing the sectorial constitutional power of 
arbitrators. The mechanism has been the inclusion of clauses that provide a list of 
what is understood to be either FET or CMS. The starting point of this stage was 
within NAFTA, the same Legal Framework that unleashed the FET in the first 
place, when the NAFTA Commission enacted its interpretative note, in order to 
limit the scope of the FET in the Customary Minimum Standard. However, this 
attempt was limited by the fact that the CMI is also a broad concept. Faced with 
this criticism the Talbot's Tribunal stated that the CMI had evolved giving rise to 
new possibilities for interpretation. Since then the latest treaties contain details as 
to what is understood as FET, to limit the discretion of the adjudicators, and 
therefore limit its constitutional powers. One example of this new generation of 
clauses is the one included in the investment chapter in the Peru – United States 
agreement: 
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For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be 
afforded to covered investments. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and 
“full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that 
which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights. The 
obligation in paragraph 1 to provide: (a) “fair and equitable treatment” includes the 
obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory 
proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal 
legal systems of the world336 
 
The intention of the states is clearly to limit the creation of what is referred 
to as additional substantive rights. In any case, some room for discretion is left 
open, because in the same treaty there is a text inserted in the annexes: ‘the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens refers to all 
customary international law principles that protect the economic rights and interests 
of aliens.’337 This addition may help to further internalize concepts —and not only 
Denial of Justice and Due Process— as long as they can be justified as a principle 
to protect alien rights and interests. Therefore, there is some remaining sectorial 
constitutional potential in this type of clause. 
The last two generations of FET clauses coexist considering that the 
duration of an IIA ranges from 10 to 20 years, but their contribution to the 
development of II Law is considerable, specifically because it has allowed for the 
internalization of a series of concepts that despite already being considered 
universal had not previously enjoyed any application in the context of investment, 
i.e. Due Process, and Denial of Justice. In addition, new concepts were developed 
that had not been dealt with before while opening the door to a second layer of 
norms. These new concepts can be understood as secondary standards of investment 
protection, e.g. ‘legitimate expectations’ and ‘transparency standards’, and, they are 
composed of concepts that were not incorporated in any treaty provision, but were 
instead created by tribunals, most of the time in the exercise of interpretation of 
 
 
 
336 art 10.5 (2) of the "Peru - United States of America Trade Promotion Agreement" 2006. 
337 Annex 10-A Customary International Law, ibid. 
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other standards, e.g. ‘fair and equitable’, ‘no expropriation’. These norms lie at the 
core of the transnational dimension of international investment law. 
One prominent example of a secondary standard is that of the ‘legitimate’ 
or ‘basic’ ‘expectations’ of investors. Under this concept, a state has the unique 
obligation to protect not only the property of the investor but also the expectations 
generated by its own conduct. This idea dramatically increases the scope of 
responsibility undertaken by states. However, this wording formula ‘legitimate 
expectations’ does not appear in any investment treaty. The concept was extracted 
while arbitral tribunals were interpreting the FET standard. In other words, the 
‘legitimate expectations’ standard does not come from the express consent of the 
state, but from what arbitrators believe that state meant by the words ‘fair’ and 
‘equitable’. 
It is believed that the Tribunal of Tecmed vs. Mexico used this concept of 
‘basic expectations’ for the first time338 in the following way: 
 
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in light of the 
good faith principle established by international law, requires the Contracting Parties 
to provide international investments treatment which does not affect the basic 
expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the 
investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, 
free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, 
so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its 
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices 
or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations. 
[…]339 
 
 
 
 
 
338 Michele Potestà, "Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots 
and the Limits of a Controversial Concept", Society of International Economic Law (SIEL), 3rd 
Biennial   Global   Conference.   Available   at   SSRN:   <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2102771>   or 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.21027712012> 4. 
339 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v The United Mexican States Case No ARB (AF)/00/2, 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID. May 29, 2003 para 154. See 
also para 88. 
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The Tribunal does not provide any further reasoning for the inclusion of the 
concept of ‘basic expectations’ rather than this link with the principle of good faith. 
Since then, a domino effect caused by a series of arbitral tribunals has developed 
this idea340, with most tribunals merely quoting the Tecmed case. The use of this 
standard has generated a great debate about its boundaries. However, what seems 
important for a pluralistic debate is not whether the concept is reasonable, but rather 
the logic involved in reaching such a conclusion. The Tecmed Tribunal extracts this 
concept from the wording ‘fair and equitable’ that was in the text of a treaty. As 
stated before, under the logic of the Art. 38 of the Statue of the ICJ, a valid rule can 
come from principal sources: conventions, custom, and general principles of law. 
The Tecmed Tribunal chose to establish the obligation of respecting the ‘basic 
expectations’ from the first source – the BIT signed between Mexico and Spain. 
However, this treaty does not contain any reference to such an obligation. For that 
reason, the Tribunal arrives at its conclusion by using the methods of interpretation 
of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Concretely, it was established that the 
‘ordinary meaning’ of the words ‘fair’ and equitable’ are drafted in the BIT. The 
reasoning is as follows: 
 
The Arbitral Tribunal understands that the scope of the undertaking of fair and 
equitable treatment under Article 4(1) of the Agreement described above is that 
resulting from an autonomous interpretation, taking into account the text of Article 
4(1) of the Agreement according to its ordinary meaning (Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention), or from international law and the good faith principle, on the basis of 
which the scope of the obligation assumed under the Agreement and the actions 
related to compliance therewith are to be assessed.341 
 
From this point on, the development of the concept used this award as a 
precedent for the existence of an obligation to protect the expectations of the 
investor. The debate centered on three different ramifications of the concept; one 
 
 
340 Trevor J. Zeyl, "Charting the Wrong Course: The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations in 
Investment Treaty Law (March 3, 2011)", 2011) 27-28. 
341 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v The United Mexican States Case No ARB (AF)/00/2 
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related to the nature of the expectation generated by express promises on the part 
of a State, a second based on the nature of ‘unilateral declarations’ by that State, 
and the last referring to changes in the ‘regulatory framework’342. However, all of 
the discussions revolved around the series of awards generated after Tecmed. 
Notwithstanding, it does not sound coherent that such a sophisticated 
meaning can come from the ‘ordinary meaning' of the words ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’. 
From this perspective, almost anything could be inferred from those words plus the 
principle of good faith. After all, if States wanted to elevate the protection of the 
investment, it is logical that they would introduce express provisions in treaties 
rather than wait for a group of arbitrators to interpret such a high level of 
commitment. Moreover, the concept has been linked to other sources such as 
custom and principles. However, it becomes even more difficult to establish a series 
of repetitive acts with the element of opinio juris in such a way as to believe that 
states recognize the standard. On the other hand, ‘legitimate expectations’ have 
been linked to the source of general principles of law that can be found in local 
administrative law systems. Even though this seems like a more coherent line of 
argumentation, it leads to two observations. The first is that the notion of ‘legitimate 
expectations’ used in Tecmed does not base any argumentation on this point of 
view. Other tribunals developed the standard in a more coherent way while many 
others just quote one another. In other words, the standard was not internalized as 
a principle; this idea came later as a way of understanding it. The second 
observation is that there is no single uniform expression of legitimate expectation 
in local administrative systems.343 In fact, many domestic systems do not even 
recognize this concept. 
The inconsistency of the argument of tribunals for the inclusion of 
secondary standards leads to the following questions: 1) If states do not expressly 
establish high standards for protection such as ‘legitimate’ or ‘basic expectations’ 
as well as others, then why did tribunals start to include this extensive 
argumentative reasoning?; 2) Why is such sophisticated argumentation needed to 
extract the 'ordinary meaning’ of a provision that had already been used for many 
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years?  The  FET  standard  was  used  in  binding  treaties  for  years,  but  this 
interpretation only emerged over the last 15 years. 
The answer to the above questions is rather simple: because it has proven to 
be effective. It is not just a mere coincidence that the FET standard was developed 
at the end of a decade that saw investment flow quadrupling. In other words, a 
specialized sector of a global society eagerly wanted this further development of 
the legal framework that regulated their activities. These standards of treatment 
transport the international law to the 21st century leaving many theoretical gaps 
behind. This is because previously the international law simply did not fulfill the 
needs of transnational communities. 
There is one thing for sure; the general international law that dealt with 
investment was binary in essence. It had been reduced for a long time to a dilemma: 
to expropriate or not to expropriate? When after centuries the answer to that 
question was defined through military aggression and nationalization in some 
countries, e.g. the Soviet Union and Mexico, the discipline evolved one step 
towards the next dilemma: to pay compensation or not to pay compensation?344 On 
the last years , investment transactions grow quantitatively and qualitatively, and 
so conflicts arise from such transactions became more complex. 
After failing to negotiate trade and investment regimes in the Havana 
Charter in 1948, the international investment community observed how its twin 
branch, international trade law, was evolving into a series of negotiation rounds 
within a single complex multilateral agreement. Since the signature of the first BIT 
between Germany and Pakistan, the regulation of investment expanded into 
bilateralism. In this context, the standards of treatment, especially the FET, went 
beyond being a standard. They became Hart's secondary rule itself: The FET -along 
with other standards- became the source itself. The standards became the ‘rules of 
recognition’ for a tribunal centric Regime. 
 
3.3.3.2 Full Protection and Security Standard 
The ‘Full Protection and Security’ standard is incorporated in the same clause as 
the FET standard. There is no certainty about the origin and first use of the FPS 
 
 
344 This step was taken by the hull formula after the nationalization in 1933. 
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concept, unlike the FET standard which can be traced back to the Havana Charter 
in 1948. David Collins traced the origins of FPS to at least an 1833 Friendship, 
Commerce  and  Navigation  Treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Chile345. 
However, the text of the old treaty was more specific and less ambiguous than the 
one seen today because it clearly introduced the idea of the protection of aliens in 
the context of non-discrimination from nationals and providing access to justice.346 
The FPS allows tribunals either to internalize concepts in the Investment 
Regime or to re-contextualize general international law concepts, whose application 
in the investment context was not clear. As a result, the FET and FPS have given 
rise to contradictory interpretations of arbitral tribunals, where there is no consensus 
as to whether the two standards are actually independent from one another.347 
Inside its systemic function, the FPS has been used to internalize at least 
two different rules of responsibility. First, the responsibility arising from the 
physical security of the investment, which includes violence, generated by private 
parties.348 Second, responsibility arising from legal protection, understood as 
providing means to investors to exercise their rights, and the use of the power of 
 
 
 
345 David Collins, "Applying the Full Protection and Security Standard of International Investment 
Law to Digital Assets" (2011)  J. World Investment & Trade 225. 228. 
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the states to protect the investor in matters beyond physical protection. There are 
cases like the BIT Argentina–Ukraine349, where there is a clear limitation to the 
legal protection, ‘plena protección legal’, of the investment. 
This extensive interpretation of both the legal and physical protection of the 
investment has generated calls to further establish the responsibility of states in 
order to protect against circumstances that were not contemplated during the 
celebration of a treaty that includes the FPS clause. For instance, there are 
interpretations that have made a connection between the FPS and the responsibility 
of states during cyber-attacks.350 
In addition, the FPS empowers arbitrators with a type of public authority, 
capable of controlling the power of the states under its own authority. The previous 
statement implies an understanding of authority that can only be developed within 
the following premise: the current global setting is characterized by an absence of 
a concept of absolute sovereignty, which means that the exercise of public authority 
is not exclusive to the State. Therefore, in some cases there may be a confluence of 
overlapping public authorities within the same physical space. 
It is believed that the authority of arbitrators arises from the clauses 
contained in the majority of IIAs, which specify an arbitration proceeding as a 
method for solving disputes. However, it is the absolute standards of treatment, i.e. 
FET, and FPS, used as undetermined concepts, which allow arbitrators to 
internalize concepts such as ‘previous decisions’ and to assess all kinds of state acts 
in two ways. First, it allows arbitrators to categorize acts of the state in the exercise 
of their competences as lawful/unlawful, and second it imposes a cost —economic 
compensation— in case an act is deemed to be unlawful. An argument can be made 
that investment arbitrators do not have the power to derogate domestic law or 
 
 
349 The text in Spanish language is the following: “Cada Parte Contratante, una vez que haya 
admitido inversiones de inversores de la otra Parte Contratante en su territorio, garantizará plena 
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regulation or to limit the state competencies in a formal way. This means that if the 
acts of the state are found unlawful, the tribunal does not have the power to change 
the legal situation of the investor in the host state, but to establish compensation. 
However, any compensation implies a reputational and economical cost for 
the country involved. This reputational cost may be difficult to assess, but it has to 
be acknowledged especially for developing countries who are attempting to develop 
a good reputation in order to attract flows of capital or for countries that have 
undergone armed conflicts who have similar needs. The economic cost can be 
significant. There are several examples of awards that have established 
compensations that are considerable, especially for a developing country. In 
addition, since the enforcement of awards is rooted in the mechanism of the ICSID 
conventions, the New York conventions, it is implied that non-compliance with an 
award can only be made with a considerable ‘degree of difficulty’.351 
The public authority of the investors is empowered by the use of open and 
broad concepts like FPS (or FET), because this allows for the inclusion of other 
concepts that were not expressly recognized in the text of the treaties. There are 
three argumentative paths, which while they are similar, result in the adjudicator 
enjoying a high level of discretion. 
First, the words ‘full protection and security’ without any further 
clarification in a text can be understood by arbitrators as a reference to an 
independent standard. If they are understood as such, a considerable degree of 
leeway exists to limit the scope of responsibility of the state in determining the 
lawfulness of any conduct. Defenders of this position could use the following 
reasoning: if the parties of a treaty wanted to refer to international custom, they 
would use the words ‘international custom’, therefore the meaning of ‘full 
protection and security’ must be a different concept. 
Second, is the argumentative path that sees the FPS as a reference to 
international custom. If the parties had wanted to include a very low threshold of 
responsibility, like a concept of ‘absolute responsibility’ for the FPS or ‘legitimate 
expectations’ on the part of the investors, these same parties would have chosen to 
 
 
 
351 Ibid 988. 
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incorporate such words in the text of the treaty. However, a new question will 
immediately arise: what is the minimum standard of treatment for investors in the 
21st century? 
The third argument that can be made is that the interpretation of the FPS has 
to be understood as a part of the FET standard since both wording formulas are 
often in the same clause, as in the following: ‘Investment shall at all times be 
accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security.’352 
In this case, the FPS can be considered an obligatory part of the FET. This case will 
lead to even more open questions with respect to defining the FPS, in the context 
of the words “fair” and “equitable”. 
As a result, any one of the argumentative paths that an adjudicator can 
take— to see the FPS as a part of international law, or as an independent standard— 
gives them a broad range of decisions; it empowers them. While the clause for 
arbitration inserted in a treaty allows arbitrators to solve disputes, standards of 
treatment such as the FPS confer broad power with respect to the categorization of 
lawful/unlawful acts, a true source of public authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
352 "Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ukraine on the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments"  (UNCTAD International Investment Agreements Database, in 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/498> accessed 29 August 2015, 
2002. 
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4. The Construction of a South American Principles Discourse in Times of 
Global Pluralism353 
 
Once international investment law is viewed in terms of the dynamic between its 
two dimensions (i.e. normative and transnational), understanding the legitimacy— 
validity, acceptance and moral justification— of investment adjudication becomes 
a more complex issue because it implies the co-existence of different norms, values 
and criteria of validity. There are two possible conceptual paths that can be taken 
given a pluralistic account. The first path entails a more radical pluralist 
conception, where the justifiability of the international investment regime is not a 
priority, given that fragments of society have collided and will continue to collide 
in the ‘messiness of hybridity’354, while in each new encounter, lawyers will be 
instrumental in defending the interests and values of the communities to which they 
belong. The second path, a counter-hypothesis, is to pursue the justifiability — a 
minimal one— of authority in the plural global legal arena beyond the national level 
where there is neither an ‘agent’ with superior resources that can use coercion to 
induce compliance, nor an ‘established national community’355 where a traditional 
democratic process can legitimize authority. 
The present chapter seeks to follow the second pluralist path by developing 
a legal discourse that considers the justifiability of public authority in terms of its 
degree of interaction, i.e. cooperation, coordination and toleration356, with other 
types of authority, alongside the development of a set of regional principles that can 
later spread through the same transnational sources of the international investment 
regime. 
 
 
 
 
353 A part of the research contained in the present chapter was published by the peer reviewed 
Journal of World Investment & Trade, in the article "The Rise of Common Principles for Investment 
in Latin America: Proposing a Methodological Shift for Investor-State Dispute Settlement", (2016) 
17 
354 Berman. 1237 
355 Law and Governance in Postnational Europe: Compliance Beyond the Nation-State 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005). 
356   Roughan. 258 
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This section takes on the challenge of providing a legal bridge between the 
rationality of investment arbitration while at the same time establishing the 
justifiability of the exercise of public authority at the domestic level in South 
American societies. One viable course of action is to systematize a set of common 
principles, which implies going beyond State consent to the legitimation of 
investment arbitration in the international arena and moving towards something 
more complex than a mere space for ‘power-based interactions’357 between 
sovereign States. 
In this specific context, a regional legal discourse can be pursued where the 
authority of investment adjudicators is justified if it observes the principles 
accepted by the societies affected by its decisions. A discourse-based approach to 
principles allows for a return to the main source, the ‘original fountain’358 of all 
legitimate authority— the people— and, at the same time, authorizes interaction 
with global regimes, because once a society has consented to be governed by 
specifically identified principles, they cannot reasonably object when those 
principles are applied.359 
The roadmap of this argument proceeds as follows: the construction of such 
a legal discourse needs to first be detached from the conceptual assumptions of 
Carlos Calvo, the Argentinean jurist of the 19th century whose ideas evolved within 
the framework of Vattel fundamentals into a doctrine that has been accepted across 
the region during the last two centuries and has even re-emerged in some countries 
in Latin America in the 21st century. 
Detachment from this doctrine leaves space for the justifiability of 
investment authority within a principles-based discourse. However, this discourse 
demands a basic framework that can be elaborated as having a structure with three 
clusters: First, a general group of concepts where compatibility exists between the 
fundamental public law of States with the general principles of law identified by 
 
 
 
357 Armin von Bogdandy, "Discourse Theory and International Law: An Interview with Jürgen 
Habermas, Verfblog, 2013/5/12, Http://Www.Verfassungsblog.De/En/Discourse-Theory-and- 
International-Law-an-Interview-with-Juergen-Habermas/", 2013). Accessed 1 March 2016. 
358 See Alexander Hamilton ‘No. 22’ in Hamilton. 112. 
359 Richard H. Fallon. 797. 
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arbitrators interpreting customary international law, such as the access to justice 
and due process. Second, an intermediate cluster that includes certain concepts 
present in the constitutions of South American States, i.e. Legal Certainty, which 
have a degree of compatibility with interpretations in investment tribunals, but 
which have not been recognized as general principles of law, as in the case of 
legitimate investor expectations. Finally, a third cluster of fundamental principles 
which have been partially or not at all considered by investment arbitrators, but are 
fundamental in the justification of authority at the domestic level for Latin 
American States. This last cluster of fundamental principles represents the core 
element for a new regional legal discourse on investment, and special attention will 
be given to defining its two principles: transparency and inclusion. 
 
4.1 The Calvo Conceptual Trajectory and the Critical Approach to Foreign 
Investment in the 21st Century in Latin America 
The resistance of some Latin American countries compared to the traditional 
international investment law regime in the 21st century cannot be considered as a 
new or isolated event; it is based on a conceptual trajectory that started with Carlos 
Calvo and his work in the 19th century. However, a closer look at Calvo’s work 
shows that he based his writings entirely on the conceptual assumptions of Emer 
De Vattel360. Thus, using Calvo’s fundamentals is analysing the complex issues of 
foreign investment from the point of view of Vattel’s world, where States possess 
an absolute and exclusive power over their people and territory and where the only 
normative production on the international arena is the agreements between those 
States. The following paragraphs will describe this trajectory. 
 
4.1.1 Carlos Calvo on the Adoption of Vattel’s ‘Arrangement’ of 
International Law 
It is not possible to understand the evolution of the doctrinal treatment of foreign 
investment in Latin America without studying Carlos Calvo (1822-1906), an 
Argentinean diplomat who also represented Paraguay, and the doctrine expressed 
in his book Derecho internacional teórico y práctico de Europa y América, first 
 
 
 
360 See Chapter 1, section 1.2 
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published in 1868361. Carlos Calvo’s ideas later evolved into the so-called Calvo 
doctrine, which influenced the legal discourse, the drafting of treaties, and even 
Latin American Constitutions, such as the Mexican Constitution of 1911.362 The 
impact of Calvo’s work has made his name present in today’s debates and even 
occasionally in arbitration.363 
The doctrine can be summarised into two main ideas: first, the principle of 
non-intervention, based on the concept of equality and independence of States, and 
secondly, the absolute equality between foreigners and nationals.364 The first would 
lead to the prohibition of diplomatic protection for investors and the second would 
determine that ‘redress for grievances’365 would only be possible before local 
authorities. 
However, a closer look at these two concepts and at Calvo’s work in general 
indicates that his doctrine is not revolutionary because it was built upon the 
assumptions of previously mentioned Emer de Vattel. As explained in Chapter One, 
the Vattelian logic provides a clear concept of the validity of agreements between 
sovereigns as law, the exercise of public authority and its justification. In addition, 
the logic allowed the creation of a positive law of the States within a political 
configuration of territorially exclusive public authorities, where- in other words- in 
each defined territory, power is exercised by a sole sovereign State. 
Carlos Calvo based his work on those concepts, including numerous express 
quotes366 of Vattel’s book. Furthermore, Calvo used the fundamental concepts of 
 
 
 
361 Carlos Calvo, Derecho Internacional Teorico y Practico de Europa y America (Durand ed 
Pedone-Lauriel 1868). 
362 See Antonio Martínez Báez, ‘La Cláusula Calvo en el Constitucionalismo Mexicano’ in César 
Sepúlveda Gutiérrez, Antonio Martínez Báez and Alfonso García Robles, Carlos Calvo: Tres 
Ensayos Mexicanos (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores 1974) 42. 
363 See for instance Aguas Del Tunari, S.A. v Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No ARB/02/3, 
ICSID2005. para 141, footnote 118. 
364 Donald R. Shea, The Calvo Clause: A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and 
Diplomacy (Univ. of Minnesota Press 1955) 19. 
365 ibid. 
366 For example, Calvo opens his key Chapter of Rights of equality by quoting Vattel, see Carlos 
Calvo, Derecho Internacional Teórico y Práctico de Europa y America (D’Amyot 1868) 197. 
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exclusive authority and equality between States developed by Vattel to incorporate 
them into his reasoning. Accordingly, the treatment of aliens in one State’s territory 
belongs to the exercise of the latter’s authority and ought to have been respected by 
other equal States. This does not mean that Calvo accepted all of Vattel’s premises 
because Calvo manifested dissatisfaction with the order established by European 
nations,367 especially with the premises relating to the treatment of aliens. 
As a first conclusion, the work of Calvo was not a theoretical revolution, but 
rather it formed the basis for a legal discourse based on the principle of non- 
intervention that grouped together most of the then-new Latin and South American 
countries. Therefore, his merit was the development of a doctrine grounded on solid 
conceptual ideas, while simultaneously expressing them clearly enough to be 
understood not only by international jurists, but also by the majority of actors from 
the region. 
The Calvo doctrine was a theoretical instrument to bring the legal 
relationship between the State and investors back to the national sphere. One 
hundred years would be needed for countries to internationalise the legal relation 
again, when the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) entered into force in 1966, 
and in 1969 the Chad-Italy bilateral investment treaty (BIT) included, for the first 
time, a clear investment arbitration clause. Soon afterwards, the use of arbitration 
started to spread in the network of international investment agreements. 
By the 1990s it appeared that any attempts by South American States to pull 
back the legal treatment to forgings at the domestic level were left behind. However, 
soon after, a group of countries started to re-float Calvo’s fundamentals. The cases 
of Bolivia and Ecuador are probably the most striking ones, because both countries 
introduced Calvo-like provisions in their 21st century constitutions.368 In the case 
of Ecuador, it incorporated- in 2008- an express constitutional prohibition of the 
Ecuadorian State to enter in any agreement that ‘yields’ its sovereign jurisdiction 
 
 
 
367 Cesar Sepúlveda, ‘Presencia viviente de Carlos Calvo’ in Sepúlveda Gutiérrez, Martínez Báez, 
and García Robles 22. 
368 See Katia Fach Gómez, "Ecuador’s Attaintment of the Sumak Kawsay and the Role Assigned to 
International Arbitration", (2011) 447-483. 
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to international arbitration entities with the exception on Latin America369. The 
Bolivian constitution contains a similar provision for ‘foreign enterprises’ that 
carries out activities in the ‘chain of production of hydrocarbons in name and 
representation of the State’.370 
 
4.1.2 From  Carlos  Calvo  to  the  Latin  American  Critical 
Approach of the 21st Century 
The use of Calvo’s ideas in the present century in Latin America can be explained 
by looking closely at the recent history of the countries in the region and their 
problems in the last few decades. The Argentinean jurist Roberto Gargarella 
identifies at least two specific and important ‘dramas’ that shaped the structure of 
the constitutions of countries in the region, but can also explain the re-emergence 
of  the  Calvo  doctrine  in  the  21st  century:  the  terrible  human  rights’  abuses 
committed during different dictatorships in the 1970s, and the severe social crises 
provoked  by  programmes  of  economic  change  or  adjustments  imposed  by 
international institutions,371  such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 
particular,  the  social  chaos  attributed  to  economic  adjustment  programmes 
generated social claims for the reestablishment of strong presidential authorities.372 
These two elements help to understand various normative developments in 
Latin America. For instance, they explain why some constitutions in the region- 
specifically the ones of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela- engaged in apparently 
contradictory developments, as made evident by Gargarella, with the enactment of 
extensive bills of rights while at the same time concentrating power in the hands of 
 
 
 
369 See art 422 of Ecuador’s Constitution (2008). "Constitucion de la Republica del Ecuador 2008", 
2008). See also, Katia Fach Gómez, "Latin America and Icsid: David Versus Goliath? " (2011) 501 
Law and Business Review of the Americas. Katia Fach Gómez ‘Latin America and ICSID: David 
versus Goliath?’ (2011) 17 Law and Business Review of the Americas 501. 
370 art 366 of Bolivia’s Constitution (2007), "Constitucion Politica del Estado Plurinacional de 
Bolivia" 2007. 
371 For a detailed account of the impact of these historic events on the constitutions in the region see 
Roberto Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810 - 2010 the Engine Room of the 
Constitution N (Oxford Univ. Press 2013) 148-155. 
372 ibid 151. 
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the executive, a fact which can prevent those rights from being effective.373 From 
an international law perspective, these circumstances determine a re-assertion of an 
absolute concept of sovereignty that resembles that of the 18th century. 
This constitutional structure of the States has two effects on the field of 
international investments. First, the concentration of power in the executive branch 
might lead to arbitrariness despite the extensive bill of rights expressed in the same 
constitution, with the risk that such arbitrariness will extend to both nationals and 
foreign investors. Second, States of the region might want to pull back from the 
international investment legal framework, limiting investment protection to the 
domestic level or, in other words, once again impose some of Calvo’s fundamentals, 
such as making redress for grievances possible only before local authorities. 
Nevertheless, it seems to be a hard enterprise to use the fundamentals of the 
Calvo doctrine and to bring the legal regulation of foreign investment back to the 
nation-State in the current global legal setting for at least three reasons. To begin 
with, this would involve a large majority of States to simultaneously pull out of the 
international regime of investment protection. This is not likely to happen because 
a prisoner’s dilemma374 exists among developing countries, whereby the need to 
attract capital and technology leads them to compete with each other. Secondly, 
even in the unlikely scenario that a large majority of States do withdraw from the 
network of international investment agreements, these treaties contain sunset or 
survival clauses. These clauses extend the treaty’s protection to investors for 
periods which can last up to 25 years after the denunciation of the treaty.375 Finally, 
the world society is too interconnected in this century, which was not the case in 
the years of Calvo, 
In addition, there is an inherent danger of re-establishing Calvo 
fundamentals where States exercise an exclusive authority in their territory, without 
 
 
 
373 ibid 157. 
374 For a more complete analysis of the dynamics in the region, see Prieto Munoz 97-100. 
375 The periods used in this type of clause vary from 5 to 25 years, see Joachim Gordon Kathryn; 
Pohl, "Investment Treaties over Time - Treaty Practice and Interpretation in a Changing World”, 
OECD Working Papers on International Investment (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
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the possibility of obtaining remedies outside the domestic level. The danger entails 
that a strong presidential system empowered with such authority would, in the end, 
put at stake the same extensive bill of rights that had been approved in the new 
constitutions for its own citizens. In addition, this type of authority can undermine 
not only matters of economic governance, but also other regional efforts like the 
Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS). This can be seen in cases like 
Venezuela, where the state has denounced both treaties like the ICSID Convention 
and also the IAHRS. 
 
4.2 The Framework for the Construction of Common Investment Principles in 
Latin America 
For the reasons explained in the previous section, it seems pertinent to put aside 
Calvo’s postulates and their conceptual assumptions. South American States in the 
current global legal setting cannot hold a strong conception of sovereignty, as it 
would prevent them from fully integrating with global governance structures. 
However, any legal discourse that departs from Calvo’s postulates for foreign 
investment must also come hand in hand with an alternative way of legitimization 
for authority. 
One viable solution is to systematize a set of common South American 
principles by analysing and distinguishing fundamental concepts to legitimize 
public authority that are common to States of the region and that are expressed in 
legal text either normatively in their constitutions or developed by regional 
adjudicators. This represents a quest in two dimensions: a vertical dimension which 
looks at the relation between South American States and the regional adjudicators 
created by them and a horizontal dimension that is aimed at identifying common 
concepts in the different constitutions of South American States. 
The result of this analysis leads to an outcome that in turn can lead to three 
different clusters of principles. First, a general group of concepts where 
compatibility exists between the fundamental public law of States with the general 
principles of law identified by arbitrators while interpreting the international 
customary law, such as the access to justice and due process. Second, an 
intermediate cluster that includes certain concepts present in the constitutions of 
Latin American States, i.e. Legal Certainty, which have a degree of compatibility 
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with the interpretation on investment tribunals, but which have not been recognized 
as general principles of law, as in the case of investor legitimate expectations. 
Finally, a third cluster of fundamental principles which have been partially or not 
considered at all by investment arbitrators, but are fundamental in the justification 
of authority at the domestic level for Latin American States, such as the principle 
of transparency and principle of inclusion. 
 
4.2.1 South American General Investment Principles Cluster 
This cluster contains those general principles of law that are also recognized as 
fundamentals in the constitutions of South American States, and that have been 
interpreted by arbitrators as forming part of the minimum standard of treatment to 
investors. There are two identifiable principles: due process of law and access to 
justice- or the flipside of the same coin- the prohibition of denial of justice. 
Usually, access to justice and due process have been interpreted as part of 
other standards of treatment of investors, especially the FET standard376 and other 
specific standards377. However, they can be found at the constitutional level of most 
South American States, where the following may be encompassed. 
Constitutions of the regions recognized a right to due process with different 
elements. Some, like in the case of Argentinian constitution, refer to the right to due 
process in the defence of the person and of rights as ‘inviolable’378. The Paraguayan 
constitution refers to an ‘equality in access to justice, for which effect it will level 
the obstacles that would prevent it’379. The constitution of Venezuela includes a 
more detailed version of what is understood for due process. For instance, it 
includes a right of persons ‘to have access to the evidence and to be afforded the 
 
 
 
376 See Dolzer 89-93. 
377 For instance, See the specific ‘effective means’ standard in Chevron Corporation (USA), Texaco 
Petroleum Company (USA) v The Republic of Ecuador 2011.Chevron Corporation and Texaco 
Petroleum Company v Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Partial Award on the Merits (30 March 
2010) paras 248, 254. 
378 See for example, art 18 of the Argentinian Constitution. ("Constitucion de la Nacion Argentina" 
1994). 
379 See art 47(1) of Paraguay’ s Constitution ("Constitución de la República de Paraguay" 1992); art 
76(7c) of Ecuador’s Constitution (2008). 
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necessary time and means to conduct his or her defence’380. In other constitutions 
like the case of Bolivia there is an express mention to a ‘right to be heard by a 
competent, impartial and independent jurisdictional authority’381. Finally, there are 
constitutions like the Peruvian that include a warranty of due process, referring to 
the idea that ‘no one shall be punished without judicial proceedings’382 
The observance of due process and access of justice must also be undertaken 
in the investment arbitration process, but in addition, a regional principle can 
operate as an authoritative element when the State is the one that has violated it. 
This means that a decision of an investment tribunal regarding the violation of due 
process against an investor can have more social acceptance if there is a connection 
with the responsibility of the state for the breach of a fundamental regional principle 
in addition to the breach of a specific international obligation contained in a treaty. 
The need for the tribunal to determine, with precision, the international legal 
obligation whose breach gives rise to the State’s international responsibility is 
technically correct.383 However, additional reference to ‘principles’ and ‘important 
norms’ of the host State and region can enhance, without a doubt, the argumentative 
strength of an award. For example, the Occidental v Ecuador tribunal advanced a 
far-reaching concept of proportionality, perceiving it also in light of the Ecuadorian 
Constitution.384 This draws the link between, on one hand, concepts developed in 
international law and in international investment dispute settlement, and on the 
other hand, principles of the state itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
380   See  art  49(1)  of  Venezuela’s  Constitution  ("Constitucion  de  la  Republica  Bolivariana  de 
Venezuela", 1999. 
381 art 120(I) of Bolivia’s Constitution; see also art 75 of Ecuador’s Constitution. 
382 art 139(10) of Peru´s Constitution (1993), "Constitución Política del Perú" 1993. 
383 This is one of the elements of an internationally wrongful act determined in Article 2(b) of the 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
384 Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The 
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/06/11, Award (5 October 2012) paras 396-401. 
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4.2.2 South American Intermediate Principles Cluster 
This category first seeks to cluster concepts that have been developed by investment 
arbitrators in the process of interpretation of absolute standards385 going beyond the 
text of treaties, and secondly seeks to find a level of compatibility with regional 
principles of the South American nations. In recent years, investment arbitrators 
have developed derivative standards, or standards of second order, not expressly 
recognised by the text of treaties, but developed through the interpretation of 
absolute standards. The most prominent example is the ‘legitimate expectations’ of 
investors. 
This concept was first developed by arbitral tribunals386 in the interpretation 
of the FET standard and indirect expropriation clauses. According to this concept, 
a State has an obligation to protect not only the property of the investor but also the 
expectations generated by its conduct. This approach dramatically increases the 
scope of responsibility undertaken by States when subscribing to an FET clause. 
However, the formula ‘legitimate expectations’ does not generally appear in 
investment treaties. Arbitral tribunals developed it from a sort of ‘arbitral dialogue’ 
in their interpretation of the FET standard. 
One of the most important elements that led to the concept of the investors’ 
legitimate expectations387 is probably the idea of stability and consistency of the 
host State’s legal system.388 The ‘legitimate expectations’ as such are not 
recognised in the legal systems of the region. For instance, Potestá, in his quest for 
justification of the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’, expressly acknowledges 
that in Latin America such a principle appears to be in its ‘infancy and its scope to 
 
 
 
385 For a definition of absolute standard see OECD (2004), ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
in International Investment Law’, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2004/03, 
OECD Publishing. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435 > accessed 1 March 2016. 
386 The first tribunal that used the concept of the investor’s ‘basic expectations’ was Tecnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, 
Award (29 May 2003) para 154. 
387 See in the section 2.3.3.1 Fair and Equitable Standard of Treatment of this work. 
388 For a concrete discussion on expectations based on the host State’s legal order, see Dolzer. 22- 
24; See also the related analysis in Kenneth J. Vandevelde, "A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable 
Treatment", (2010) 43 International Law And Politics 81-82. 
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date is fairly limited’.389  In this regard, it may be more plausible to speak of the 
principle’s inexistence rather than its infancy. 
The protection of expectations that are neither based on specific 
international norms nor on the fundamental principles of the nations, seems to be a 
misuse of the arbitrators’ authority which could compromise their legitimacy; if 
States had wished to elevate their responsibility to a higher degree in order to 
include the mere expectations of investors, they would have used more concrete 
terms. 
In this sense, it is better to further develop a concept like ‘legitimate 
expectations’ with a principle of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) embodied in 
some of the constitutions in the region. Three constitutions of the region make a 
reference to the idea in different ways. First, the constitution of Bolivia states that 
power to impart justice emanates from the ‘Bolivian people and is based on the 
principles of […] legal certainty’390, but without specifying what its content is. 
Then, the constitution of Venezuela links the idea of ‘reliability of the law’ 
(garantizando la seguridad jurídica) with the economic system of the state wit in 
the following way: 
 
The State, jointly with private initiative, shall promote the harmonious development 
of the national economy, to the end of generating sources of employment, a high rate 
of domestic added value, raising the standard of living of the population and 
strengthen the economical sovereignty of the country, guaranteeing the reliability of 
the law […]391 
 
 
 
 
 
 
389 Michele Potestà, "Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots 
and the Limits of a Controversial Concept", (2013) 28 ICSID Review. 97. 
390 The original text in Spanish ‘La potestad de impartir justicia emana del pueblo boliviano y se 
sustenta en los principios de […] seguridad jurídica’, art 178 of Bolivia’s Constitution. 
391 Original Spanish text: ‘El Estado conjuntamente con la iniciativa privada promoverá el desarrollo 
armónico de la economía nacional con el fin de generar fuentes de trabajo, alto valor agregado 
nacional, elevar el nivel de vida de la población y fortalecer la soberanía económica del país, 
garantizando la seguridad jurídica […]’ see art 299 of Venezuela’s Constitution. 
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The third state to include the idea in its constitution is Ecuador, by referring 
to legal security and conceptualizing it as a right ‘based on respect for the 
Constitution and the existence of prior legal regulations that are clear, public and 
applied by the competent authorities’392. Other States do not include legal certainty 
as a whole concept, but as part of the due process, like in the case of the Peruvian 
constitution that anyone should be subjected to ‘proceedings other than those 
previously established’393. 
The contours of a regional legal certainty concept are still not very clear, 
but in any case, it seems more likely that concepts developed on investment 
arbitration like the one of ‘legitimate expectations’ will be further constructed 
inside a regional principle of ‘seguridad juridica’. In addition, a problem lies in the 
lack of certainty as to the meaning of this expression and the absence of a truly 
regional character of the principle, since only the abovementioned countries include 
the term in their constitutions. 
 
4.2.3 South American Fundamental Principles Cluster 
This last category of principles represents the core of the Latin American discourse 
of common principles for investment because it is a set of concepts that have been 
partially developed, like in the case of transparency principle, or that have not been 
considered at all on investment arbitration, like in the case of the principle of 
inclusion. Even more, if a discourse-based approach is persuasive enough, these 
principles can be used by the same arbitrators while deciding over a dispute, to 
increase the moral and social acceptance of their decisions. 
In addition, for the purposes of developing a legal discourse, this cluster 
represents an opportunity to make the particularities of Latin America visible for 
investment arbitrators. Two key principles are considered in this paper: a procedural 
principle of transparency and a substantive principle of inclusion or egalitarian 
principle. 
 
 
 
392 Original Spanish text: ‘El derecho a la seguridad jurídica se fundamenta en el respeto a la 
Constitución y en la existencia de normas jurídicas previas, claras, públicas y aplicadas por las 
autoridades competentes’. art 82 of Ecuador’s Constitution. 
393 Constitución Política del Perú. 
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4.3 Principle of Transparency394 
The ‘transparency’ debate has regained importance in the global legal setting, 
where a series of adjudication processes must be inserted in different contexts and 
topics, including international investment law. In addition, different concepts of 
transparency have been developed, linking the concept with the one of availability 
of information. Anne Peters refers to the concept as a ‘culture, condition, scheme 
or structure in which relevant information is available’.395 Julie Maupin, in her 
construction of transparency for International Investment Law, adds to the notion 
of availability the need that the information must be ‘accessible’, ‘adequate’, 
‘accurate’ and ‘relevant’396. Those concepts are useful, but the construction of a 
legal principle of transparency on International Investment Law is necessary where 
the availability of information represents the exercise of two rights: access to 
information and freedom of expression. 
In this regard, there has been a considerable development in the accessibility 
standards in the different instruments of international arbitration. The following 
section briefly describes these developments. 
 
4.3.1 Transparency on Investment Arbitration Instruments and 
Treaties 
First, ICSID arbitration rules have been updated in order to tackle some of the issues 
of transparency. ICSID arbitration does not possess specific rules for the issues of 
transparency and confidentiality, but rather allows space to the parties of the dispute 
to  determine  it.  However,  in  the  silence  of  the  parties,  it  can  be  said  that 
 
 
 
394 The findings of this section where presented during the conference ‘Transparency vs 
Confidentiality in International Economic Law:, Looking For An Appropriate Balance’, which 
took place in Ravenna on 20 November 2015. 
395   Anne Peters, ‘Towards Transparency as a Global Norm’ in Andrea Bianchi and Anne Peters, 
Transparency in International Law,(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013) 534. 
396 The author extracts this element from the concept developed by Chayes, Handler and Mitchell, 
in Julie Maupin, Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the bad and the Murky 
in ibid 149. 
131 
 
 
confidentiality prevails. For instance, under article 53(3) of ICSID arbitration rules 
there is an explicit prohibition of the Secretariat to publish the award without the 
consent of the parties, but to determine an obligation to ‘promptly include’ 
publications of legal reasoning of the Tribunal. In addition, under article 39(2), 
public access to hearings is possible, in the absence of objection of the parities, and 
safeguarding confidential information. Therefore, the parties still control the access 
to the process. 
UNCITRAL rules of arbitration have also undergone an evolution, where 
the access of information has gained importance. This includes the periodic revision 
of its rules of arbitration, arriving to the United Nations Convention on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Mauritius Convention on 
Transparency), that was opened for signature on 17 March 2015. This convention 
extends the application of the UNCITRAL rules on transparency. The rules of 
transparency incorporate the standard to ‘promptly communicate’ the 
commencement of arbitral proceedings to the arbitration repository. This 
notification includes the information about the name of the disputing parties, the 
economic sector, and the treaty under which the claim is being made.397 
In relation with the process itself, the Convention establishes which specific 
documents ought to be public,398 and determines that hearings in general terms 
should also be public399. Regarding the exceptions, the Convention provides a list 
of information considered confidential, including: confidential business 
information, information that is protected against being made available to the public 
either by the treaty, the law of the respondent state, under any law or rules 
determined by the arbitral tribunal, and finally, information which would impede 
 
 
 
397 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration Resolution 
(adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 2013 on the report of the Sixth Committee 
A/68/462) (2014) (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) art 2. 
398 ibid art 3 ‘The documents specified in the Convention are: the notice of arbitration, the response 
to the notice of arbitration, the statement of claim, the statement of defense and any further written 
statements or written submissions by any disputing party; a table listing all exhibits to the aforesaid 
documents and to expert reports and witness’. 
399 ibid art 6. 
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law enforcement400. As a conclusion, the Mauritius Convention provides a coherent 
framework for distinguishing and balancing transparency and confidentiality and 
has more determinacy than the ICSID arbitration rules. 
In this trend, several treaties -especially regional- are incorporating rules 
related to transparency. On the South American practice, the Chapter of Investment 
of the Additional Protocol of the Alianza del Pacifico, between Colombia, Chile, 
Peru and Mexico, represents an important development. The text incorporates a 
whole set of transparency rules in Article 10.21 that follow the UNCITRAL 
standards. In particular, it determines the publicity of the most important documents 
as well as the existence of public hearings. In addition to the UNCITRAL standards, 
there is a special exception of the insertion of the concept of ‘seguridad esencial’ 
(essential security) in article 18.3 of the Protocol401, that establishes the exception 
to disclose information that one of the parties considers contrary to its essential 
interests in security. 
Transparency provisions are increasing; this is good news for states, 
investors and the global civil society. Even more, the so-called ‘mega-regionals’ 
are including UNCITRAL standards, like the latest Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
of which Peru and Chile are members.402 This treaty incorporates an express call to 
‘promote transparency, good governance and rule of law’403 in its preamble, and 
the UNCITRAL standards404 in a similar way to the ones described for the Alianza 
del Pacífico. The economies of the parties of the treaty represent about 40% of the 
global economy. This leads to the belief that such rules are going to be established 
as part of general practice for any future treaty or even are making transparency a 
principle of customary international law. 
 
 
 
 
 
400 ibid art 7. 
401 Protocolo Adicional al Acuerdo Marco de la Alianza del Pacífico (signed 10 feb 2014, entered 
into force 20 July 2015) (2014). 
402 The Parties of the treaty are: Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, United States, and Vietnam. 
403 Trans-Pacific Partnership (drafted 5 Oct 2015, signed 4 February 2016) (2015) (TPP). 
404 ibid art 9(23). 
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Despite all these great normative developments, the issue of transparency 
remains anchored to the consent of the parties which is a conceptual basis that 
should be overcome. The great majority of the treaties that are currently in force 
depend on the parties’ consent, and treaties like the TTIP will only enter into force 
—if ever— after a long and difficult process of ratification on the different states. 
Even the Mauritius Convention will be entered into force six months after the date 
of deposit of the third instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
(Article 9). Under the paradigm of state consent, transparency, in the context 
defined in the present section, remains an option. 
However, if arbitrators exercise a type of public authority, as it has been 
argued in Section I, transparency is not optional: it is of mandatory application in 
the process of legitimation of an investment tribunal. Transparency becomes one 
core principle of the South American investment discourse. 
Accordingly, this statement is only true if transparency is rooted in the 
primary and basic rules of the South American nations —their constitutions. In this 
case, if arbitrators, for the nature of its functions, do not possess a democratic based 
legitimation capacity, they do have an obligation to fulfill the basic principles that 
the nations —not the states— of the region have determined to rule the exercise of 
authority. 
 
4.3.2 The Contours of a South American   Principle of 
Transparency 
The principle of transparency in the region extends to the exercise of two 
fundamental rights: the access to information and the freedom of expression, both 
in their individual and collective dimensions. Since the end of the 20th century, a 
series of rights emerged in the different new constitutions and legal practices of the 
states of the region. In this context, the Chilean constitution of 1980 contains the 
following Article 8, which was later introduced in 2005: 
 
The exercise of public functions obligates its holder to comply strictly with the 
principle of probity in all their actions. The acts and resolutions of organs of the State, 
as well as their fundamentals and the procedures used, are public. However, only a 
law of qualified quorum can establish the confidentiality or secrecy of those or of 
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them, when disclosure would affect the proper fulfillment of the functions of these 
organs, the rights of persons, the security of the Nation or the national interest.405 
 
While the principle of probity can be interpreted in a wider sense, the fact 
that the next part of the article refers to the publicity of resolutions and its 
procedures determined that such principles include a standard of transparency as 
part of probity or integrity. 
Other constitutions in the region contain similar provisions. Venezuela’s 
constitution states that ‘Public Administration is at the service of the citizen and is 
based on the principles of (…) transparency.’406. The Constitution of Bolivia 
declares the need to create ‘transparent management of information and use of 
resources in all of the places of governance’.407 In general, this provision creates a 
direct link between governance, the exercise of public authority on the state level, 
and transparency understood as policy and access of information. Finally, the 
Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008 determines in Article 100: ‘At all levels of 
government, entities of participation shall be set up (…) Participation in these 
entities is aimed at: 4. Building up democracy with permanent mechanisms for 
transparency, accountability and social control.’408 In the aforementioned 
constitutional provisions there is a connection between the exercise of government 
—public authority— and transparency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
405 Constitución Política de la República de Chile (2005) art 8 of the Chilean Constitution (author 
translation). The original text reads as follows: Artículo 8 de la Constitución Política de la 
República: “El ejercicio de las funciones públicas obliga a sus titulares a dar estricto cumplimiento 
al principio de probidad en todas sus actuaciones. Son públicos los actos y resoluciones de los 
órganos del Estado, así como sus fundamentos y los procedimientos que utilicen. Sin embargo, solo 
una ley de quórum calificado podrá establecer la reserva o secreto de aquéllos o de éstos, cuando 
la publicidad afectare el debido cumplimiento de las funciones de dichos órganos, los derechos de 
las personas, la seguridad de la Nación o el interés nacional”. "Constitución Política de la 
República de Chile", 1980. 
406 Constitucion de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela (1999) art 141. 
407 Constitucion Politica del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia (2007) art 242 (4). 
408 Constitucion de la Republica del Ecuador (2008) art 100. 
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On the other hand, other states of the region rather develop this 
understanding of access of information as part of the right of freedom of expression. 
For example, the Colombian Constitution incorporates the following provision: 
‘Every individual is guaranteed the freedom to express and diffuse his/her thoughts 
and opinions, to transmit and receive information that is true and impartial […]’409 
. The relation to the right of freedom of expression can be explained by the fact that 
the absence or the lack of information affects the capacity of an individual to engage 
in the public debate about certain issues. Therefore, the absence of information can 
limit or even amount a violation of the right of freedom of expression. Yet the 
question that emerges is whether the access of information is a right in itself or if it 
is a manifestation of other rights410. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has further developed the right 
of access to information in the region. In the landmark 2006 case of Claude Reyes 
v. Chile, the Court held: 
 
 
The right to ‘seek’ and ‘receive’ ‘information’, Article 13 of the Convention protects 
the right of all individuals to request access to State-held information, with the 
exceptions permitted by the restrictions established in the Convention. […] 
Consequently, this article protects the right of the individual to receive such 
information and the positive obligation of the State to provide it, […] The delivery of 
information to an individual can, in turn, permit it to circulate in society, so that the 
latter can become acquainted with it, have access to it, and assess it. In this way, the 
right to freedom of thought and expression includes the protection of the right of 
access to State-held information, which also clearly includes the two dimensions, 
individual and social […]411 
 
 
 
409 Constitución Política de Colombia (1991) art 20. "Constitución Política de Colombia.", 1991. 
410 For a discussion about the relation of these two concepts see José Manuel Díaz De Valdés, "El 
Derecho de Acceso a la Información Pública: Su Reconocimiento por El Tribunal Constitucional", 
in Arturo Fermandois (ed.), Sentencias Destacadas 2007 (Libertad y Desarrollo 2008). 
411 Caso Claude Reyes Y Otros v Chile, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos Sentencia 19 
Sepember 2006 (Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas) 2006. Caso Claude Reyes y Otros v Chile (19 
September 2006) Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos Sentencia de Fondo, Reparaciones y 
Costas Series C No 151 para 77. 
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The vision of the Court grants a regional dimension to transparency since 
the state legal systems are bound to the Inter-American System, thus a development 
by the Court can influence the reasoning and construction of rights by local courts. 
One of the contributions of this sentence is that the Court develops a construction 
of access to information, not only as an individual right but also in the context of 
its social dimension. 
In addition, other organs of the Inter-American system have consolidated 
the transparency principle as the exercise of an access to information and freedom 
of expression. In the year 2010, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 
of the Inter-American Commission introduced the access of information as one of 
‘good judicial practices’. This document is important because it is the result of 
several meetings of judges, academics and representatives of state institutions and 
civil society in different countries of the region. Later, in 2013, the same 
Commission reaffirmed that the observance of rights and freedoms in a democratic 
system requires an institutional order in which laws prevail over the will of 
power412. In particular, the Inter-American Commission extended the access of 
information to the process of appointment of judges by stating: 
 
As an element of transparency to be observed in the selection process, the Commission 
welcomes the fact that the procedures are open to scrutiny social sectors, which 
significantly reduces the degree of discretion of the authorities responsible for the 
selection and appointment and the consequent possibility of interference by other 
powers […]413 
 
 
 
412 Inter-American Comission on Human Rights, ‘Garantías para la Independencia de las y los 
Operadores de Justicia. Hacia El Fortalecimiento del Acceso a la Justicia y el Estado de Derecho en 
las Américas’ (OEA/Ser.L/V/Ii. Doc. 44, 5 December 2013) para 1. 
413 Ibid. Personal translation, Para 80. The full Spanish text is the following: ‘Por otro lado, además 
de la publicidad de los requisitos y procedimientos, como un elemento de la transparencia a 
observarse en los procesos de selección, la Comisión considera positivo que los procedimientos sean 
abiertos al escrutinio de los sectores sociales, lo cual reduce significativamente el grado de 
discrecionalidad de las autoridades encargadas de la selección y nombramiento y la consecuente 
posibilidad de injerencia de otros poderes, facilitando la identificación del mérito y capacidades 
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To conclude, the access of information is a fundamental principle in the exercise of 
authority on judicial process in the region. In addition, the relevant information 
includes not only the documents of a particular process, but also covers the system 
as a whole as the appointment of the persons that will operate the judicial branch. 
 
4.3.3 The Application of the Regional Principle of Transparency 
on Investment Arbitration 
The question that immediately arises is whether this emerging regional principle of 
transparency, rooted in the constitutions of the South American States, and in the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights, can be applied in investment arbitration. 
This issue is not a minor one, since all of these norms create a direct responsibility 
of the states and do not address arbitration tribunals. On the other hand, investment 
arbitrators are concerned about respecting the norm —treaty, law or contract— 
which grants them jurisdiction over a dispute, and/or the procedural rules or the 
mechanism of arbitration chosen by the parties, for example ICSID. 
In the current context of plurality, arbitrators can be influenced by a regional 
discourse of principles. The reasoning behind commercial arbitration is that the 
competence of an arbitrator rests upon the will of the parties; therefore, under that 
logic, if a state consents to arbitration, by either a treaty or a contract, it is 
automatically granting competence to investment arbitrators. Moreover, if a 
violation of rights occurs, it will be the state who is responsible under international 
law. However, if investment arbitration is seen not only as a mechanism of 
resolution of disputes, but also as an exercise of authority as the present work 
argues, then the situation is different. 
Constitutions and Human Right treaties have established a reference of the 
right to access information for the states because they represent an authority and 
therefore it is necessary to contain that power. Transparency —along with other 
principles— thus constitutes a prerequisite for the exercise of authority of the states. 
 
 
 
profesionales de las y los candidatos. La Comisión considera que lo anterior resulta fundamental 
cuando se trata de la designación de las y los operadores de justicia de las más altas jerarquías y el 
procedimiento y selección se encuentra a cargo del poder ejecutivo o legislativo.’ 
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If the authority of arbitrators overlaps the former, then it has to comply with the 
fundamental principles that the citizens have established for the justification of such 
authority. 
There are four scenarios of applicability of this regional discursive 
approach: (i) in the absence of transparency rules determined by the parties; (ii) in 
the intention of one or both parties extending confidentiality beyond its intended 
purpose; (iii) on the enforceability of awards that manifestly have broken the 
fundamental principle of transparency; (iv) in the extension of the scope of 
transparency to other issues not covered by UNCITRAL rules or investment 
treaties. 
The first scenario represents one of coordination, or complementariness 
where in the absence of specific rules of transparency in a conflict, arbitrators can 
implement the higher standards provided in the UNCITRAL rules and it can 
reaffirm its decision by the recognition of common principles applied in the region. 
The second scenario is conflictive and therefore is less likely to happen. In 
this case, one or both parties can oppose to the access of information by a third party 
for any ground. The Tribunal can publish information that is not included in the 
exceptions established in the treaties, such as national security. However, if both 
parties oppose to the access of information, it is very unlikely that an arbitration 
tribunal will confront the parties and order its publication. In this not very likely 
scenario where a tribunal releases information that considers of public interest the 
discursive approach on a principle of transparency might prove useful to explain 
such decision. 
The latter situation can lead to the third situation, where the principles of 
investment are used not by an arbitrator, but for a local judge or other tribunal to 
deny the recognition of an award that has been rendered in a process that manifestly 
broke any standard of transparency. This case can only seem plausible in awards 
for which enforcement is framed in the New York convention. In this case, a ground 
for refusal of recognition and enforcement can fall inside Article V (2)b established 
for awards ‘contrary to the public policy of that country’. The function of the public 
policy is to allow states to prevent the ‘intrusion of awards’ into their legal system, 
which they consider irreconcilable.    However, this ground of refusal is rarely 
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granted. For instance, in a study of Switzerland, the provision was invoked 142 
times on commercial arbitration, from 1989 to 2009, and dismissed each time.414 
The fourth scenario represents the use of the principle to expand the relevant 
information determined as necessary under UNCITRAL rules. In particular, two 
grounds: the information related to the appointment of arbitrators and the one 
related to the cost of the process. As previously mentioned, there is a fundamental 
link between the access of information and the appointment of judges on the 
national systems. It is important for a society to recognize the merits of the person 
administrating justice and to observe the process of how that person was appointed. 
In addition, transparency in this regard makes future decisions more authoritative 
and justified on sociological and moral terms. On the contrary, the opacity of the 
qualities of a judge, regardless of his or her virtues, create the opposite effect. 
Therefore, the transparency on the appointment of arbitrators extends to the process 
of its selection, and includes the public scrutiny about possible conflicts of interest. 
The second area includes extending the principle of transparency to the 
information of all the arbitration costs that have been paid with taxpayer’s money. 
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, through the Special Rapporteur 
for Freedom of Expression, elaborated a document where study the good practices 
in judicial access the information recognizing a ‘right to know the salaries or 
income from public resources’.415 
If this criterion is applied to investment arbitration, then the access of 
information should include the amounts of money that states pay not only to the 
tribunal, but also to all persons and institutions involved in the arbitration. Here 
there is again a line that should be made between commercial and investment 
arbitration. On the one hand, in a commercial arbitration, private entities assume 
 
 
 
414 Reinmar Wolff and Christian Borris, New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 10 June 1958 ; Commentary Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement Of, (Beck, 2012) 488-492. 
415 Inter-American Comission on Human Rights, ‘Informe Anual de la Comisión Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos 2010 Informe de la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, Relatora 
Especial para la Libertad de Expresión Dra Catalina Botero’ (OEA/Ser.L/V/Ii. Doc.5, 7 March 
2011). 
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the costs of the process. On the other hand, a state obtained its financial resources 
from either: its citizens using its taxation power, contracting debt which is also paid 
by its citizens (sometimes in several generations), or by using the resources of the 
country such as controlling the exploitation of natural resources. At the end of the 
day, the population of a country will pay the bill, at least in part, of the investment 
process. With that premise, the access to the information must include the right to 
know the amount of public resources used in an arbitration process. 
 
4.4 Principle of Inclusion 
A significant issue, sometimes overlooked outside Latin America, is the social and 
economic exclusion of significant parts of the population that live under precarious 
economic and social conditions. This, in turn, generates inequality with the rest of 
the members of the population who have better opportunities and some economic 
stability. The construction of a Latin American principle-based approach to 
international investment law could not be considered as such if it did not provide 
legal answers to make this regional problem visible in the adjudication of 
investment discourse. On the contrary, investment arbitrators will dramatically 
increase their acceptance in the region if they implement a legal concept, in the 
scope of their field, which acknowledges these complex issues. 
In this quest, it is useful to look at other Latin American approaches on 
public law that have studied the relation of authority and the issues of inequality in 
the region for years. One particular approach of Latin American constitutionalism, 
known as Ius Constitutionale Commune416, provides a clear starting point: a legal 
concept of ‘inclusion’. The concept of inclusion represents a legal response to the 
social-economic inequality in Latin America and it aims to integrate all people into 
the social welfare system, i.e. health, education, economic and political systems. It 
 
 
 
 
416 See Armin Von Bogdandy, Héctor Fix-Fierro, and Mariela Morales Antoniazzi, Ius 
Constitutionale Commune En América Latina Rasgos, Potencialidades Y Desafíos (Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México; Max-Planck-Institut Für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht Und 
Völkerrecht; Instituto Iberoamericano De Derecho Constitucional, 2014); Armin Bogdandy, 
Mariela Morales Antoniazzi, and Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Ius Constitutionale Commune en 
Derechos Humanos en América Latina (Porrúa 2013). 
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is composed of two elements: redistribution and recognition.417 Redistribution 
implies a legal obligation of the State to improve the social conditions of its 
population while recognition is aimed to achieve visibility of parts of Latin 
American societies that have been marginalized for years, such as indigenous 
peoples. 
Developing an understanding of inclusion in international investment law is 
challenging since there is no legal obligation- nor should there be- for an investment 
tribunal to redistribute wealth in a country, even if investment adjudicators exercise 
a type of relative public authority. However, the construction of a principle of 
inclusion can help investment adjudicators assess or contextualise the conduct of 
the State and prevent them from reaching a calculation of damages that can 
financially make it difficult for States to integrate part of their population living 
under precarious conditions.418 
In this respect, two arguments can be advanced. First, it would be useful to 
establish the existence of a normative and fundamental obligation of the states for 
inclusion in the region. This changes the perspective of inclusion from just a 
rhetoric argument to being seen as a fundamental legal obligation the state has to 
fulfil. Second, it is necessary to determine a way that the authority of arbitrators 
recognises and acknowledges such legal fundamental obligations while solving 
investment disputes. 
 
4.4.1 Normative Base for a Principle of Inclusion 
One argumentative step consists of determining that inclusion is indeed an element 
on the fundamental public law of the South American States. In this regard, 
 
 
 
417 Laura Clérico and Martin Aldao, ‘De la Inclusión como igualdad en Clave de Redistribución y 
Reconocimiento Rasgos, Potencialidades y Desafíos para el Derecho Constitucional 
Interamericano’ in Bogdandy, Fix-Fierro, and Morales Antoniazzi 221 
418 In recent years there have been a series of cases that establish considerable amounts for 
compensation, see: CME Czech Republic BV v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award (14 March 
2003); Siemens AG v Argentina, ICSID No ARB/02/8, Award (6 February 2007); Ceskoslovenska 
Obchodni Banka, AS v Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/97/4, Award (29 December 2004); 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No ARB/06/11, Award (5 October 2012). 
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concepts of social, economic, and political inclusion can be found in all legal 
systems in the region on three different forms that can be grouped into three 
categories. 
The first category consists of countries that have introduced strong 
obligations for inclusion in their constitutions. The Brazilian Constitution provides 
an express mandate for the Federal Republic to ‘eradicate poverty and substandard 
living conditions and to reduce social and regional inequalities’419. In the same line, 
the Constitution of Bolivia in the economic organisation of the State determines 
that ‘all forms of economic organization have the obligation to generate dignified 
work and to contribute to the reduction of inequalities and to the eradication of 
poverty’.420 Finally, the Constitution of Ecuador establishes that one of the State's 
prime duties is ‘planning national development, eliminating poverty, and promoting 
sustainable development and the equitable redistribution of resources and wealth to 
enable access to Buen vivir421’.422 
The second category groups constitutions of South American States that 
include a reference to the quality of life or economic development as objectives of 
the State. For instance, the Constitution of Paraguay mandates: 
 
 
 
419 Orginal Spanish text: ‘Todas las formas de organización económica tienen la obligación de 
generar trabajo digno y contribuir a la reducción de las desigualdades y a la erradicación de la 
pobreza’. Article 3(III) of Brazil’s Constitution (1988). "Constitution of the Federative Republic of 
Brazil.", 1988). 
420 Original spanish text: ‘Todas las formas de organización económica tienen la obligación de 
generar trabajo digno y contribuir a la reducción de las desigualdades y a la erradicación de la 
pobreza’. Article 312(II) of Bolivia’s Constitution. 
421 The Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008 includes the concept of Buen vivir that literally can be 
translate as ‘good leaving’. However it pretend to include on the Constitution of a concept refer by 
indigenous communities as sumak kawsay, taken from Quichuan language— the most important 
language of indigenous communities in Ecuador. The contours of this concept on the constitutional 
sphere are still not defined, for that reason it is only referred on the present work as Buen vivir 
without further translation. 
422 Original Spanish text: ‘Son deberes primordiales del Estado: […] 5. Planificar el desarrollo 
nacional, erradicar la pobreza, promover el desarrollo sustentable y la redistribución equitativa de 
los recursos y la riqueza, para acceder al buen vivir. Article 3(5); see also article 3(1) of Ecuador’s 
Constitution. 
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The quality of life shall be promoted by the State through plans and policies that 
recognize conditioning factors, such as extreme poverty and the impediments of 
disability or of age. The State shall also promote research on the factors of population 
and their links with socioeconomic development, with the preservation of the 
environment and with the quality of life of the inhabitants.423 
 
Along the same lines, the Constitution of Argentina establishes, as a 
mandate to the legislative branch, an obligation to ‘provide whatever is conducive 
to human development, to economic progress with social justice, to the productivity 
of the National economy, to the generation of employment’ and also to ‘provide for 
the harmonious growth of the Nation and for populating its territory; to promote 
differentiated policies that lead to balancing the irregular development of Provinces 
and regions’424,  while the  Constitution of  Guyana  cites  an  economic goal of 
development.425 
There is also a third group of constitutions that includes references to a 
concept of inclusion. For instance, the Constitution of Peru, which establishes a 
fundamental ‘duty of the State to promote general welfare based on justice and the 
comprehensive and balanced development of the Nation’.426 In the same line, the 
 
 
423 Original spanish text: ‘La calidad de vida será promovida por el Estado mediante planes y 
políticas que reconozcan factores condicionantes, tales como la extrema pobreza y los impedimentos 
de la discapacidad o de la edad. El Estado también fomentará la investigación sobre los factores de 
población y sus vínculos con el desarrollo económico social, con la preservación del ambiente y con 
la calidad de vida de los habitantes’, art 6 of Paraguay’s Constitution. 
424 Orginal spanish text: ‘Proveer lo conducente al desarrollo humano, al progreso económico con 
justicia social, a la productividad de la economía nacional, a la generación de empleo, a la formación 
profesional de los trabajadores, a la defensa del valor de la moneda, a la investigación y desarrollo 
científico y tecnológico, su difusión y aprovechamiento. Proveer al crecimiento armónico de la 
Nación y al poblamiento de su territorio; promover políticas diferenciadas que tiendan a equilibrar 
el desigual desarrollo relativo de provincias y regiones’, art 75(19) of Argentina’s Constitution 
(1994) 
425 art 14 of Guyana’s Constitution (1980), "Constitution of the Co-Operative Republic of Guyana 
Co-Operative Republic of Guyana" (1980). 
426 Original spanish text: ‘Son deberes primordiales del Estado: […] proteger a la población de las 
amenazas contra su seguridad; y promover el bienestar general que se fundamenta en la justicia y 
en el desarrollo integral y equilibrado de la Nación’. art 44 of Peru’s Constitution (1993). 
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Colombian Constitution provides that the state ‘shall intervene in order to 
rationalize the economy with the purpose of […] the improvement of the quality of 
life of the inhabitants’, and it later adds: the state shall intervene for the sake of the 
full employment of the human resources and to ascertain that all individuals, 
especially those with a low income, may have effective access to all basic goods 
and services.’427 Finally, the Chilean Constitution cites a duty of a ‘harmonious 
integration’ of all the sectors of the Nation. 
In addition, the concept of inclusion goes beyond social and economic and 
includes political issues. This implies the recognition and integration of all groups 
that have not already been fully integrated in the society and in decision-making 
processes, such as indigenous people.428 This has also been acknowledged in the 
constitutional texts, and in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights;429 the latter has further developed the concept of previous consultation as a 
way of empowering indigenous communities to choose the destiny of their own 
lands.430 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
427 Original spanish text: ‘El Estado, de manera especial, intervendrá para dar pleno empleo a los 
recursos humanos y asegurar que todas las personas, en particular las de menores ingresos, tengan 
acceso efectivo a los bienes y servicios básicos. También para promover la productividad y la 
competitividad y el desarrollo armónico de las regiones. art 334 of Colombia’s Constitution (1991).’ 
428 ‘Access to Justice and Social Inclusion: The Road Towards Strengthening Democracy in Bolivia, 
Oea/Ser.L/V/Ii. Doc. 34’ (Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, 2007) para. 229. 
429 See for example Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador (27 Jun 2012) Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights Series C No 245 paras 159-161. 
430 See Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (31 Aug 2001) Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Series C No 79; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay. Merits, (17 Jun 2005) Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights Series C No 125; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v 
Paraguay. Merits (29 March 2006) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 146. 
Saramaka People v Suriname (28 Nov 2007) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 
172; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay (24 Aug 2010) Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series C No 214. 
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4.4.2 Contours of a South American Principle of Inclusion 
As it has been shown, the idea of inclusion is common in all the basic norms of the 
Countries of the region, either as an express and fundamental mandate for the State 
to eradicate poverty, improve life conditions and reduce inequalities, or by the 
introduction as an objective for the economic development of its citizens. 
The use of these types of constitutional clauses can be explained by the fact 
that South America has been considered as one of the most unequal regions in the 
word, and also explains that what binds the region together are not only cultural 
similarities, e.g. language, or origin, but also ‘common dramas’. However, the use 
of the described clauses on constitutions makes inclusion a legal problem because 
it creates a fundamental legal obligation that affects the way public authority should 
be exercised in the region. 
The constitutional clauses determine and limit the way that the State should 
use its institutionalised power. These constitutional norms do not provide specific 
rules for arbitrators. However, in the context of global plurality, where several legal 
regimes interact and even collide, tolerance and visibility of other types of 
authorities is necessary in order to legitimise arbitral decisions. This raises a number 
of questions of how the authority of arbitrators should interact with these provisions 
and how those fundamental norms could (or should) impact while assessing the 
responsibility of a State of the region in an investment conflict. 
In this context, three further considerations about the operational character 
of the principle of inclusion on investment arbitration are appropriate. First, the 
construction of a principle of inclusion should not be confused or used as an excuse 
by a host State for expropriation without compensation or for any other arbitrary 
act. This case will amount to an abuse of the concept, because it will turn the 
principle into a euphemism, for example for confiscation, and it will empty it of its 
content. 
Second, the principle of inclusion in investment law can be applied when 
evaluating the responsibility of a State in the merits phase of a particular case. Then, 
arbitrators could assess the proportionality431 of State conduct when deciding about 
 
 
431 See Alec Stone Sweet, "Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality's New Frontier " (2010) 4 Law 
and Ethics of Human Rights. 
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the breach of treaty provisions, and in particular the absolute standards of treatment. 
Under the inclusion paradigm, the breach of absolute standards of treatment 
contained in IIAs should be considered in the light of States’ essential obligation to 
integrate the less favoured fragments of society into social welfare systems. 
Third, regardless of the reason for the breach of an obligation, and in 
extraordinary cases, an arbitration tribunal should not impose a compensation that 
will damage the State’s capacity to fulfil its functions because in that case it would 
be sanctioning the vulnerable fragments of society. This means an extraordinary 
obligation for arbitrators to exercise self-restraint in determining the amount of 
compensation, only in cases when there is room for their discretion. In this sense, 
the assessment of the economic ‘capacity to pay’ has been already discussed by 
international adjudicators outside the region in the Eritrea - Ethiopia Claims 
Commission damages award, in the following way: 
 
The Commission also considered whether an award of compensation should be limited 
as necessary to ensure that the financial burden imposed on Eritrea would not be so 
excessive, given Eritrea’s economic condition and its capacity to pay, as seriously to 
damage Eritrea’s ability to meet its people’s basic needs. As discussed previously, 
claims of compensation in claims of this magnitude may raise significant questions at 
the intersection of the law of State responsibility and fundamental human rights […]432 
 
One example where the principle could have been used in South America 
was the Occidental v Ecuador case where the tribunal held that standards of 
treatment in the Ecuador-USA BIT had been breached. At the same time, it 
acknowledged a wrongful act on behalf of the investor: the latter had failed to obtain 
prior ministerial authorisation to transfer rights under a Participation Contract, 
reduced the amount of compensation by 25%, and justified the amount as the 
‘exercise of its wide discretion’. This was the reasoning of the tribunal: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
432 Eritrea Ethiopia Damages Claims Commission, The Hague, Final Award Ethiopia’s Damages 
Claims (17 August 2009) para 313. 
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Having considered and weighed all the arguments which the parties have presented to 
the Tribunal in respect of this issue, in particular the evidence and the authorities 
traversed in the present chapter, the Tribunal, in the exercise of its wide discretion, 
finds that, as a result of their material and significant wrongful act, the Claimants have 
contributed to the extent of 25% to the prejudice which they suffered when the 
Respondent issued the Caducidad Decree. The resulting apportionment of 
responsibility as between the Claimants and the Respondent, to wit 25% and 75%, is 
fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the present case.433 
 
It is not clear why exactly the arbitral tribunal arrived at 25%, instead of 
20%, 30%, or a different percentage. In this context, a principle of inclusion could 
at least persuade an investment tribunal to determine a more objective way and to 
consider elements that can allow for an evaluation of damages that also takes into 
account the economic reality of the host State434. For instance, the amounts of the 
budget of healthcare or education of a host country could be used as reference or 
limit in cases where, as in Occidental, arbitrators claim such wide discretion. In the 
end, wide discretion entails wide responsibility. 
 
4.5 Insertion of the South American Principles 
Construction of a regional discourse depends on a minimal accord on legal 
principles among the various South American nations, specifically between the 
different legal sectors across the region (e.g. Human Rights, Constitutional, 
commercial lawyers). In addition, even if this discourse is consolidated, a second 
challenge remains: to properly insert these principles into the international 
investment law regime. This is a crucial step, because efforts to construct this 
 
 
 
 
 
433 Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The 
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/06/11, Award (5 October 2012) para 687 
434 In a later decision, a Committee partially annulled the award and reduced the amount to be paid 
to the investor as compensation. However, this reduction was not due to the reasons expressed in 
this section. See Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company v The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/06/11, Decision On Annulment Of The 
Award (2 November 2015) para 586. 
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discourse only at the regional level might have a very reduced impact, if not 
properly overseen by investment adjudicators. 
In this context, it is possible that the insertion of principles could proceed 
along two different paths that do not preclude each other, and which can even 
proceed in parallel: (i) Conventional or external means; and (ii) Non-conventional 
or systemic internal means (i.e. arbitral process litigation). 
 
4.5.1 Conventional or External Means 
This path refers to international consent from the various South American states to 
internalize principles, and it can manifest at two levels: the inter-state level with the 
signing of new treaties, and the private-state level where state consent is expressed 
through the use of contractual clauses. 
Consent at the inter-state level refers to the creation of international norms 
that contain legal principles in relevant clauses. This does not imply the express 
need for a ‘Treaty of South American Principles for Investment’ — an idea that 
might be desirable but that could take years to materialize, like most regional efforts 
in Latin America. Instead, it refers to the insertion of principles from the South 
American Fundamental Cluster in the new international investment agreements that 
are being negotiated. 
There are several signs that indicate that a new era of South American 
treaties is approaching and leaving behind the backlash against investment 
agreements that we witnessed in the early years of the 21th century. One sign of 
this trend is that states like Argentina, despite being the state most frequently sued 
by investors, have decided to celebrate the Qatar-Argentina BIT in 2016; this is 
Argentina’s first investment agreement in more than 15 years. Another sign of this 
trend comes from countries like Brazil, which launched its own category of 
investment agreements, the so-called Cooperation and Facilitation Investment 
Agreements (CFIA)435. These types of treaties differ from traditional investment 
agreements like BITs in several respects, but most remarkably for the absence of 
private-state mechanisms such as arbitration for solving disputes. 
 
 
435 There are at least 6 CFIAs that have been negotiated between Brazil and Chile, Colombia 
Mexico, Malawi, Mozambique and Angola. See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA 
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It seems more likely that countries such as Argentina and Brazil which have 
chosen the various approaches described above, will reach agreements on the 
insertion of clauses with common principles (e.g. the principle of inclusion) than 
agreeing to a specific investment policy. For instance, the Argentina-Qatar BIT, 
incorporates a ‘right to regulate’ clause that gives states the leeway to achieve 
‘legitimate policy objectives’ while the Brazilian CFIAs also include a section to 
this effect. Principles from the fundamental cluster, such as the inclusion principle, 
could help to better define the limits of investment agreements, and at the same time 
will establish a practice that may influence other countries in Latin America when 
they draw up new treaties. 
However, it has to be acknowledged that this path involves external reforms 
to the regime and meaningful change could take years to materialize, while new 
treaties undergo a long process of negotiation and ratification by local parliaments. 
For instance, it is not known when the new Argentina-Qatar BIT and the Brazilian 
CFIAs described in this section will be duly ratified, and therefore it could also be 
years (if ever) before they are applied in a concrete case of adjudication. 
Within this path, another level of use is the private-state level, where a South 
American State could insert principles into contractual clauses. The use of this level 
also has its shortcomings, because a large proportion of investment arbitration 
arises from the breach of standards contained in international treaties, and in this 
sense the impact of contractual clauses will be limited to establishing the 
contractual responsibility of the state. 
 
4.5.2 Systemic Internal Means 
A challenge for the second path which uses insertion of principles is to internalize 
them during the process of adjudication, so they are visible to arbitrators in already 
existent disputes. Undoubtedly, this represents an elaborate enterprise, because it 
implies building concrete legal arguments based on the public law principles of the 
nation state involved in the dispute. 
This path provides an option that could affect the outcome of future cases 
while avoiding the need to wait for an massive external reform of international 
investment agreements. As mentioned above, it could take years before new treaties 
provide a basis for investment disputes, and in the meantime, investment cases will 
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pile up in the region even in states that have not been sued in the past (e.g. 
Colombia).436 
Internal means can be used to methodologically incorporate South 
American principles in the legal arguments prepared both by respondent states and 
investors in the same arbitral proceedings. The use of public law principles has been 
a core argument in new approaches to international investment law for the last ten 
years437, but a criticism of these approaches is that they could fall into ‘euro-centric 
comparativism’438. This criticism refers to the fact that an extraction of some of the 
‘general’ principles of law applied in investment arbitration (e.g. legitimate 
expectations) are in fact the outcome of principles most widely used in certain 
jurisdictions. 
In this sense, there might be a place in both an academic and practical sense 
for the regional legal discourse explained in this chapter, but only if we avoid two 
related pitfalls. First, the principles discourse needs to distance itself from those 
very critical stances that tend to reduce the legal world to ‘colonizer-colonized’ 
dichotomies439, missing the complexity of the normative developments that have 
taken place in recent years. Second, a closely related issue: avoiding the perception 
that the principles-discourse approach is either ‘pro-state’ or ‘pro investor’ since 
this polarization will immediately prevent its acceptance. 
 
 
 
 
 
436 See the ICSID cases of Colombia against: América Móvil S.A.B (ARB(AF)/16/5); Glencore 
International A.G. and C.I. Prodeco S.A. (ARB/16/6); and Eco Oro Minerals Corp. (ARB/16/41) 
437   Most notably see Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public 
Law (Oxford Univ. Press 2010), Benedict; Schill Stephan  Kingsbur, "Investor-State Arbitration as 
Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global 
Administrative Law", (2009) Institute of International Law and Justicem Working Paper 2009/6 
Global Administrative Law Series. 
438 In this regard, see the criticism in José E. Alvarez, "‘Beware: Boundary Crossings’ – a Critical 
Appraisal of Public Law Approaches to International Investment Law", (2016) 17 The Journal of 
World Investment & amp; Trade. 220 
439 See an analysis of this dynamic in  Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below 
Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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With these caveats in mind, the use of South-American principles does not 
imply that they need be internalized only by respondent states, because they could 
also be invoked and internalized by investors in order to strengthen certain legal 
claims and arguments. As has been noted, the manifest arbitrariness or abuse of 
power of one state against an economic enterprise — whether it is national or 
foreign-owned — should be illegal. This is not only because the nature of this 
enterprise will have been determined by previous decisions taken by a group of 
arbitrators, who discussed the meaning of ambiguous words such as ‘fair’ and 
‘equitable’, but also because it contravenes the fundamental public law of South 
American host states as specified both in their constitutions and in the Inter- 
American System of Human Rights. 
In addition, inserting principles such as ‘inclusion’ in legal arguments, 
requires an analysis of proportionality. This implies that when an arbitral tribunal 
scrutinizes an action that is claimed to be ‘illegal’, it must do so using a public law 
methodology. In other words, proportionality analysis allows for the resolution of 
conflicts  between  principles  that  have  the  same  normative  hierarchy.  Unlike 
constitutional adjudication where principles hold the same abstract value, the use 
of proportionality in investment conflicts implies that arbitrators have to resolve 
legal conflicts between standards of treatment contained in Investment Agreements, 
and the fundamental public law of the state that is used to justify a specific action. 
Therefore, it has to be acknowledged that, on the one hand, insertion of a 
principles discourse using an analysis of proportionality runs the risk of conferring 
wider authority on arbitrators, but, on the other hand, it could prove an effective 
legal tool to mediate complex normative conflicts in the absence of the capacity to 
make a structural external reform in the short term. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Investment arbitrators no longer solve disputes, but instead exercise a unique type 
of public authority in the global legal space. It is true that disputes arising from 
foreign investments are not new in international law; in fact, they have occurred 
ever since the first treaties, such as the treaty of Munster, were signed in the current 
era. However, with the Abs-Shawcross Draft and the first BIT between Germany 
and Pakistan in 1959, a new regime emerged. And in 1991, after AAPL vs. Sri 
Lanka, the first arbitration case, was decided, this regime took a new turn. For the 
first time, a new type of public authority emerged from within the investment 
regime itself to address conflicts unlike those of previous centuries, which usually 
centered exclusively on matters arising from expropriations. 
Traditionally, the nation-state enjoyed a monopoly on the use of force to 
back  up  its  authority  and  enforce  decisions.  By  contrast,  today’s  investment 
arbitrators make decisions but lack the use of force to enforce them. However, they 
do possess a legal authority that can effectively restrain the actions of a state. This 
authority is manifested in two ways. First, it allows arbitrators to review the 
lawfulness of any act (or omission) of the public power by any of the branches of 
the state when a dispute arises in light of an IIA. If an evaluation establishes that an 
act has been unlawful, the investment arbitrator has the capacity to demand that a 
sum be payed in compensation. Second, this award can impact future cases brought 
forward by any party in the system, even in the absence of a formal system of 
precedents or connections between cases. It can be said that formally an investment 
tribunal cannot derogate a law or declare an administrative act void, but it can 
impose considerable costs on the state, which then limits that state’s freedom to act. 
That investment arbitrators can exercise this type of authority implies legal, 
sociological and moral challenges to their legitimacy. In traditional international 
commercial arbitration, the very fact that parties consent to submit their dispute to 
an impartial arbitrator is enough to legitimize his role. By contrast, in investment 
arbitration, the power granted to arbitrators is so far-reaching that its legitimization 
becomes more complex, since this power co-exists alongside the powers of the 
states and other international adjudicators. 
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The tensions generated by this type of authority operating outside the state 
has led to two types of response from South American societies. The first involves 
trying to restore the absolute authority of the state, in accordance with the postulates 
of the Calvo doctrine. However, it has been argued that this response is hard to 
implement, and can undermine other regional efforts such as the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights. The second scenario represents an effort at reform, in 
which, among other measures, development-friendly clauses are inserted into new 
treaties and other bodies are created for the adjudication of disputes. While most of 
these reforms will help to construct a more robust system, they require time to 
implement, and during this time dozens of new cases will be brought forward by 
investors. In this context, the present research explored a third scenario. Under this 
scenario, the legitimacy of international investment law is achieved from a 
systemic-internal perspective. This makes it possible to couple global and regional 
interests within the development of a legal discourse based on principles for 
investment. 
It is possible to construct a discourse with these characteristics for South 
America in two steps. First, by creating a minimal accord on legal principles among 
the various South American nations, but most importantly among the different legal 
sectors that cut across the regions (e.g. Human Rights, Constitutional, and 
Commercial lawyers). The second step involves the insertion of these principles in 
the international investment law regime, using either: (i) Conventional methods, 
including both inter-state, (i.e. treaties) and private-state (i.e. contractual clauses); 
or (ii) Systemic methods (i.e. arbitral process litigation). 
Previously, a framework to fulfil the first step —the development of a South 
American discursive legal approach to deal with international investment law— 
was provided by grouping three clusters of principles: (i) general investment 
principles, establishing due process and the right to access justice which serves to 
increase the acceptance of awards, (ii) intermediate principles, where an emerging 
concept of seguridad jurídica (legal certainty) could be further analysed, and (iii) 
fundamental legitimation principles, including the principle of transparency as the 
exercise of the rights of freedom of expression and access to information, and a 
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principle of inclusion, that can be used by the same arbitrators to assess the 
proportionality of any state majeure. 
The proposed framework does not by any means claim to solve all of the 
legitimacy problems or deficits that have been attributed to international investment 
arbitration, since there are several other issues that can be handled using the same 
systemic internal perspective, such as the codes of conduct for arbitrators. Instead, 
it seeks to a) challenge the way that South American nations usually think about 
these issues and b) set the path for inter-systemic options of reform. 
In this quest, it may be useful to reference Carlos Calvo: not his 
fundamentals of 1867, but rather his approach to developing a strong conceptual 
framework that could be understood by everyone. That is the function that 
principles should have; they must allow non-legal experts in society to engage in 
meaningful public debate. Finally, this regional principles approach to investment 
can work as a legal bridge between the logic internal to international investment 
law regime and the social and political reality faced by South America populations, 
which is still characterized by a considerable inequality gap. 
In the current context of global uncertainty with debates on ‘parochialism’ 
vs. ‘universalism’, ‘fragmentation’ vs. ‘pluralism’ and where academic lines 
between legal terms such as ‘public’ and ‘private’ are becoming blurred, there is a 
need for South American societies —in states that have neither economic, political 
nor military power at their disposal— to more closely embrace rather than to 
antagonize the law. This is the core message this in-depth analysis seeks to 
communicate. 
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